IN RE BRIAN LAMAR LINDSEY MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of O.N.L., E.J.G. III, and L.D.G.,
Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 16, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 234811
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-026960-NA
TINA RENEA LINDSEY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
EDDIE JAMES GREGORY,
Respondent.
In the Matter of J.M.L., Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 234812
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-026961-NA
TINA RENEA LINDSEY,
Respondent-Appellant.
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In the Matter of B.L.L., Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 234813
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-026962-NA
TINA RENEA LINDSEY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
OTIS BUTTERFIELD,
Respondent.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Sawyer and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to the minor children pursuant to
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (j) and (l). Respondent now appeals and we affirm.
At the beginning of the termination hearing, the parties offered a stipulation under which
respondent would admit to certain allegations in the petition and that her parental rights would be
terminated; however, the termination order would be held in abeyance to allow respondent an
opportunity to abide by certain conditions under the stipulation and thereafter have the
termination order set aside. This is similar to the procedure employed in In re Adrianson, 105
Mich App 300; 306 NW2d 487 (1981). The trial court rejected the stipulation, concluding that
by statute it was obligated to terminate respondent’s parental rights once the grounds for
termination were established unless the trial court found that it was not in the best interests of the
children to terminate the parental rights. The termination hearing proceeded and the trial court
ultimately found that the grounds for termination existed and terminated respondent’s parental
rights.
Respondent’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to accept
the stipulation. We disagree. Respondent directs us to no authority which states that a trial court
is obligated to accept a stipulation. In fact, a trial court is not obligated to accept a stipulation.
See In re Finlay Estate, 430 Mich 590, 595; 424 NW2d 272 (1988) (a court is not required to
accept the parties’ stipulation of law); Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 21; 614 NW2d 183
(2000) (trial court not permitted to “blindly accept” a stipulation regarding the best interests of
the child in a child custody case).
-2-
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
-3-
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