MICHAEL LANE V CITY OF RIVERVIEW
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL LANE,
UNPUBLISHED
April 16, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227374
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-832057-NZ
CITY OF RIVERVIEW,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Wilder and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s order denying its motion for
summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim under the persons with disabilities civil rights act
(PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.1 We reverse.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a heavy equipment operator at the city landfill.
Plaintiff began to have problems with his right elbow in 1995, and was subsequently diagnosed
with epicondylitis and underwent physical therapy. Plaintiff returned to work and did not inform
defendant of any restrictions, but was unable to operate most of the heavy equipment. The
landfill’s lead operator assigned plaintiff to light “floater” tasks from approximately May 1996
until the end of the year. On February 19, 1997, plaintiff was placed on a work restriction, which
called for no repetitive motion of his right arm. The landfill director determined that plaintiff
would have to resume the other duties of a heavy equipment operator. Plaintiff could not operate
all the heavy equipment and was unable to continue working without the light duty assignments.
Plaintiff brought this action, alleging he was handicapped and unlawfully discriminated against
when defendant refused to accommodate him by allowing him to perform light duties as the
landfill’s “floater.” Defendant’s subsequent motion for summary disposition was denied by the
trial court.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary
disposition. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In reviewing a
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions,
admissions or any other documentary evidence submitted in a light most favorable to the
1
The PWDCRA was formerly known as the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff’s claim
was originally filed under that former title.
-1-
nonmoving party to decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Ritchie-Gamester v
City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999); Rollert v Dep’t of Civil Service, 228
Mich App 534, 536; 579 NW2d 118 (1998). All reasonable inferences are resolved in the
nonmoving party’s favor. Hampton v Waste Mgt of MI, Inc, 236 Mich App 598, 602; 601 NW2d
172 (1999).
To establish a prima facie case under the PWDCRA, plaintiff must establish that (1) he is
disabled as defined by the PWDCRA,2 (2) his disability is unrelated to his ability to perform the
duties of a particular job, and (3) he was discriminated against in one of the ways described in
the statute. Kerns v Dura Mechanical Components, Inc, 242 Mich App 1, 12; 618 NW2d 56
(2000), citing Rollert, supra at 538. For a disability to be unrelated to an individual’s ability to
perform, the disability, with or without accommodation, must not prevent the individual from
performing the duties of a particular job or position. MCL 37.1103(l)(i).
Plaintiff has the burden of coming forward with evidence from which a factfinder could
reasonably infer that his physical impairment affected his ability to perform the normal activities
of daily living. Lown v JJ Eaton Place, 235 Mich App 721, 734; 598 NW2d 633 (1999).
Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is determined in
light of (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or expected
duration, and (3) its permanent or expected permanent or long-term effect. An
impairment that interferes with an individual’s ability to do a particular job, but
does not significantly decrease that individual’s ability to obtain satisfactory
employment elsewhere, does not substantially limit the major life activity of
working. [Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc, 220 Mich App 212, 218; 559 NW2d 61
(1996) (citations omitted)].
Here, plaintiff has not produced evidence that establishes the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the existence of a disability.3 At most, plaintiff has shown that his
2
MCL 37.1103(d)(i)(A) provides:
Except as provided under subdivision (f), "disability" means 1 or more of the
following:
(i) A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual,
which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional
disorder, if the characteristic:
(A) For purposes of article 2, substantially limits 1 or more of the major
life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual's ability to
perform the duties of a particular job or position or substantially limits 1 or more
of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual's
qualifications for employment or promotion.
3
We reject plaintiff’s argument that this particular issue is unpreserved. Defendant argued in its
motion for summary disposition that plaintiff was not handicapped and could not establish a
prima facie case under the statute. Plaintiff’s response to the motion claimed that plaintiff was
handicapped within the definition of the statute. The trial court’s order denying defendant’s
(continued…)
-2-
impairment interfered with his ability to work as a heavy equipment operator. Although plaintiff
claims in his brief on appeal that epicondylitis is permanent in nature and significantly restricts
his ability to use his arm, he has not presented evidence of such impairment. The report of Dr.
R.H. Poling, which plaintiff introduced below describes plaintiff’s condition and treatment
between December 1995 and March 1996, but does not indicate the duration of impairment or
any long-term effect. Neither plaintiff’s deposition nor any medical record provides evidence of
duration or permanency. It is not enough for plaintiff to suggest that he will present evidence of
his impairment at trial. See Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314
(1996), and Karbel v Comerica Bank, 247 Mich App 90, 97; 635NW2d 69 (2001) (stating that
when the burden of proof at trial would rest on the party opposing the motion for summary
disposition, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but
must, by documentary evidence, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial). Under these circumstances, plaintiff has not shown that his alleged impairment
substantially limits a major life activity. Lown, supra; Stevens, supra.
Further, plaintiff cannot establish that his alleged disability is not related to his ability to
perform his job as a heavy equipment operator. Plaintiff testified at deposition that the “floater”
position is a recognized position at the landfill and as the employee with the most seniority, he
was entitled to the position. The affidavit of the landfill’s former lead operator, Michael Jones,
supports plaintiff’s claim that he was entitled to work as the “floater.” The city’s official job
description for “heavy equipment operator” lists several duties involving eight separate pieces of
equipment. Among those duties are operation of the sweeper and water wagon, which plaintiff
performed under Jones’ supervision. The city’s job description further states that “all
incumbents may not perform all duties.” Given that evidence, there is an issue of fact regarding
whether the “floater” position exists and whether plaintiff was entitled to the position.
Significantly, however, there is no evidence to suggest that the light duties performed by
plaintiff while serving as the “floater” are the only duties required to be performed by the
landfill’s “floater.” Instead, the undisputed evidence indicates the tasks plaintiff performed as
the “floater” under Jones’ supervision were less than full-time duties. Plaintiff testified at
deposition that “[t]he landfill basically had no light-duty work” and that Jones “was helping him
out” by assigning him light tasks. Plaintiff acknowledged that other employees complained
because he was getting light assignments. According to the affidavit of Jones’ successor,
Rawson Beals, the tasks performed by plaintiff during the period Jones gave plaintiff light duty
assignments were not full-time tasks. The sweeper and water wagon, the only two essential
pieces of equipment that plaintiff operated, were not operated on a full-time basis. Beals claimed
the sweeper was not operated in winter months. Beals also claimed there is no need for a landfill
employee to take care of supplies in the tool room or to do paperwork.4 Beals recalled that
(…continued)
motion states: “Adopt plaintiff’s brief and oral argument as the basis for my decision.” Thus, the
issue whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact in
regard to his alleged disability was raised and addressed below. Consequently, the issue was
preserved for our review. Miller v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co, 218 Mich App 221, 235; 553
NW2d 371 (1996).
4
We note that Jones’ affidavit claims the “floater” position involves the duties that were
performed by plaintiff. However, neither Jones nor any other witness indicated that the tasks
(continued…)
-3-
during the time Jones was giving plaintiff light assignments, when a landfill employee was
absent, heavy equipment operators other than plaintiff would be required to work overtime to
cover for the missing employee.5
We conclude that while there was evidence that the “floater” position exists and the most
senior employee is entitled to that position, there is no evidence that plaintiff could perform the
essential functions of that job on a full-time basis. Plaintiff essentially seeks to have his job as
heavy equipment operator restructured due to his alleged impairment, which defendant is not
obligated to do.
Because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the PWDCRA, the trial court
erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition. In light of our disposition, we
need not address defendant’s remaining issues.
Reversed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
(…continued)
performed by plaintiff were the only tasks required of the “floater.”
5
We note that the term “floater” suggests that the individual filling the position have the ability
to be placed in any position at the landfill depending on day-to-day need. It is undisputed that
plaintiff was unable to operate all the equipment at the landfill.
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
