JOHN SWIDE V VERLA J LINTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN SWIDE and JOAN SWIDE,
UNPUBLISHED
April 16, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellants/CrossAppellees,
v
No. 223354
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 97-003339-CH
VERLA J. LINTON,
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Murphy and Hoekstra, JJ.
HOEKSTRA, J., (concurring and dissenting).
Respectfully, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the equitable doctrine of
clean hands precludes defendant from any recovery for improvements that she made to the
property. It is undisputable that defendant’s agreement violated rules promulgated under the
Adult Foster Care Facility Licensing Act, MCL 400.701 et. seq. However, my review of the
agreement between defendant and the now-deceased property owner does not persuade me that it
was one-sided or unconscionable in its basic nature. At the time defendant made the agreement
to obtain the property, she was providing $800.00 per month worth of adult foster care and
receiving payments of $616.50 per month. The agreement called for her to provide lifetime care,
and to pay the expenses of his funeral, back taxes on the property, and all costs associated with
the transfer. Relative to the net value of the property, I cannot say that this agreement, on its
face, amounts to inequitable conduct or bad faith. Further, I do not believe that every violation
of a regulatory rule such as the one that defendant violated automatically requires that a court
invoke the clean hands doctrine. On balance, it is my opinion that application of the doctrine is
inappropriate on the facts of this case.
Nevertheless, I believe that plaintiffs are entitled to partial relief under MCR 3.411. Of
the three grounds for awarding defendant compensation, I find no lawful basis on which the trial
court could award compensation for the difference between what plaintiffs paid and what the
court and plaintiffs deemed the property was worth, and for the funeral costs that defendant paid.
Therefore, I would concur with the majority that defendant is not entitled to those awards.
However, I find that the property taxes paid by defendant were an improvement within the
meaning of MCR 3.411, and thus the trial court properly awarded compensation for her payment
of them.
-1-
With regard to the cross-appeal, I join with the majority opinion.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
-2-
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