PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL R WILLSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224823
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 99-004468
MICHAEL R. WILLSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder,
MCL 750.316, second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, assault with intent to commit murder,
MCL 750.83, and three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(c), (e)
and (f). He was sentenced to life imprisonment for each of the murder convictions and to forty
to sixty years’ imprisonment for each of the remaining convictions, all sentences to be served
concurrently. We vacate defendant’s second-degree murder conviction and one of the firstdegree CSC convictions, but affirm in all other respects.
I. Prosecutorial misconduct
Defendant argues that misconduct by the prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial. In those
instances where defendant did not object to the challenged conduct, we review the issue for plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613
NW2d 370 (2000). This requires a showing that a clear or obvious error prejudiced defendant,
i.e., affected the outcome of the proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764, 774;
597 NW2d 130 (1999). Defendant bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. Id.
Otherwise, questions of misconduct by the prosecutor are decided case-by-case. On review, this
Court examines the pertinent portion of the record and evaluates the prosecutor’s remarks in
context to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v
Legrone, 205 Mich App 77, 82-83; 517 NW2d 270 (1994).
A. Comments about the DNA evidence
Defendant argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to remark that it was probable
that the blood of both victims was on the jacket because no such conclusion was warranted based
on the evidence. Defendant did not object to this remark below.
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A prosecutor may not make a statement of fact to the jury that is unsupported by the
evidence, but he is free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they
relate to his theory of the case. Schutte, supra at 721.
Here, we agree that comments suggesting that it was probable that the blood of both
victims was on the jacket were improper, given that there was no evidence concerning
probabilities that this was the case. See People v Coy, 243ch App 283, 296-303; 620 NW2d 888
(2000). However, the error was not outcome determinative considering the other evidence in the
case and the defense theory that defendant did not participate in the offenses.
Defendant also complains about the prosecutor’s remarks in rebuttal, to which he
objected. While the prosecutor’s remark was not based on the evidence, it was responsive to
defendant’s argument in summation. Considered in this context, the remark does not require
reversal. Schutte, supra at 721. Further, the brief remark did not deny defendant a fair trial
because the court instructed the jury that the attorney’s statements were not evidence and that it
was to base its decision only on the evidence. People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 671; 509
NW2d 885 (1993).
B. Shifting of the burden of proof
We disagree with defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of
proof. Where a defendant testifies at trial or advances, either explicitly or implicitly, an alternate
theory of the case that, if true, would exonerate the defendant, comment on the validity of the
alternate theory cannot be said to shift the burden of proof. People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 115;
538 NW2d 356 (1995). Although a defendant has no burden to produce any evidence, once the
defendant advances evidence or a theory, argument on the inferences created does not shift the
burden of proof. Id.
Here, the prosecutor was merely commenting on the validity of defendant’s theory and
did not shift the burden of proof. By offering a defense that was contingent on his credibility,
defendant invited arguments by the prosecutor about the validity and weight of the evidence in
support of his theory. Id. at 118.
C. Misrepresentation of the element of premeditation
Defendant argues that the prosecutor used a faulty analogy to illustrate the concept of
premeditation. There was no objection to the prosecutor’s remarks during voir dire or
summation in which the prosecutor discussed the concept of premeditation. While the example
used by the prosecutor may not have exactly comported with the law, any error was not outcome
determinative because the court properly instructed the jury on the concept of premeditation and
deliberation and directed the jury to base its verdict on its instructions. Moreover, we disagree
that the prosecutor erred by suggesting that defendant had conceded the element of premeditation
because defendant did in fact suggest that he was not contesting that element of the crimes.
D. Remark about victim’s intuition
Defendant complains that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence by commenting on
the victim’s intuition. Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s remarks at trial. It is
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apparent that the prosecutor was merely arguing the evidence and all reasonable inferences
arising from it as they related to his theory of the case, and properly responding to the defense
arguments. Schutte, supra at 721. Plain error has not been shown.
E. Use of the gruesome photograph
At trial, the prosecutor questioned defendant about its exhibit 10, a picture depicting the
crime scene. On appeal, defendant complains that the prosecutor made an improper appeal to
sympathy, People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 104; 351 NW2d 255 (1984), when he repeatedly
questioned defendant about what he saw in it and then, in summation, told the jury that the
reasons for asking these questions were to see if defendant recognized his “signature” on the
photo and/or whether he saw his own work.
Defendant did not object below. Considered in context, the prosecutor was merely
arguing that defendant was the perpetrator. The remarks were not an improper appeal for
sympathy.
F. Violation of the court’s sequestration order
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor violated the trial court’s sequestration order by
failing to have some of his witnesses leave the courtroom before his opening statement. Even
assuming that the sequestration order was violated, defendant has not shown that he was
deprived of a fair trial. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial in connection
with this issue, noting the lack of apparent prejudice to defendant. People v Griffis, 218 Mich
App 95, 100; 553 NW2d 642 (1996). On appeal, defendant does not indicate what witnesses the
opening statement improperly influenced, nor has he shown how he was prejudiced by the
witness’ presence during opening statement.
In sum, defendant has not sustained his claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
II. Double Jeopardy
A double jeopardy issue presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal.
People v Clark, 243 Mich App 424, 429; 622 NW2d 344 (2000). However, because defendant
did not raise this issue below, we review the issue for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. Carines, supra at 774.
A. The murder convictions
The double jeopardy guarantees in the federal and state constitutions protect a defendant
from multiple punishments for the same offense. Clark, supra at 429. Multiple murder
convictions arising from the death of a single victim violate double jeopardy. Id. Because the
judgment of sentence reflects that defendant was convicted and sentenced for both first-degree
murder and second-degree murder for the death of a single victim, we vacate the second-degree
murder conviction and affirm the first-degree murder conviction. Id. at 429-430.
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B. The criminal sexual conduct convictions
Defendant also claims a double jeopardy violation because of the multiple criminal
sexual conduct convictions. One sexual penetration, even if accompanied by more than one of
the aggravating circumstances listed in MCL 750.520b, may give rise to only one conviction and
sentence. People v Johnson, 406 Mich 320, 330-331, 279 NW2d 534 (1979). However, where
there is more than one penetration, each may be punished separately. People v Dowdy, 148 Mich
App 517, 521; 384 NW2d 820 (1986).
Here, there was evidence at trial that defendant penetrated the victim twice, once while
on the couch and once while on the chair. On appeal, defendant acknowledges that the jury
could have found two penetrations (emphasis supplied by defendant), but complains that it
cannot be determined from the record whether the jury actually found that multiple penetrations
were committed because (1) the issue of multiple penetrations was not specifically brought to the
jury’s attention by the court or prosecutor; (2) the jury “was never instructed to convict for each
instance of penetration it found”; and (3) the verdict does not clarify whether defendant effected
penetration twice.1 However, because defendant did not raise this issue below with an
appropriate objection to the court’s instructions or verdict, we review this issue for plain error.
Because, factually, there was evidence of two separate penetrations and, legally, a defendant may
be convicted and punished for each separate act of penetration, defendant has failed to show that
allowing two of the CSC convictions to stand would constitute plain error. However, because
defendant was convicted of three separate counts of penetration and because there was evidence
of only two penetrations at trial, we agree that one of defendant’s CSC convictions must be
vacated as being violative of double jeopardy.
We vacate defendant's second-degree murder conviction and one of the first-degree
criminal sexual conduct convictions, and affirm in all other respects.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
Defendant’s brief, p 34.
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