PEOPLE OF MI V GUADALUPE RUIZ MEYER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 15, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 225332
Hillsdale Circuit Court
LC No. 99-238531
GUADALUPE RUIZ MEYER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Markey and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree child abuse, MCL
750.136b(2). She appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that she was deprived of her constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel. Generally, a successful claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel requires a defendant to show that his or her attorney’s representation deviated from an
objective standard of reasonableness, resulting in the denial of a fair trial. People v Toma, 462
Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s actions
constituted sound trial strategy under the circumstances. Id., 302. A defendant must
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Id., 302-303, quoting People v Mitchell, 454 Mich
145, 167; 560 NW2d 600 (1997).
In support of defendant’s contention that she was deprived of her constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, she notes a number of specific instances where she believes that
her trial counsel’s performance deviated from objective standards of reasonableness. She also
notes that, even if these instances do not individually constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,
taken together, they indicate that trial counsel’s overall performance was deficient. In reviewing
defendant’s contentions, we have examined both the trial record and the record of the evidentiary
hearing on this question conducted by the trial court pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich
436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). We will consider each of defendant’s allegations of unprofessional
conduct separately.
Defendant argues that trial counsel ineffectively conducted jury voir dire because he
failed to inquire whether any jurors had family members who were treated by a physician who
appeared as an expert witness for the prosecution. The record demonstrates, however, that the
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trial court had already asked this very question of the prospective jurors, and received no
affirmative responses; therefore, trial counsel’s failure to repeat this question demonstrates not
ineffectiveness but attentiveness. Defendant argues that counsel was also ineffective with
respect to the voir dire in failing to follow through on the question as to whether any prospective
jurors had children. This argument misapprehends the reason for counsel’s concern as to
whether jurors had children; indeed, he testified at the Ginther hearing that his trial strategy was
to convince the jury that defendant’s conduct was legitimate parental discipline and he believed
parents would be more receptive to this argument than non-parents. Moreover, trial counsel
testified that he wanted a representative mix of parents and non-parents on the jury panel. This
approach represented legitimate trial strategy, and did not constitute ineffective assistance.
Toma, supra at 302.
Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to try to weaken the
credibility of a nurse, who testified that defendant arrived at the hospital some time after the
ambulance carrying decedent, by suggesting that she was too busy performing resuscitation to
notice when defendant arrived. At the Ginther hearing, defense counsel testified that he believed
a jury would not think it unreasonable for a parent with a number of other small children to care
for to be somewhat delayed in proceeding to the hospital because she would have to arrange for
the necessary childcare. We are not persuaded that this was an unreasonable trial strategy.
Defendant also directs our attention to four instances where trial counsel failed to object
or failed to pursue evidentiary objections. For example, defendant references trial counsel’s
failure to object, on hearsay grounds, to a physician’s testimony regarding a statement defendant
made to her. However, as the trial court correctly noted at the Ginther hearing, the statement
was offered as that of a party-opponent, and was not inadmissible. MRE 801(d)(2). It is well
established that trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to advocate a meritless position. People
v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Another alleged error occurred when trial counsel objected to the admission of certain
photographs, without first requesting the sequestration of the jury. At the Ginther hearing, trial
counsel testified that he was taken by surprise by the attempt to present photographs because he
thought his objections to the photographs were already on record, and was focusing on the
immediate need to deal with an unforeseen circumstance rather than with the presence of the
jury. The trial court found both his surprise and his reaction to have been understandable
because there had been a substitution of prosecuting attorneys. We agree. Therefore, we do not
believe that trial counsel’s conduct deviated from an objective standard of reasonableness.
Moreover, as the trial court found at the Ginther hearing, no serious prejudice occurred, because
the trial court excused the jury sua sponte as soon as counsel began his objection. Finally, we
note that defendant could not have been prejudiced because the photographs were ultimately
admitted; therefore, any prejudice caused by hearing a brief reference to what the photographs
depicted was subsumed by the jury seeing the actual photographs. Consequently, there is no
possibility that, but for counsel’s conduct, the result would have been different, thereby
precluding a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Toma, supra at 302-303.4.
The remaining two issues involving evidentiary objections deal with trial counsel’s
withdrawal of objections to testimony by a law enforcement witness. In both of these instances,
trial counsel simply declined to persevere in objections that were, upon further consideration,
groundless. Moreover, his objections had already effectively been overruled by the time he
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withdrew them. His withdrawal of these objections after realizing that they had no basis did not
constitute ineffective assistance. See Snider, supra at 425.
Defendant alleges another error by counsel with respect to the officer’s testimony about
the wrongfulness of tying children down. She asserts that counsel should have cross-examined
the officer to elicit an admission that there might be limited circumstances where doing so is
acceptable. Defense counsel testified at the Ginther hearing, however, that he had an “instinct”
that the officer, who had already testified that tying a person down is never right, would not
make this admission. We are not persuaded that defendant has overcome the presumption that
this was legitimate trial strategy. Toma, supra at 302.
Defendant raises several concerns regarding the lack of medical testimony put forward in
her defense. She notes that an emergency medical technician witness was unable to testify
regarding the propriety of the actions taken by the emergency medical technicians because trial
counsel did not discover that the witness was only certified in Maryland and precluded from
testifying as an expert witness. We agree that there is little excuse for defense counsel not
anticipating this issue. As the trial court correctly found, however, the conduct of the emergency
medical technicians was insignificant in the overall context of the trial. Indeed, there was expert
testimony that the victim had thirty-one injuries, excluding those that may have been caused by
medical professionals. Moreover, there was expert testimony that most of these injuries
appeared to be several days old. Accordingly, we do not believe that this one instance of
unprofessional conduct was outcome determinative. Toma, supra at 302.
Defendant also complains that counsel failed to cross-examine a medical expert
concerning the possibility that the child was diabetic and failed to present expert medical
testimony that his bruises could have had a cause other than child abuse. However, there was
direct and apparently incontrovertible testimony from the forensic pathologist who examined the
child that an examination of the organs that secrete insulin showed that he was not diabetic.
Counsel also testified at the Ginther hearing that he did not pursue these defenses because there
was no factual basis for them, and that he had to resist considerable pressure from defendant and
her husband to “manufacture” defenses. We note that, not only are counsel not required, in order
to be effective, to put forward meritless defenses, but that they are prohibited by the rules of
professional conduct from doing so. MRPC 3.3; Snider, supra at 425. Accordingly, trial counsel
was not ineffective in abiding by this professional obligation.
Defendant also asserts that counsel failed to follow through on all of the witness leads
that he was given. Her husband testified at the Ginther hearing to this effect, and also testified
that counsel told him that the court had limited him to calling only five witnesses. Defense
counsel contradicted these statements in his testimony, and the trial court found defendant’s
husband’s testimony not to be credible. In fact, defense counsel presented eleven witnesses for
the defense, and asserts that he made considered judgments not to call certain witnesses after
interviewing them and determining that their testimony would not be helpful. In addition, he
was unable to call certain other witnesses because defendant provided him incomplete contact
information. Accordingly, we find no basis for ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.
Finally, defendant asserts that counsel was ill at the onset of trial, and presented the
testimony of two witnesses that he had complained of feeling ill. At the Ginther hearing, trial
counsel denied having been ill, and the trial court believed him. In any event, counsel’s
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performance can only be evaluated by an objective standard. Measured by that standard, it is
clear on a review of the record that his performance was zealous and skillful. He cross-examined
prosecution witnesses assiduously, offered numerous evidentiary objections, a number of which
were sustained, as was his objection to a jury instruction requested by the prosecution, presented
the evidence of the eleven witnesses he called for the defense, and presented a cogent opening
statement and forceful closing argument. As such, we believe that defense counsel’s overall
performance did not deviate from objective standards of reasonableness. Nor are we persuaded
that, but for the one aforementioned instance of unprofessional conduct, the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. Indeed, there was strong evidence of defendant’s guilt.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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