PEOPLE OF MI V DANIEL LEROY WARNOCK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 1, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227965
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-168921-FC
DANIEL LEROY WARNOCK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Markey and K.F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MCL
750.529, assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, assault with intent to rob while
armed, MCL 750.89, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and four counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to
concurrent prison terms of nine to fifty years for the conspiracy conviction, 10-1/2 to 50 years
each for the assault with intent to commit murder and assault with intent to rob while armed
convictions, and five to twenty years for the first-degree home invasion conviction, those
sentences to be served consecutive to four concurrent two-year terms for the felony-firearm
convictions. He appeals by right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor and several codefendant witnesses, who
testified for the prosecution, deliberately misled the jury with regard to whether the codefendants
testified in exchange for lenient charges or sentences. This issue was not preserved with an
appropriate objection at trial; therefore, we review it for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). We find
no plain error requiring reversal.
Prosecutors have a duty to correct false evidence and may not knowingly use false
evidence to obtain a conviction. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 417; 633 NW2d 376
(2001), lv pending, quoting People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 277; 591 NW2d 267 (1998).
The duty to correct applies to testimony relating to the facts of the case and to testimony
affecting the credibility of witnesses. Lester, supra at 277.
[D]ue process is offended where a prosecutor, although not having
solicited false testimony from a state witness, allows it to stand uncorrected when
it appears. This rule applies even where the false testimony goes only to
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credibility. Failure to correct false testimony requires reversal if the false
testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the
jury. [People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 568; 496 NW2d 336 (1992) (citations
omitted).]
Alleged errors must be reviewed to determine whether the prosecutor allowed false testimony to
pass uncorrected. See Lester, supra at 278.
In this case, three codefendant witnesses testified that they did not receive promises of
leniency in exchange for their testimony. Defendant speculates that there must have been
promises made or bargained for in exchange for the testimony. He accuses the prosecution of
eliciting false testimony and allowing this false testimony to stand. The record does not support
this argument; it is based only on defendant’s speculation. We will not grant defendant a new
trial based on speculation that the prosecution allowed false testimony to stand and deliberately
misled the jury. In Herndon, supra at 417-418, a panel of this Court rejected an argument that
the prosecutor elicited false testimony where the record did not support that the testimony at
issue was false or that the prosecutor knew there was false testimony. We find that the record in
this case does not lead to the conclusion that the testimony of the codefendants was false or that
the prosecutor deliberately misled the jury with regard to whether promises were made in
exchange for the testimony.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly admitted prior bad-acts evidence in
violation of MRE 404(b). This issue is not preserved. Defendant never objected to the evidence
in question on the ground that it was inadmissible under MRE 404(b). Although defendant
objected to some of the evidence on grounds of relevance, an objection on one ground is
insufficient to preserve an appellate attack on another ground. People v Maleski, 220 Mich App
518, 523; 560 NW2d 71 (1996). We review unpreserved issues for plain error. Carines, supra
at 763, 774.
Defendant complains that evidence that he was a drug dealer and was involved in
previous drug-related violence was improperly admitted under MRE 404(b). We disagree.
[R]elevant other acts evidence does not violate Rule 404(b) unless it is
offered solely to show the criminal propensity of an individual to establish that he
acted in conformity therewith. Thus, other acts evidence is admissible whenever
it is relevant on a noncharacter theory. [People v Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254,
259; 549 NW2d 39 (1996) (citation omitted; emphasis in original).]
In this case, the prosecutor’s questions were not asked to call defendant’s character into question
or to obtain a conviction based on the impermissible inference that defendant had a propensity to
commit crime and acted in conformity therewith. The jury was already aware of the character of
the victim and all of the codefendants because there was no question that all were involved with
illegal narcotics. Rather, the prosecutor’s reasons for questioning defendant were relevant to
rebut defendant’s testimony on direct examination. Specifically, the evidence was relevant and
probative of the victim’s ability to identify defendant and to discredit defendant’s claim that he
had never met the victim. Further, the evidence called into question defendant’s claims that he
transported one of the codefendants to the motel party to supply drugs. Finally, the questions
about defendant’s knowledge of drug-related violence were relevant and probative of
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defendant’s intent to carry the gun to the crime scene. A witness may be cross-examined on any
matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. People v Layher, 464 Mich 756,
764; 631 NW2d 281 (2001). The evidence was not improperly admitted and, therefore, we find
no plain error.1
Defendant next contends that reversal is warranted because the prosecutor improperly
elicited an opinion from a police detective that defendant was the shooter. We disagree. In
People v Moreno, 112 Mich App 631, 635; 317 NW2d 201 (1981), the defense counsel asked an
officer about whether witnesses were shown pictures of other suspects or only pictures of the
defendant. The officer admitted that he had not shown pictures of other suspects to the
witnesses. Id. To rehabilitate the investigation on cross-examination, the prosecutor wanted to
show that numerous people were interviewed before the defendant was identified as the
perpetrator and that the defendant’s picture was shown to witnesses only after the officer was
satisfied of the defendant’s guilt based on other evidence. Id. The prosecutor was allowed to ask
some questions on the issue and, in fact, elicited that the officer became personally satisfied
about the defendant’s guilt but nevertheless continued to investigate until he had sufficient
information to seek a warrant. Id. at 636. This Court held that because the questions were asked
in response to the defendant’s questions about the investigation and because the questions were
not asked in an attempt to persuade the jury to convict the defendant based on the officer’s
opinion of the defendant’s guilt, they did not warrant reversal. Id.
It is impermissible for a witness to express his belief in the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. It is also impermissible for the prosecutor to express
his opinion on defendant’s guilt. However, where the prosecution’s remarks are
made in response to questions or arguments made by defense counsel, no error
occurs. [Id. at 635 (citations omitted).]
See also People v Stacy, 193 Mich App 19, 37; 484 NW2d 675 (1992).
In this case, defense counsel called the detective as a witness and attempted to leave the
jury with the impression that the information gathered during the investigation pointed to
someone other than defendant as the shooter. On cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to
rehabilitate the investigation and the fact that defendant was charged as the shooter. The
prosecutor elicited that the investigation determined that defendant was the shooter. Some of the
information, which led to that conclusion, was thereafter emphasized by the prosecutor on crossexamination. Contrary to defendant’s arguments on appeal, the prosecutor did not ask the
detective to express his personal beliefs about defendant’s guilt. Further, at trial, the prosecutor
1
We note that even if the evidence were improperly admitted, reversal still would not be
required because defendant has failed to demonstrate that the testimony at issue affected the
outcome of his case. Carines, supra at 763. The evidence was overwhelming that defendant
was the shooter. Moreover, even if this Court accepted that the outcome of the case was affected
by the admission of the evidence, reversal is not warranted because there has been no showing
that defendant was actually innocent or that the error affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the proceedings. Id.
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did not argue for conviction based on the prestige of his office, his opinions, or the opinions of
the detective. Defendant was not denied a fair trial under the circumstances.
Defendant also argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair and
impartial jury because a courtroom spectator made an improper comment to a juror in an attempt
to influence the juror. We find no error requiring reversal. A “criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury.” People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App
521, 528; 586 NW2d 766 (1998). To justify a new trial, “error must appear affirmatively.”
People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 545; 583 NW2d 199 (1998). In other words, before a
new trial based on juror misconduct is warranted, some showing must be made that the
misconduct at issue affirmatively prejudiced the defendant’s right to trial before a fair and
impartial jury. People v Schram, 378 Mich 145, 159-160; 142 NW2d 662 (1966); People v Fox
(After Remand), 232 Mich App 541, 558; 591 NW2d 384 (1998); Fetterley, supra at 545. In
Fetterley, supra at 545, the juror testified that she left her neighbor’s company immediately
when her neighbor began to talk about the defendant. The trial court found the juror to be
credible and refused to grant the defendant a new trial because there was no showing of
prejudice. Id. at 545-546. In Schram, supra at 159-160, the Court cited to two cases where
jurors overheard remarks about the guilt of a defendant and, because prejudice was not shown,
reversal was not warranted. Prejudice must be shown. Id. at 159. It cannot merely be the
subject of speculation. Id.
In this case, the juror continued immediately to the jury room after hearing the spectator’s
comment. The juror later informed the trial court of the incident and indicated that she could
nevertheless be fair and impartial. The juror agreed not to discuss the incident with the other
jurors. Under the circumstances, defendant’s claim that he was denied a fair and impartial jury is
unsupported by the record. Defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced.
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because
trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the other bad-acts testimony, failed to object to
the detective’s testimony that defendant was the shooter, and failed to move for the removal of
the tainted juror.
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for
counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). The
defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound
trial strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466 NW2d 315 (1991). “Defense
counsel is not required to make frivolous or meritless motions,” People v Darden, 230 Mich App
597, 605; 585 NW2d 27 (1998), or objections, People v Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App
411, 425; 564 NW2d 149 (1997).
None of defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel have merit. Counsel
was not ineffective for failing to object to the challenged other bad-acts evidence. As previously
discussed, the evidence was properly admissible. Second, counsel was not ineffective for failing
to object to the detective’s testimony. The testimony was not improper under the circumstances.
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Finally, the record does not support that the juror who heard the spectator’s comment about
defendant’s guilt was tainted. Moreover, counsel’s decision relating to the selection of jurors is
generally a matter of trial strategy. See People v Johnson, 245 Mich App 243, 259; 631 NW2d 1
(2001), lv pending. Defendant cannot overcome the presumption in this case that counsel’s
actions in failing to pursue the removal of the juror was a matter of trial strategy. We also note
that defendant has failed to demonstrate that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the outcome of his
case would have been different. Defendant has therefore failed to sustain his burden of
demonstrating that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant also requests that we remand this case for a Ginther2 hearing. The request is
not only untimely, but also defendant has failed to make the requisite showing that a remand is
necessary. MCR 7.211(C)(1). The request is denied.
We affirm.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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