IN RE KOLC MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BRANDON MITCHELL KOLC
and NOEL SAGE KOLC, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 25, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 229572
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-374917
PAULA VIOLA SCHLEICHER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
PHILLIP EUGENE KOLC, a/k/a PHILLIP
EUGENE KOLC, JR.,
Respondent.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Murphy and Markey, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (3)(c)(i), (3)(g), and (3)(j). We
affirm.
Respondent’s children were removed from her care when she reported that her oldest son
sexually abused her nine-month old baby. Respondent allowed her oldest son to care for the
baby despite the fact that she had suspected him of committing sexual abuse. Additionally,
respondent took her four-year old child to work with her in lieu of leaving him in the care of her
oldest son because the oldest son had physically harmed the child. The four-year old child
suffered from severe behavior problems, including improper sexual conduct. Some evaluators
concluded that this child had been exposed to inappropriate violent and sexual material and that
his behavior was learned. The four-year old attempted suicide while in the care of his foster
parents. While respondent alleged that the attempt evidenced the need to return the child to her
home, some evaluators concluded that the attempt was the result of improper and inaccurate
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information conveyed by respondent that the child would be returned to her home. The child’s
therapist recommended that he remain in foster care or be admitted for long-term hospitalization.
While respondent completed all necessary aspects of her parent/agency agreement, the
trial court concluded that she had not benefited from the services provided. Respondent initially
blamed her oldest son for the abuse, then blamed the children’s father, then recanted any sexual
abuse and alleged that any condition was caused by diaper rash. Lastly, respondent alleged that
her oldest son admitted the sexual abuse. However, when interviewed by police, the oldest son
expressly denied any admission. When her oldest son left a center without authorization,
respondent allowed him to remain with her for three days.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 352; 612 NW2d
407 (2000). Respondent had the opportunity to prevent sexual and physical abuse of her two
youngest children, but left the children in the care of the suspected abuser, her eldest child.
There was no evidence that respondent could provide proper care and custody within a
reasonable period of time considering the age of the children. Termination was required unless
the court found that termination was clearly not in the child’s best interests. Id. at 364-365. On
this record, we cannot conclude that termination was clearly not in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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