PEOPLE OF MI V RONALD B JORDAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 22, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 219279
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-010345
RONALD B. JORDAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
ON REMAND
Before: Hood, P.J., and Doctoroff and K. F. Kelly
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court to consider issues raised but
not addressed in our prior opinion.1 In lieu of granting leave to appeal, our Supreme Court
reversed this Court’s decision and remanded “for consideration of issues raised but not addressed
in its decision.”2 People v Jordan, 465 Mich 869; ___ NW2d ___ (2001). We now address
those issues and affirm in part, vacate in part and remand for entry of order.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
This case arises out of the shooting death of Mr. Cedric Eldridge, on August 5, 1998.
The shooting occurred in the basement of a home owned by Mr. Raymond McCarver. At this
time, defendant was an occupant of Mr. McCarver’s residence. Evidence adduced at trial
established that on the night of the fatal shooting, defendant and another unidentified male went
to Mr. McCarver’s home. Mr. John Dixon, a friend of Mr. McCarver’s, let defendant and the
1
People v Ronald B. Jordan, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, entered
[05/11/01] (Docket No. 219279.)
2
In our earlier opinion, we reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded on the grounds that the
trial court permitted a police officer to render his professional opinion that based on the
witnesses’ interviewed, one of the original suspects, Mr. Stanley Harper, was not involved in the
crime. We held that by allowing the officer’s testimony in this regard, the trial court effectively
deprived defendant of the ability to put forth a viable defense especially considering that
defendant’s theory of the case was that Stanley Harper, not defendant, shot and killed the
decedent. In light of our previous disposition, we held that we need not address the other two
issues raised on appeal.
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other unidentified male inside whereupon both proceeded to the basement together. Thereafter,
Mr. Eldridge and Mr. Harper arrived at the house and Mr. Dixon let them in. Mr. Dixon testified
that approximately five minutes after defendant arrived, defendant called him down into the
basement and inquired whether Mr. Eldridge was upstairs because defendant wanted to speak
with him. Pursuant to defendant’s request, Mr. Eldridge went down into the basement.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Dixon testified that he heard a noise coming from the basement
and went to investigate. When he proceeded down the landing toward the basement, Mr. Dixon
testified that he observed someone half way out the side door brandishing a gun. Mr. Dixon
testified that he could not identify the individual that possessed the gun because he only saw the
individual’s arm and the hand in which the individual held the gun. After the commotion, Mr.
Dixon testified that he proceeded into the basement and discovered the victim, Mr. Eldridge,
laying on the floor.
Similarly, Ms. Della Gill, Mr. Eldridge’s girlfriend, took the stand at trial and testified
that on August 5, 1998, she and Mr. Eldridge returned to Mr. McCarver’s house after shopping at
the mall. Ms. Gill testified that when they entered the home, she proceeded to the bathroom
while Mr. Eldridge proceeded down toward the basement. Ms. Davison, another woman at the
house that evening, testified that she heard what sounded like arguing coming from the basement
and advised Mr. McCarver that he should investigate. Very shortly thereafter, Ms. Gill testified
that she heard a sound much like a firecracker. Ms. Gill indicated that when she came out of the
bathroom, all she heard was the door and then recalls Mr. Dixon advising that Mr. Eldridge was
shot. According to Ms. Gill’s testimony, by the time she reached the basement, the only two
individuals present were Mr. McCarver and Mr. Eldridge who was lying on the floor.
He testified that he was sitting in the dining room talking for about five or ten minutes
when he got up to leave. He testified that as he proceeded to go down the landing to access the
side door, he heard something that sounded like a “gun pop.” Then, Mr. Harper testified that he
crept down the basement stairs and observed defendant bending over the victim who was laying
on the floor. Mr. Harper testified that he saw a shiny object in defendant’s hand. When
defendant noticed Mr. Harper’s presence, defendant told him to “get the f--- upstairs.”
Defendant was charged with felony murder. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial
court provided an instruction to the jury on aiding and abetting. During deliberations, the jury
inquired about the application of the aiding and abetting instruction. The trial court advised that
aiding and abetting applied to all of the charges and the jury returned to deliberations.
Thereafter, the jury returned their verdict finding defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and
felony firearm. In accord with the jury’s verdict, the trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth
time offender, to consecutive sentences of seventeen to twenty-five years’ imprisonment for
voluntary manslaughter and two years for the felony-firearm conviction.
II. The Aiding and Abetting Instruction
On appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor did not have sufficient evidence to
warrant the aiding and abetting instruction. We do not agree. When reviewing challenges to the
sufficiency of evidence, this Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecutor and determine[s] whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements
of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Izarraras Placante 246 Mich
-2-
App 490, 495; 633 NW2d 18 (2001). See also People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d
130 (1999).
A person that aids or abets the commission of a crime may be convicted and punished as
if that individual committed the offense directly. MCL 767.39; People v Turner, 213 Mich App
558, 568; 540 NW2d 728 (1995). To establish that defendant aided and abetted the commission
of a crime, the prosecutor must put forth evidence to prove that:
(1) [T]he crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person,
(2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the
principal in committing the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission
of the crime or knew that the principal intended its commission at the time he
gave aid or encouragement. People v Norris, 236 Mich App 411, 419; 600 NW2d
658 (1999).
As one court explained, “[t]he sin qua non of aiding and abetting is that more than one
person must be criminally involved either before, during, or after the commission of a crime.”
People v Parks, 57 Mich App 738, 743; 226 NW2d 710 (1975). Indeed, aiding and abetting
contemplates “all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator of a crime and comprehends all
words or deeds that might support, encourage, or incite the commission of a crime.” Turner,
supra at 568. (Citation omitted.) Additionally, it is not necessary to establish the identity of the
principal “if the existence of a guilty principal is proven.” People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604,
611; 493 NW2d 471 (1992) (emphasis in original.) To submit the aiding and abetting issue
before the jury, “the evidence need only tend to establish that more than one person committed
the crime, and that the role of a defendant charged as an aider and abettor amounts to something
less than the direct commission of the offense.” Id. citing People v Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376,
382; 465 NW2d 365 (1991).
In the case at bar, the prosecutor put forth testimony establishing that defendant arrived at
the home that evening with an unidentified male and that upon entry, both immediately
proceeded to the basement. Further, testimony established that defendant requested to speak
with the victim and pursuant to defendant’s request, the victim went down to the basement. Very
shortly thereafter, witnesses for the prosecution testified that they heard a “pop” or something
that sounded like a “firecracker.” Mr. Dixon testified that after he heard the sound, he caught a
glimpse of someone going out the door. Although Mr. Dixon could not identify the individual,
he did testify that he observed that individual holding a gun. Similarly, another witness for the
prosecution testified that after the shot, he proceeded into the basement and observed defendant
bending over the victim who was laying on the floor. This witness also testified that defendant
had a shiny object in his hand.
Although mere presence is, in and of itself, insufficient to establish that a defendant aided
or abetted the commission of a crime, Norris, supra at 419-420, the prosecutor presented
testimony sufficient to establish that either defendant committed the crime himself, or
alternatively, aided and abetted the principal in accomplishing that feat. As the trial court
properly observed, “[t]here is no eye witness to what actually occurred. It could have been either
one of them under the evidence presented on the record.”
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Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution reveals that a
rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of aiding and abetting beyond a reasonable
doubt sufficient to convict defendant on that theory. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit
error requiring reversal by providing the aiding and abetting instruction to the jury.
To the extent that defendant argues that the aiding and abetting instruction rendered by
the trial court caused the jury undue confusion thus mandating reversal, we similarly disagree. A
review of the record reveals that the trial court twice instructed the jury on the theory of aiding
and abetting before the jury began deliberations. During its deliberations, the jury expressed
confusion as regards aiding and abetting. In response and with both trial counsel in agreement,
the trial court advised the jury that the aiding and abetting instruction applied to all charges and
advised them that they could refer to the written instructions for assistance. The jury did not
express any further confusion regarding the instructions and returned their verdict accordingly.
Reviewing the instructions rendered by the trial court in their entirety, we find that the
instructions fairly presented the issues for trial and sufficiently protected the defendant's rights.
Piper, supra at 642. Accordingly, we do not find error requiring reversal in this regard.
IV. Defendant’s Sentence
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court violated the two-thirds rule enunciated in
People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683; 199 NW2d 202 (1972) when it sentenced defendant to
seventeen to twenty-five years’ imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter. In Tanner, the court
held that any sentence providing for a minimum which exceeds two-thirds of the maximum is an
improper sentence violative of the intermediate sentencing act. Id. at 689. In the case at bar, the
trial court’s seventeen year sentence violated the two-thirds rule by four months. The
prosecution agrees.
Imposition of a partially invalid sentence does not mandate setting aside the entire
sentence, but rather the offending sentence “is to be set aside only `in respect to the unlawful
excess.’” People v Thomas, 447 Mich 390, 393; 523 NW2d 215 (1994) (citing MCL 769.24.)
Defendant’s sentence exceeds the allowable minimum of sixteen years and eight months by
exactly four months. Consequently, the original sentence was invalid only to the extent of those
additional four months. Id. Accordingly, we vacate that part of the trial court’s sentencing
decision and remand for correction of the sentence to a sixteen year and eight month minimum
term of imprisonment and a twenty-five year maximum term of imprisonment. Id.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded to the trial court for entry of an order
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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