IN RE MCCLAIN MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of WHISPER McCLAIN and
TREASURE McCLAIN, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 11, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 234487
Manistee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-000074-NA
CANDICE McCLAIN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DON McCLAIN and RAYMOND YENDEL,
Respondents.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Jansen and R. D. Gotham*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g).1 We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory ground for termination
under § 19b(3)(g) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(F)(3); MCR
5.974(I); In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Here, the
1
We note that the trial court, in its written opinion, noted that respondent’s parental rights to
another child had been previously terminated. Based on the allegations in the petitions, it
appears that respondent’s parental rights to that child were terminated under § 19b(3)(i),
although it is not entirely clear from the record. In any event, the trial court did not appear to
place undue emphasis on this fact in its opinion.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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evidence showed that the twin children were removed from the home when they were just over
one year old. They were not thriving while in respondent’s care, were developmentally delayed,
and were undernourished. Respondent was often harsh with the children and had unrealistic
expectations of their abilities. Further, the children would frequently have bruises, scabs, and
bug bites. The condition of the home was very poor as well because the yard was cluttered,
dirty, and unsafe for toddlers, and the house itself was dirty and in need of repair. During the
two years of services with the FIA, respondent did little, if anything, to improve the home for the
children. Moreover, once the children were placed in foster care, they gained weight and were
generally healthier. Under these circumstances, there was clear and convincing evidence to
warrant termination of parental rights under § 19b(3)(g).
Although the required elements under § 19b(3)(c)(i) were not established because the
termination of parental rights was ordered at the initial disposition and 182 or more days had not
elapsed since the issuance of the initial dispositional order, the error in relying on this section is
harmless inasmuch as only one statutory ground need be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. MCL 712A.19b(3).
Next, we reject respondent’s argument that there were procedural defects in the
proceedings that mandate that the order terminating parental rights be set aside. Initially, we
note that these arguments were not raised below and are, therefore, not preserved for appellate
review. In any event, there was no violation of § 19b(3) because the order of disposition was the
order of termination entered on April 26, 2001. No review hearing is required between the time
of the filing of the petition and the adjudication trial. Further, there were no violations under
MCR 5.973(B) and (C) because the applicable court rule in this case is MCR 5.974, which
governs proceedings where termination is sought immediately and there is no lengthy
dispositional phase. MCR 5.942(A) is also clearly not applicable in this case because that rule
applies to a juvenile delinquency proceeding. To the extent that MCR 5.973(A)(2) and (A)(5)(b)
are applicable through MCR 5.974(D), we note that a four-day delay between the disposition and
the adjudication does not mandate reversal of the trial court’s termination order, and because
respondent did not raise this issue below, we are left without a record whether the delay was
attributable to good cause, which would be in the trial court’s discretion to determine.
Lastly, respondent argues that the trial court failed to state “[b]rief, definite, and pertinent
findings [of fact] and conclusions [of law] on [the] contested matters” as required by MCR
5.974(G)(1), and failed to include a statutory basis for the termination order as required by MCR
5.974(G)(3). We believe that the trial court’s opinion is sufficient in this case, although the trial
court’s opinion could have included more fact findings. Although the trial court did not set forth
the particular statutory citations in its opinion or order, the trial court did state the statutory
language indicating that the grounds for termination were respondent’s failure to provide proper
care and custody, previous termination of parental rights to another child, and failure to rectify
the conditions leading to the adjudication. We agree with the trial court that, based on the
evidence, the grounds for termination under § 19b(3)(g) were “thoroughly established.”
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Roy D. Gotham
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