IN THE EST OF JACK ROSENBERG DEC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re ESTATE OF JACK ROSENBERG, Deceased.
CHARLOTTE ROSENBERG, Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF JACK
ROSENBERG, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
January 8, 2002
Appellant,
v
RUBENSTEIN, ISAACS, LAX & BORDMAN,
P.C.,
Nos. 215371; 216741
Oakland Probate Court
LC No. 77-129354-SE
Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Smolenski and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases, Charlotte Rosenberg, the personal representative of the estate
of Jack Rosenberg, appeals as of right the probate court’s final order allowing fees (Docket No.
215371) and the probate court’s order compelling compliance with its order increasing escrow
(Docket No. 216741). We affirm both orders.
In 1979, Charlotte Rosenberg retained Rubenstein, Isaacs, Lax & Bordman, P.C. to
represent the estate. Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. represented the estate in a suit against Rosenberg
Brothers and Friendship Companies, performed services related to a federal estate tax return
audit, and performed other services for the estate. The estate paid Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.
almost $300,000 for work performed on its behalf, but stopped its payments in 1981. On
September 24, 1984, Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. filed a petition for costs and attorney fees related
to its representation of the estate between October 1, 1981 and September 30, 1983. After an
evidentiary hearing, the probate court awarded Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. $167,510.97 for its legal
services performed for the estate. On appeal, this Court remanded the case because of an
erroneous factual finding by the probate court. In re Rosenberg Estate, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued July 15, 1997 (Docket Nos. 174934 and 180744). On
remand, the probate court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently entered a final
order allowing fees for Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. in the amount of $167,510.97. After this final
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order had been entered, the probate court entered an order compelling the estate to comply with a
prior order to increase the escrow amount to secure the payment of any fees awarded to
Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. from the estate.
On appeal, Charlotte Rosenberg first argues that the probate court did not have the
authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing on remand when this Court did not specifically
mandate an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. “The power of a lower court on remand is to take
such action as law and justice require that is not inconsistent with the judgment of the appellate
court.” McCormick v McCormick, 221 Mich App 672, 679; 562 NW2d 504 (1997). In the
instant case, this Court ordered the probate court to take the following actions on remand:
On remand, we direct the probate court to determine whether the total
amount of compensation sought by Rubenstein (approximately $467,500) was
reasonable under the circumstances of this case, then use that determination as a
basis for deciding what additional fees beyond those already paid, the Rosenberg
estate may owe to Rubenstein’s firm. When determining the reasonableness of
the lawyer’s charges, the court should consider the factors set forth in In re
Krueger Estate, 176 Mich App 241, 248; 438 NW2d 898 (1989), including but
not limited to the amount of time spent, the amount of money involved, the
character of the services rendered, the skill and experience necessary, and the
results obtained. [In re Rosenberg Estate, unpublished opinion per curiam of the
Court of Appeals, issued July 15, 1997 (Docket Nos. 174934 and 180744), slip op
at 2.]
This Court did not order the probate court to reopen the proofs and conduct an evidentiary
hearing, but it did not prohibit the probate court from taking this action to determine the
reasonableness of fees. Therefore, the probate court’s decision to conduct an evidentiary hearing
was not inconsistent with this Court’s remand order.
Charlotte Rosenberg cites Meadowlanes Limited Dividend Housing Ass’n v City of
Holland (After Remand), 176 Mich App 536; 440 NW2d 71 (1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on
other grounds 437 Mich 473 (1991), on remand MTT (Docket Nos. 89792, 103246, 55933, April
2, 1993), for the proposition that a lower court must make a decision that the existing trial record
is insufficient before considering new evidence on remand. We disagree. This Court’s opinion
in Meadowlanes does not support the proposition for which it is cited. In Meadowlanes, this
Court recognized the lower court’s discretion to take actions it deems necessary on remand, as
long as those actions are in compliance with the appellate court’s remand order. This Court
stated:
The order remanding this case back to the tribunal did not mandate that the
tribunal rehear the case or consider other evidence. It was apparently the decision
of the tribunal that enough facts were available to it on the record to comply with
the order of remand. We have no reason to disagree with this assessment. We
find that the remand order of this Court has been complied with. [Id. at 542.]
This decision does not limit a lower court’s discretion on remand. Rather, it reaffirms the lower
court’s discretion to do what it deems appropriate when the appellate court does not provide
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specific instructions on remand. Charlotte Rosenberg offers no authority to suggest that a lower
court may not consider additional evidence on remand when the appellate court does not
specifically mandate such action. Because considering additional evidence was proper in the
context of this Court’s remand in the instant case, the probate court did not exceed the scope of
its authority in conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Next, Charlotte Rosenberg argues that the probate court abused its discretion in awarding
Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. attorney fees because: (1) many of the services performed by
Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. did not benefit the estate, (2) the services performed by Rubenstein,
Isaacs, et al. were not reasonable or as complex as claimed, and (3) some of the services
performed by Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. were detrimental to the estate. We disagree.
An attorney is entitled to receive reasonable compensation for necessary legal services he
performs on behalf of an estate or its personal representative. MCR 8.303(A); In re Krueger
Estate, supra at 248. In general, the probate court has broad discretion in determining what
amount constitutes reasonable compensation. Id. In making this determination, the court should
consider, among other factors, the amount of time spent, the amount of money involved, the
character of the services rendered, the skill and experience necessary, and the results obtained.
Id. No one factor alone is dispositive in determining attorney fees. Id. at 250. The party
claiming the right to compensation has the burden of proof in this regard. Id. at 249. The
probate court must review a petition for attorney fees for reasonableness with an eye toward
preservation of the estate’s assets for the beneficiaries. In re Sloan Estate, 212 Mich App 357,
364; 538 NW2d 47 (1995).
“The standard of review applied by this Court to a probate court’s determination as to the
amount of attorney fees to be awarded is whether the court abused its discretion.” In re
Humphrey Estate, 141 Mich App 412, 439; 367 NW2d 873 (1985). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the result was “so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences
not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof,
not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.” Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382,
384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).
Charlotte Rosenberg maintains that the probate court abused its discretion in awarding
Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. attorney fees because some of Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s services did
not benefit the estate. Legal services rendered on behalf of an estate are compensable when the
services confer a benefit on the estate by either increasing or preserving the estate’s assets. In re
Sloan Estate, supra at 362. Charlotte Rosenberg first argues that Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s
services related to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress did not benefit the
estate because the claim was personal to her. The evidence shows, however, that the claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress may have been beneficial to the estate. Erwin
Rubenstein testified that the estate benefited from the emotional distress claim because it
provided a means by which Rosenberg Brothers could be influenced to settle the case without
litigation. Rubenstein had suggested the emotional distress claim to Charlotte Rosenberg and she
signed an affidavit relating to the claim. Larry Campbell, an expert in commercial litigation and
litigation services, testified that the emotional distress claim benefited the estate because it
subjected Rosenberg Brothers to additional exposure to liability, which increased the potential
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for an additional judgment or a better opportunity to settle the matter. Therefore, the probate
court did not abuse its discretion in including Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s fees for the emotional
distress claim in its award of attorney fees.
Next, Charlotte Rosenberg argues that Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s services related to a
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim did not benefit the estate
because the claim was meritless and was never filed. Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. researched the
RICO claim to see if the litigation could be moved into federal court. Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.
believed that moving the case to federal court under RICO would be advantageous to the estate
because it would put additional pressure on Rosenberg Brothers and the state trial court was
tending to rule against the estate in regard to motions. Although the RICO claim was never filed,
Charlotte Rosenberg does not dispute that the work on the claim was done on behalf of the estate
and was meant to benefit the estate. Because Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s services in regard to the
RICO claim were done to benefit the estate, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. attorney fees for these services.
Charlotte Rosenberg also contends that there is no evidence that the number of
depositions taken by Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. benefited the estate. Anthony Trogan testified that
a large number of depositions were taken because there were attorney-client privilege issues that
had to be avoided, there were a great number of objections, they had to cover a significant length
of time and a large number of different incidents and entities, the issues were complex, and there
was a voluminous amount of material to explore. Rubenstein testified that the depositions were
necessary because of the large number of claims and persons involved in the case. The
depositions had to cover a period going ten to fifteen years into the past because Rubenstein,
Isaacs, et al. was attempting to establish ownership and interest in certain contracts and
transactions and there was a great deal of tracing and background that had to be developed.
Additionally, Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. was attempting to establish a pattern of conduct regarding
fraud perpetrated by Jack Rosenberg’s brothers. Some persons were deposed to search for,
explore, and develop assets that had not been previously disclosed. Additionally, the accountants
had to be deposed to explore the equity method as opposed to the cost method of accounting.
Rubenstein testified that the following objectives were obtained by taking the depositions: (1)
information was obtained to include a constructive trust claim in the complaint,1 (2) a Sun Life
building interest was discovered, (3) the fair market value was discovered,2 (4) the way in which
the returns were prepared as far as the equity method was discovered, and (5) the claims in the
estate’s complaint were proven. Expert witness Campbell opined that the fees Rubenstein,
Isaacs, et al. charged the estate during the course of the litigation, including the fees for the
depositions, were reasonable for the services rendered and that the services provided were
reasonable and necessary. He opined that the case involved difficult issues, involved a great deal
of work, and that the litigation was extremely contentious. Campbell further opined that
1
Rubenstein testified that a constructive trust was established by discovering that a substantial
portion of the money in one of the partnerships was taken from that partnership, including the
estate’s funds, and used to acquire nine or ten other shopping center interests.
2
Rubenstein did not specify the property to which he was referring.
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Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s services benefited the estate.3 Charlotte Rosenberg knew about all of
the depositions and was present at all but one of the depositions. We find that this evidence
demonstrates that the depositions taken by Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. were necessary and
reasonable and benefited the estate.
Next, Charlotte Rosenberg argues that there is no evidence that the depositions taken by
Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. required the presence of two or three of Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s
attorneys. Rubenstein testified that it was necessary for a member of his firm to attend the
depositions along with Trogan because of the large amount of information that was necessary to
go through in the deposition. Each attorney performed a different function at the depositions.
Campbell opined that it was reasonable for Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. to assign two or three
attorneys to a deposition. Charlotte Rosenberg was made aware of the number of attorneys at the
depositions and approved of their presence. We find that this evidence shows that it was
reasonable and it benefited the estate for Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. to have two or three attorneys
attend the depositions.
Charlotte Rosenberg further contends that the probate court abused its discretion in
awarding attorney fees to Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. because the services performed by
Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. were not complex or reasonable. First, Charlotte Rosenberg argues that
the services were not complex because some of the services performed by Rubenstein, Isaacs, et
al. were routine matters. Although some of the services performed by Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.
may have been routine, there was testimony that the federal tax audit was complex. Rubenstein
described the litigation against Rosenberg Brothers and Friendship Companies as “[v]ery, very
difficult. Very, very complex.” He stated that the estate was complex because of the substantial
number of interests in partnerships and closely held corporations and the tax implications of
these interests. He also described the litigation as “a very difficult, hard fought, litigated matter.”
Trogan described the case as “complex” and very contentious. James LoPrete, an expert on the
reasonableness of fees in probate cases, testified that the work involved with the estate was
substantially more than a routine estate because of the tax issues involved with partnerships, real
estate partnerships, and closely held businesses. LoPrete opined that the case was difficult and
required “a high degree of sophistication in the tax field.” Campbell opined that the case
involved difficult issues, involved a great deal of work, and that the litigation was extremely
contentious. We conclude that this expert testimony regarding the complexity of the services
performed by Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. was sufficient for the probate court to find that
Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s fees were reasonable.
3
Charlotte Rosenberg challenges Campbell’s expert opinion which she claims was based on
insufficient information because he did not closely examine all of the depositions. The record
indicates that Campbell formed his opinion after reviewing depositions, pleadings, motions,
interrogatories, answers to interrogatories, the opinion of the Court of Appeals, time slips, time
summaries, and some of the probate accountings. Although he admitted that he only “looked at”
some of the depositions without reviewing them for information, he paid special attention to
other depositions. We conclude that Campbell’s review of the materials was sufficient to form
an expert opinion.
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Next, Charlotte Rosenberg argues that Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. caused the federal tax
audit to become more complex by failing to appraise the estate’s real estate property. LoPrete
opined that it may have been beneficial to the estate to refrain from appraising the real estate
because the appraisal may have been high and it may have been advisable for the estate to just try
to dispute the appraisal made by the federal government, especially in a case where there may
have been undisclosed assets. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the probate
court’s finding that Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s decision not to appraise the real estate was made
for the benefit of the estate and was reasonable even if it made the tax audit more complex.
Charlotte Rosenberg also argues that Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. caused the Rosenberg
Brothers litigation to become more complex by expanding the relief sought by the estate to
corporate dissolutions, constructive trust theories, fraud, director liability, and other theories.
Charlotte Rosenberg does not argue that these services were not done for the benefit of the estate,
but merely argues that she did not initially request them. An attorney should not be limited to
investigating causes of action requested by the client. It is part of a lawyer’s responsibility to
investigate causes of action and alternate methods of obtaining relief. Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.
informed Charlotte Rosenberg of the claims it was alleging and the relief sought. These claims
were made to benefit the estate and were not objected to by Charlotte Rosenberg. We find that
these services provided by Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. were not unreasonable merely because they
made the litigation more complex.
Next, Charlotte Rosenberg argues that the probate court abused its discretion in awarding
attorney fees to Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. because some of the services performed by Rubenstein,
Isaacs, et al. were detrimental to the estate. Specifically, she claims that the estate suffered a loss
of $45,000 in investment income because of the interest charges of the Internal Revenue Service
due to Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s advice not to pay the estate taxes. Although Charlotte
Rosenberg wanted to pay the estate taxes, there was evidence that the estate taxes were not paid
because the estate did not have sufficient funds to make the payment. Therefore, we find that the
probate court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.
despite the estate’s loss in investment income due to the failure to pay estate taxes.
Next, Charlotte Rosenberg argues that Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s failure to appraise the
real estate interests of the estate resulted in an increase in the estate tax. The estate tax examiner
appraised the estate’s real estate property and increased the value of various partnership interests.
Both Rubenstein and Charlotte Rosenberg approved the changes in value of the interests. There
is no evidence on the record what the real estate interests would have been appraised for if
Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. had had them appraised, whether the appraisals would have been
different than the appraisals done by the tax examiner, or whether the Internal Revenue Service
would have accepted the appraisals. Therefore, Charlotte Rosenberg’s argument that Rubenstein,
Isaacs, et al.’s failure to have the properties appraised increased the estate tax is merely
speculation.
Next, Charlotte Rosenberg argues that the probate court’s October 8, 1998 final order
allowing attorney fees should be reversed because this Court erred in its prior decision in In re
Rosenberg Estate, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued July 15, 1997
(Docket Nos. 174934 and 180744), when it awarded Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. interest at a rate of
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twelve percent. We disagree. We agree with Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. that this Court is bound
by its previous decision under the law of the case doctrine. The applicability of the law of the
case doctrine is a question of law subject to review de novo. Ashker v Ford Motor Co, 245 Mich
App 9, 13; 627 NW2d 1 (2001).
Under the law of the case doctrine, if an appellate court has passed on a legal
question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus
determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a
subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same.
[Grievance Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 259; 612 NW2d 120 (2000)
(citation omitted).]
Generally, “an appellate court’s determination of an issue in a case binds lower tribunals on
remand and the appellate court in subsequent appeals.” Grievance Administrator, supra at 260.
The law of the case doctrine applies only to issues actually decided, either implicitly or explicitly,
in the prior appeal. Id. The primary purpose of the law of the case doctrine is to maintain
consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single
continuing lawsuit. Ashker, supra at 13. The law of the case applies regardless of the
correctness of the prior decision. Id. at 15. However, the doctrine does not preclude
reconsideration of a question if there has been an intervening change of law that has occurred
after the initial decision of the appellate court. Id. at 13.
In the instant case, this Court addressed this issue in its July 15, 1997 opinion:
Rosenberg argues that the probate court erred in granting appellee interest
at twelve percent from the date of its petition to the date of satisfaction of the
judgment. While the probate court did not indicate what rate of interest applied,
we find that twelve percent is the appropriate interest rate. MCL 600.6013(4);
MSA 27A.6013(4).
The interest rate is controlled by MCL 700.767; MSA 27.5767 as amended
by 1982 PA 412, which requires a rate consistent with MCL 660.6013 [sic]; MSA
27A.6013. The substance of 1982 PA 412 is consistent with MCL 700.717; MSA
27.5717; we can discern no intent by the Legislature to repeal 1982 PA 412 by its
enactment of MCL 700.717; MSA 27.5717.
House Speaker v State
Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 562-563; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). [In re
Rosenberg Estate, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
July 15, 1997 (Docket Nos. 174934 and 180744), slip op at 3.]
Charlotte Rosenberg does not argue that there has been a change in the law regarding this issue
since this Court’s July 15, 1997 decision. This issue has been explicitly decided by this Court.
Accordingly, the law of the case applies and this issue may not be decided differently on appeal
from the remand. Consequently, Charlotte Rosenberg’s argument fails under the law of the case
doctrine.
Next, Charlotte Rosenberg argues that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to enter the
order compelling compliance with its order increasing escrow. We disagree. Jurisdiction is a
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question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Bass v Combs, 238 Mich App 16, 23; 604
NW2d 727 (1999).
As a preliminary matter, Charlotte Rosenberg maintains that the probate court did not
have the authority to enter an order requiring the estate to pay money into an escrow account to
secure payment of fees awarded to Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. We disagree. MCL 700.733 allows
the probate court to arrange for future payment or possible payment on claims against an estate
by creating a trust, giving a mortgage, obtaining a bond or security from a distributee, or
otherwise. MCL 700.733(3)(b). Therefore, the probate court had the authority to enter its May
15, 1990 order for escrow and its October 6, 1998 order increasing the amount of the escrow.
Charlotte Rosenberg argues that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to enter its order
compelling compliance with its order increasing escrow because the proceedings were stayed on
appeal. We disagree. After an appeal is claimed and notice of the appeal is given at the probate
court, all further proceedings in pursuance of the sentence, order, judgment, or denial appealed
from shall cease until the appeal is determined. MCL 600.867(1); MCL 700.35(1). Once an
appeal has been filed or the Court of Appeals has granted leave to appeal from an order of the
probate court, the trial court is divested of its jurisdiction to set aside or amend the order
appealed from except by order of the Court of Appeals, by stipulation of the parties, or as
otherwise provided by law. MCR 5.802(A); MCR 7.208(A); Bass, supra at 24. However, “[a]n
appeal does not stay the effect or enforceability of a judgment or order of a trial court unless the
trial court or the Court of Appeals otherwise orders.” MCR 7.209(A)(1); Bass, supra.
On October 6, 1998, the probate court entered an order increasing the escrow to $1
million to secure the payment of any fees awarded to Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. On October 8,
1998, the probate court entered a final order allowing fees for Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. in the
amount of $167,510.97. On October 27, 1998, Charlotte Rosenberg filed a claim of appeal of the
probate court’s final order allowing fees. Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al. subsequently filed a motion to
compel compliance with the probate court’s order to increase escrow and on December 18, 1998,
the probate court entered an order granting Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s motion.
We conclude that the probate court had jurisdiction to enter the order granting
Rubenstein, Isaacs, et al.’s motion to compel compliance with the order increasing escrow
because Charlotte Rosenberg’s filing of a claim of appeal from the final order allowing fees did
not stay the enforceability of the order compelling compliance with the escrow order. The
probate court’s October 6, 1998 order increasing escrow was entered before the final order of
fees was entered or appealed. Therefore, the probate court had jurisdiction to enter this order
increasing escrow. The issue is whether the probate court had jurisdiction to compel compliance
with this order after Charlotte Rosenberg appealed the October 8, 1998 final order. We find that
it did. The October 6, 1998 order was properly entered. Charlotte Rosenberg’s subsequent
appeal of the October 8, 1998, order did not stay the effect or enforceability of the order of the
probate court. MCR 7.209(A)(1); Bass, supra at 24. Therefore, although the probate court may
have lacked jurisdiction to amend or set aside the final order allowing fees, it did have the
authority to oversee further proceedings to enforce its order increasing escrow.
Further, even if the enforcement of the probate court’s final order allowing fees was
stayed, the enforcement of the order compelling compliance with the order increasing escrow
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would not be stayed. In Comerica Bank v City of Adrian, 179 Mich App 712; 446 NW2d 553
(1989), this Court held that where Comerica Bank appealed an order regarding fees, “this Court
acquired jurisdiction as to that order [the order regarding fees], but not as to the other orders and,
therefore, even assuming that the properly appealed order was automatically stayed, we do not
believe that the other orders were stayed.” Id. at 730. Similarly, even if the final order allowing
fees was stayed in the instant case, the order compelling compliance with the increase in escrow
would not also be stayed.
Although we affirm the orders of the probate court, we find no merit to Rubenstein,
Isaacs, et al.’s contention that the instant appeals are so vexatious as to justify the imposition of
sanctions against Charlotte Rosenberg.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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