JILES SEARCY V CHRYSLER CORPORATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JILES SEARCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 4, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 228271
WCAC
LC No. 95-000008
CHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and White and Collins, JJ.
WHITE, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do not agree that the law of the case doctrine precluded the
WCAC from considering whether plaintiff is entitled to separate awards against each employer.
Rather, the law of the case doctrine required the WCAC to address the merits of the issue. The
issues before us in this appeal flow from the Supreme Court’s remand to this Court for
consideration as on leave granted, and the consequent reversal and remand to the WCAC by a
panel of this Court “for further consideration in light of its ruling in McCalla [v Marine City
Nursery, Inc, 10 MIWCLR 1445, 1997 ACO # 504], regarding the continuing viability of
Hairston [v Firestone Tire & Rubber, 404 Mich 104; 273 NW2d 400 (1978)].” Searcy v
Chrysler Corp, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued 8-3-99 (Docket
No. 209191). The Court of Appeals opinion reversing and remanding to the WCAC stated in
pertinent part:
Plaintiff Jiles Searcy appeals by leave granted from an order entered by the . . .
[WCAC] denying his petition to reduce the amount by which defendant Chrysler
Corporation is allowed to coordinate pension and other benefits against its
worker’s compensation liability. This Court initially declined to grant leave and
plaintiff sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. While leave was pending,
the WCAC issued an opinion in McCalla, [supra,] which called into question
the WCAC’s original decision in this case finding that Hairston, [supra], was
no longer good law following the 1980 amendments to the [WDCA]. The
Supreme Court then denied leave, but remanded to this Court for consideration as
on leave granted.
The WCAC’s original decision allocating payment of disability benefits between
Chrysler Corporation and the City of Detroit was not at issue in the WCAC
decision that is presently before this Court. However, in light of the WCAC’s
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subsequent decision holding that Hairston, supra, remains good law, and
calling into question its original decision in this case, we remand to the
WCAC for reconsideration of the issue of dual recovery and coordination of
benefits.
Defendant interlocutorily appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, without success.
The Supreme Court’s order denying leave stated that “we are not persuaded that the question
presented should be reviewed by this Court prior to the proceedings ordered by the Court of
Appeals and any further subsequent review by the Court of Appeals.”1
On remand, the WCAC affirmed, and its determination was based solely on res judicata
grounds:
. . . the Commission’s 1992 decision [Searcy I] was challenged at the higher
courts and . . . both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to correct the alleged “error” of the Commission. Both chose not to
change the Commission’s decision, and it became final. Plaintiff cannot now relitigate that underlying entitlement determination. . . . The final decision of the
Appellate Commission in the first Searcy case controls plaintiff’s entitlement to
benefits on the issue of dual recovery and coordination of benefits.”
Because I believe the WCAC’s opinion stood this Court’s directive on remand on its head, I
would reverse and remand to the WCAC for consideration on the merits of the dual recovery
and coordination of benefits under McCalla and Hairston, supra, as directed by the prior opinion
of this Court.
/s/ Helene N. White
1
The Supreme Court’s order is dated March 28, 2000.
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