PEOPLE OF MI V ADRIAN GATSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 225561
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 99-002222-FC
ADRIAN GATSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Sawyer and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction, following a jury trial, of armed
robbery, MCL 750.529. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 225 to 360 months’
imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant first asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial
after a police officer inadvertently testified that defendant was previously convicted of firstdegree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I) arising out of another armed robbery. We review a trial
court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. People v Griffin, 235 Mich
App 27, 36; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). An abuse of discretion exists if, based on a thorough review
of the facts before the trial court, an unprejudiced person would conclude that no justification or
excuse could support the court’s ruling. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d
568 (1996).
We recognize that a police officer’s unresponsive or volunteered remarks are subject to
intense scrutiny to determine whether the officer violated the special obligation of law
enforcement not to venture into forbidden areas that could prejudice the defendant. People v
Holly, 129 Mich App 405, 415-416; 341 NW2d 823 (1983). However, it is clear that the police
officer’s mention of defendant’s previous conviction was not unresponsive to the prosecutor’s
inquires. Moreover, it was not volunteered, but was merely an inadvertent error. The officer
simply referred to the wrong one of two separate convictions arising from the trial about which
the officer was asked. The prosecutor immediately recognized the witness’ error and followed
the answer with a statement that offered the jury a plausible explanation for what the prosecutor
impliedly characterized as the witness’ mistaken memory of the previous trial without repeating
the offending conviction or drawing further attention to it. On this record, we are not persuaded
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial.
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Defendant also contends that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor improperly
invited him to comment on the credibility of prosecution witnesses. Alternatively, defendant
asserts that his counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s questions denied defendant the
effective assistance of counsel. We disagree with both contentions.
We review a defendant’s unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error
affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999);
People v Pfaffle, 246 Mich App 282, 288; 632 NW2d 162 (2001). Reversal is warranted only
when a plain error resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant or seriously affected the
fairness or integrity of the trial. People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370
(2000). Although a prosecutor should not ask a defendant to assess the credibility of prosecution
witnesses, this impropriety does not necessarily warrant reversal. People v Buckey, 424 Mich 1,
17; 378 NW2d 432 (1985).
Here, the prosecutor’s request that defendant assess the prosecution witnesses’ credibility
was contained in a very short exchange, did not affect defendant’s composure, and addressed the
content of defendant’s own direct testimony, which was directly opposed to the prosecution
witnesses’ account of the incident. Further, reversal is not warranted where any prejudicial
effect could have been cured had counsel raised a timely objection. People v Watson, 245 Mich
App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Here, had counsel objected, any prejudice could have
been cured by an instruction from the court. Id. Thus, we are not persuaded that reversal is
warranted.
In a related argument, defendant contends that his counsel’s failure to object to the
prosecutor’s improper questions denied him the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
Because defendant did not move for a new trial or a Ginther1 hearing in the trial court,
our review is limited to errors apparent from the existing record. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App
361, 385; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must make an affirmative showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that errors in counsel’s performance resulted in actual prejudice –
that is, had counsel not erred, there existed a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694
(2000); People v Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 331; 614 NW2d 647 (2000). Here, defendant has
not overcome the well-settled presumption that counsel’s decision to not object during the course
of the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant was the product of sound trial strategy.
People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the
misdemeanor offense of larceny by conversion, MCL 750.362.2 We disagree. Claims of
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
2
The plain language of MCL 750.362 does not specify under what circumstances larceny by
conversion constitutes a misdemeanor offense. However, MCL 750.362 does provide that one
who commits larceny by conversion “shall be punished as provided in the first section of this
chapter,” which is MCL 750.356. At the time defendant committed the instant offense, MCL
750.356(5) provided that larceny of property under $200 was a misdemeanor offense.
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instructional error are reviewed de novo by considering the instructions as a whole to determine
whether a defendant’s rights were sufficiently protected. People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139,
143-144; 585 NW2d 341 (1998). However, a trial court’s decision to not instruct the jury on a
lesser included misdemeanor offense will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252, 265; 330 NW2d 675 (1982); People v Steele, 429
Mich 13, 19; 412 NW2d 206 (1987).
In Stephens, supra, at 261-264, our Supreme Court articulated five requirements that
must be met for an instruction on a lesser misdemeanor offense to be warranted. The party
seeking such an instruction must make a proper request, there must be “an appropriate
relationship between the charged offense and the requested misdemeanor,” the requested
instruction must be supported by a rational view of the evidence set forth at trial, and, if the
prosecutor requests the instruction, the defendant must have adequate notice of it as a charge he
is expected to defend against. Finally, the requested instruction may not result in undue
confusion or some other injustice. Id. at 264. With regard to the requirement that the requested
instruction be supported by a rational view of the evidence at trial, the Supreme Court observed:
This means that not only must there be some evidence which would justify
conviction of the lesser offense, but that “proof on the elements or elements
differentiating the two crimes must be sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may
consistently find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser
included offense.” [Id. at 262-263 (emphasis supplied), quoting United States v
Whitaker, 144 US App DC 344, 347; 447 F2d 314 (1971).]
Thus, the pertinent inquiry here is whether the record contains “some evidence which
would justify conviction of the lesser offense” of larceny by conversion. Stephens, supra at 262.
Quoting the holding of an earlier panel in People v Scott, 72 Mich App 16, 19; 248 NW2d 693
(1976), this Court recently articulated the elements of the offense of larceny by conversion in
People v Mason, 247 Mich App 64, 72; 634 NW2d 382 (2001).
(1) [T]he property at issue must have “‘some value,’” (2) the property belonged to
someone other than the defendant, (3) someone delivered the property to the
defendant, irrespective of whether that delivery was by legal or illegal means, (4)
the defendant embezzled, converted to his own use, or hid the property “‘with the
intent to embezzle or fraudulently use’” it and (5) at the time the property was
embezzled, converted or hidden, the defendant “‘intended to defraud or cheat the
owner permanently of that property.’” Stated more simply, larceny by conversion
occurs “where a person obtains possession of another’s property with lawful
intent, but subsequently converts the other’s property to his own use.” [Id. at 72,
quoting People v Christenson, 412 Mich 81, 86; 312 NW2d 618 (1981) (footnote
omitted).]
We are not convinced that a rational view of the evidence could have supported a
conviction of larceny by conversion. Stephens, supra at 262. At trial, defendant testified on his
own behalf. Specifically, he indicated that he met with the victim, who was driving a taxicab, at
approximately 2:30 to 3:00 a.m. on June 11, 1999. When the victim picked defendant up at the
corner of Eight Mile Road and Gratiot, defendant directed the victim to take him to a crack house
in the area of Linhurt and Chalmers. According to defendant, the victim asked defendant to
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obtain two “stones” of crack cocaine for the victim when he went into the crack house.
Defendant agreed to do so, and accepted a total of $45 from the victim, $40 for the crack
cocaine, and an extra $5 for his services. Defendant further testified that he entered the crack
house, purchased the items for the victim, but then instead of returning to the taxicab to give the
victim the crack cocaine, he walked away through a vacant parking lot.
Consequently, a review of the record does not yield evidence indicating that at the time of
the conversion of the victim’s funds, defendant specifically intended to permanently defraud or
cheat the victim of the money given in exchange for his promise to obtain crack cocaine. Mason,
supra at 72. Consequently, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its substantial
discretion in declining to instruct the jury regarding the offense of larceny by conversion.
Stephens, supra at 264-265.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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