PEOPLE OF MI V PAULA KUCHCIAK
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224296
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-164349-FH
PAULA KUCHIAK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Sawyer and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from her conviction, following a jury trial, of solicitation of
murder, MCL 750.157b(2). The trial court sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, third
offense, MCL 769.11, to a term of twenty to sixty years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant’s conviction arises from her attempt to engage an individual to kill Michael
D’Anniballe, her ex-boyfriend and the father of her young son. On appeal, defendant initially
argues that the prosecution proffered insufficient evidence to support her conviction of
solicitation of murder. We disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we adhere to the
following well-established principles of law.
“[W]hen determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to
sustain a conviction, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found
that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
[People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000), quoting People
v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1202 (1992).]
In People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 616; 591 NW2d 669 (1998), this Court
articulated the requisite elements of the offense of solicitation of murder.
Pursuant to MCL 750.157b(1) “ ‘solicit’ means to offer to give, promise to
give, or give any money, services, or anything of value, or to forgive or promise
to forgive a debt or obligation.” Solicitation to commit murder is a specific intent
-1-
crime that requires proof that the defendant intended that a murder would in fact
be committed. People v Vandelinder, 192 Mich App 447, 450; 481 NW2d 787
(1992). Solicitation to commit murder occurs when (1) the solicitor purposely
seeks to have someone killed and (2) tries to engage someone to do the killing.
Id. Solicitation is complete when the solicitation is made. Id. A contingency in
the plan may affect whether the victim will be murdered, but does not change the
solicitor’s intent that the victim be murdered. Id. at 450-451. Actual incitement
is not necessary for conviction. People v Salazar, 140 Mich App 137, 143; 362
NW2d 913 (1985).
After reviewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we are
satisfied that a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved the elements of
solicitation of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Testimony at trial established that defendant
was angry with D’Anniballe after he gained custody of their son, and thereafter discussed ways
with her then-boyfriend, Edward Yoder, to have D’Anniballe murdered. According to the
record, Yoder arranged contact between defendant and an undercover police officer posing as a
“hit man” by the name of “Ice.” After “Ice” called defendant’s residence and left his pager
number, she returned the page that same evening, met him the next day in person, and told him
in clear and unequivocal terms that she wanted D’Anniballe killed and his body disposed of in a
manner that would avoid detection. Defendant further provided “Ice” with details about
D’Anniballe1 to facilitate the murder, and agreed to pay “Ice” $3,000 for his services. Viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we are satisfied that a rational trier of
fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant specifically intended to have
D’Anniballe killed, and attempted to engage the undercover police officer to carry out this
endeavor. Crawford, supra at 616.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the
charge of solicitation of murder on the basis of entrapment. We disagree.
“A trial court’s finding following an entrapment hearing will be upheld unless clearly
erroneous.” People v Kent, 194 Mich App 206, 211; 486 NW2d 110 (1992). The rationale
underlying the entrapment defense is “to deter the corruptive use of governmental authority by
invalidating convictions that result from law enforcement efforts that have as their effect the
instigation or manufacture of a new crime by one who would not otherwise have been so
disposed.” People v Juillet, 439 Mich 34, 52; 475 NW2d 786 (1991) (Brickley, J.). Michigan
courts utilize an objective test to determine whether a defendant was entrapped. People v
Hampton, 237 Mich App 143, 156; 603 NW2d 270 (1999).
The objective test focuses on the propriety of the government’s conduct that
resulted in charges against the defendant rather than on the defendant’s
predisposition to commit the crime. People v Patrick, 178 Mich App 152, 153154; 443 NW2d 499 (1989). The question is whether the actions of the police
were so reprehensible under the circumstances that the court should refuse, as a
1
Specifically, defendant told “Ice” where D’Anniballe worked, his home address, the type of
vehicle he drove, his license plate number, and D’Anniballe’s physical description.
-2-
matter of public policy, to permit the conviction to stand. People v Rezendes, 164
Mich App 332, 334; 416 NW2d 436 (1987). Entrapment occurs when (1) the
police engage in impermissible conduct that would induce a person similarly
situated to the defendant and otherwise law abiding to commit the crime, or (2)
the police engage in conduct so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated by the
court. People v Ealy, 222 Mich App 508, 510; 564 NW2d 168 (1997).
[Hampton, supra at 156.]
We reject defendant’s claim that the trial court’s finding that she was not entrapped was
clearly erroneous. While defendant testified that she was coerced into a situation where she had
to meet with the undercover officer, the objective evidence adduced at the entrapment hearing
belies her claim. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that defendant took the initiative in
responding to “Ice’s” phone call, setting up the subsequent meeting with “Ice,” and plotting
D’Anniballe’s murder. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the police
did not engage in conduct that would induce an otherwise law abiding person in defendant’s
situation to solicit murder, nor was their conduct so reprehensible or intolerable to the extent that
defendant’s conviction should not stand. Id.
Likewise, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion when
imposing sentence. Considered against the backdrop of the premeditated and vicious nature of
this crime, defendant’s previous criminal history, and her status as a third habitual offender, we
are satisfied that her sentence of twenty to sixty years’ imprisonment does not violate the
principle of proportionality. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). To
the extent that defendant maintains that her sentence was grossly disproportionate in comparison
to the current legislative sentencing guidelines, we note that the legislative sentencing guidelines
are not applicable to the instant case because defendant committed this crime before January 1,
1999. People v Reynolds, 240 Mich App 250, 254; 611 NW2d 316 (2000).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying her request to reopen the
proofs to present documentary evidence in the form of a telephone bill.2 We disagree.
Whether to allow the admission of evidence is a decision we review for an abuse of
discretion. People v Taylor, 195 Mich App 57, 60; 489 NW2d 99 (1992). A trial court’s
decision regarding whether to reopen proofs is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 419; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
“Relevant in ruling on a motion to reopen proofs is whether any undue
advantage would be taken by the moving party and whether there is any showing
of surprise or prejudice to the nonmoving party.” [Id., quoting People v Collier,
168 Mich App 687, 694-695; 425 NW2d 118 (1988) (footnote omitted).]
2
During her trial testimony, the jurors were provided the opportunity to question defendant.
During her direct testimony, defendant testified that she attempted to contact the police by
telephone after she met with “Ice.” One of the jurors subsequently asked defendant if she had
proof in the way of a telephone bill that she attempted to call the police. Defendant responded in
the affirmative, indicating that such proof was in her jail cell. The next day, defendant sought to
introduce the telephone bill into evidence.
-3-
In the instant case, the trial court declined to admit the evidence after it found that its
admission would have required additional testimony to authenticate the contents of the bill and
the identity of the phone numbers it contained, and because there was no indication that defense
counsel was ready to present the necessary witnesses. Moreover, the prosecutor had not received
this document in advance, and it appears from the record that the prosecutor was surprised by
defendant’s attempt to admit it on the last day of trial. On this record, we are unable to conclude
that the trial court’s decision to foreclose admission of this evidence was an abuse of discretion.
Similarly, we share the trial court’s view that the proposed evidence had minimal
probative value. The mere fact that defendant called the police does not necessarily substantiate
her assertion that she called the police to warn them about the plot to kill D’Anniballe.
Similarly, a review of the transcript of the entrapment hearing, as well as defendant’s trial
testimony, reveals that she had earlier testified about her attempts to telephone the police after
meeting with “Ice” as part of her defense. Consequently, we are not persuaded that the phone
bill was newly discovered evidence warranting admission on the last day of trial. See People v
Solak, 146 Mich App 659, 675; 382 NW2d 495 (1985). Under the circumstances, we are not
persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to reopen proofs on the last day of
trial.
Finally, the judgment of sentence erroneously reflects that defendant was convicted of
first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, rather than solicitation of murder, MCL 750.157b(2). We
therefore remand for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment of sentence. People v Avant,
235 Mich App 499, 521; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
Defendant’s conviction and sentence is affirmed. However, we remand for the
ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
