HELEN A TELTOW V TIGER DEVELOPMENT LLC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HELEN A. TELTOW,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
TIGER DEVELOPMENT, LLC and MCCLURE
OIL COMPANY,
No. 223070
St Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000672
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: K.F. Kelly, P.J., and Hood and Doctoroff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order denying her motion for summary disposition
and granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On March 2, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging breach of an oil and gas lease by
defendant McClure Oil Company (McClure). Specifically, plaintiff alleged that this defendant
had not produced oil or gas from her property since 1991, and ceased operation of the property
on October 6, 1996. Additionally, plaintiff alleged that defendant McClure improperly assigned
the lease to defendant Tiger Development, LLC (Tiger) on October 16, 1996, without obtaining
plaintiff’s consent.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. Defendants argued that the oil
and gas lease was valid, although it did not contain a definitive term of duration. Defendants
also argued that plaintiff could not obtain relief because the litigation did not name all necessary
parties. Defendants further argued that the requirement that plaintiff consent to any assignment
was void as a restraint on alienation. Alternatively, defendant argued that the requirement could
not be enforced because it was an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Defendants also argued
that the lease could not be forfeited as a result of the violation of the assignment term of the
lease. Lastly, defendants argued, without citation to authority, that plaintiff’s acceptance of
income from the lease was an acknowledgment of the assignment and waiver of objection to it.
In support of the motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and
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(C)(10), defendants submitted the affidavit of David J. Hall, managing partner of defendant
Tiger.1
Plaintiff’s motion, brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), alleged that the lease must be
construed against the draftor, defendant McClure. Additionally, plaintiff alleged that oil and gas
leases were to be construed for the benefit of the lessor and against the lessee. Any restraint on
alienation in the present case was therefore reasonable. The lease drafted by defendant McClure
did not contain an express duration. Thus, the lease term was controlled by assignment and
production. Defendant Tiger alleged that it would extend production. Accordingly, the property
could be occupied indefinitely if the restraint on alienation was not enforced as written. If the
restraint on alienation was deemed unreasonable, it could not be severed from the lease and the
entire lease was void. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants breached the notice provision of the
lease, and therefore, the lease had expired and plaintiff was entitled to summary disposition.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition and denied plaintiff’s
motion. The trial court concluded in its “findings of law” that case law required a conclusion
that an assignment without the seller’s consent was an unreasonable restraint on alienation when
the seller did not raise allegations of waste, impairment, or loss of security. Likewise, the trial
court held that plaintiff had failed to meet this damage requirement. The trial court also held,
without citation to authority, that plaintiff had waived any consent to the assignment by receipt
of royalties, and it was “bound to construe the Agreement against forfeiture.”
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the consent
to assignment provision of the lease was an illegal restraint on alienation. We conclude that
summary disposition was inappropriate because underlying facts to determine a claim of
reasonable restraint on alienation were not provided. A motion brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich
331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). The moving party must identify the issues where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. MCR 2.116(G)(4). The moving party must make and
support the motion with pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence.
Spiek, supra; MCR 2.116(G)(4), (G)(5). Once the moving party has made and supported the
motion, the opposing party may not rest on the mere allegations and denials contained in the
pleadings, but must set forth facts showing that there is a disputed issue for trial. SSC Associates
Ltd Partnership v General Retirement System of Detroit, 192 Mich App 360, 364; 480 NW2d
1
The first affidavit by David Hall stated that it was based on personal knowledge and cited
attached documentation, evidencing the initial lease, royalty shares, and the assignment.
However, this affidavit also delineated defendant McClure’s drilling operations on plaintiff’s
property. Specifically, the affidavit provided that the “Teltow 3” was drilled on “the property”
and produced oil and gas until 1991, when it was “temporarily shut in.” Despite this fact, the
well had “not been abandoned” and was to be reworked by defendant Tiger. However, there was
no foundation to establish that this portion of the affidavit was based on personal knowledge
because there was no record indicating that Hall had any connection to defendant McClure.
Additionally, there was no attached documentation from a representative of defendant McClure
to establish these facts. The moving party must make and support a motion for summary
disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). MCR 2.116(G)(4). The evidence must be
substantively admissible. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
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275 (1991); MCR 2.116(G)(4). A disputed fact, or the lack thereof, must be established by
admissible evidence. SSC, supra. Where the truth of a material factual assertion is contingent
upon credibility, a genuine issue arises that must be decided by trial, and the motion for summary
disposition cannot be granted. Id. at 365. Summary disposition is inappropriate where motive,
intention, or other conditions of the mind are material issues. Pemberton v Dharmani, 207 Mich
App 522, 529 n 1; 525 NW2d 497 (1994). Summary disposition is also suspect where the
credibility of a witness or deponent is crucial. Vanguard Ins Co v Bolt, 204 Mich App 271, 276;
514 NW2d 525 (1994).
The purpose of summary disposition is to avoid extensive discovery and an evidentiary
hearing when a case can be quickly resolved on issues of law. American Community Mutual Ins
Co v Comm’r of Insurance, 195 Mich App 351, 362; 491 NW2d 597 (1992). Summary
disposition involving mixed questions of law and fact is inappropriate where certain material
facts are disputed. Cf. Haupt v Kerr Mfg Co, 210 Mich App 126, 132 n 2; 532 NW2d 859
(1995). Mixed questions of law and fact are those decisions that require the application of a
legal standard to fact determinations. Thompson v Keohane, 516 US 99, 109-111; 116 S Ct 457;
133 L Ed 2d 383 (1995).
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the assignment provision constituted an
impermissible restraint on alienation. On the record available, we disagree. “A restraint on
alienation of property is defined as an attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract
to cause a later conveyance (1) to be void (disabling restraint), (2) to impose a contractual
liability upon the conveyance for conveying in breach of the agreement not to convey
(promissory restraint), or (3) to terminate all or part of a conveyed property interest (forfeiture
restraint).” LaFond v Rumler, 226 Mich App 447, 451; 574 NW2d 40 (1997). Whether a
restraint on alienation may occur is contingent upon the type of interest at issue and whether the
restraint is reasonable. Sloman v Cutler, 258 Mich 372, 374-375; 242 NW 735 (1932); LaFond,
supra at 453. If the lessee’s property interest is absolute, restriction on the right of alienation is
void. Sloman, supra. However, if the lessor retains an interest in the property, the reversionary
interest generally supports imposing a restriction on alienation. Id. Michigan has adopted a
flexible approach to restraints, and a restraint on alienation will not be enforced unless it is found
to be reasonable in a particular case. Nichols v Ann Arbor Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 73
Mich App 163, 168; 250 NW2d 804 (1977).
A land contract is an executory contract in which the sellor retains legal title to the
premises, but equitable title passes to the purchasers upon execution of the contract. Zurcher v
Herveat, 238 Mich App 267, 291; 605 NW2d 329 (1999). Legal title transfers when the
purchaser performs all of the obligations of the contract. Id. However, an oil and gas lease
transfers an interest in oil and gas, while the lessor retains a reversionary interest in the mineral
estate. Energetics, Ltd v Whitmill, 442 Mich 38, 47; 497 NW2d 497 (1993). Upon termination
of an oil and gas lease, any oil and gas rights revert to the grantor of the lease. Id. In the
transaction in this case, the interest in land held by plaintiff was not merely the holding of legal
title until defendants finished their purchase obligations. Rather, plaintiff held title to the
property and merely granted defendants permission to remove oil and gas. Pursuant to Sloman,
supra, and Energetics, supra, the general rule of law supports a restriction on alienation due to
the nature of plaintiff’s property interest. Accordingly, the trial court erred in applying the law
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of land contracts to this transaction where plaintiff retains title to the property and defendant
holds only removal rights pursuant to the lease agreement.
Having concluded that a restraint on alienation is permissible under the facts at issue, the
next inquiry is whether any restraint on alienation is reasonable. This issue is not preserved for
appellate review because it was not decided by the trial court. Miller v Inglis, 223 Mich App
159, 168; 567 NW2d 253 (1997). Where an issue presents a question of law for which all
necessary facts have been presented, we may address the issue on appeal. Id. However, the
record is devoid of any factual detail surrounding the assignment, defendants’ omission in failing
to obtain consent, and the reasonableness of any objection by plaintiff. Furthermore, the issue of
reasonableness generally presents a question of fact. Cf. Sington v Chrysler Corp, 245 Mich
App 535, 549; 630 NW2d 337 (2001). While defendants acknowledged that plaintiff’s consent
to the assignment was not requested, there was no explanation proffered for this deficiency.2
Additionally, there was no record development regarding the reasonableness of the restraint
provision and any rejection of the assignment by plaintiff. Accordingly, we reverse the trial
court’s order granting summary disposition. The decision was premature,3 and the parties failed
to present appropriate evidence to the trial court to resolve the issue of reasonableness on
summary disposition.4
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
2
It is unknown if notice was not given to plaintiff in order to avoid her exercise of other portions
of the lease. For example, both parties acknowledge, although there is no documentary evidence
to support the proposition in the record, that Teltow 3 was placed on plaintiff’s property, but it
ceased production in 1991. After five years of dormancy, defendant Tiger sought to obtain
production. The lease provided if the first well was dry, a second well had to be commenced
within twelve months or payments had to continue. From the record, we cannot determine if this
condition was complied with or if it could be exercised regarding the drilling of wells beyond the
first two.
3
Our decision applies equally to the waiver issue raised by defendants. A statement of position
without citation to authority is insufficient to bring an issue before the court. Mann v Mann, 190
Mich App 526, 536; 476 NW2d 439 (1991). We will not search for authority to sustain or reject
a party’s position. Id. at 537. It is questionable whether plaintiff can be deprived of her property
rights when defendants could be made whole by return of the funds. The parties should
thoroughly research and prepare these issues for the trial court.
4
This may be achieved by the submission of stipulated facts, documentary evidence filed with a
new dispositive motion, or an evidentiary hearing.
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