LAKE STATES INS CO V BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD OF MICH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LAKE STATES INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219992
Huron Circuit Court
LC No. 97-000245-CZ
BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD OF
MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Doctoroff and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for
summary disposition and granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition. We reverse and
remand.
This case arises out of an accident in which Paul Lutz was struck by an automobile while
riding his bicycle on May 29, 1992. Lutz, who was then ten years old, suffered very severe
injuries as a result. Lutz was discharged to his parents’ home in February 1993, where he
continues to receive home health care services provided by Olsten Health Services. Defendant is
Lutz’s medical insurer and plaintiff is the issuer of the automobile insurance for the vehicle that
struck Lutz. Plaintiff also provided automobile insurance for the Lutzes and the automobile
insurance policy had a coordinated medical benefits provision. Under defendant’s policy,
defendant would pay for “skilled care” services, as defined in the policy. In December 1996,
defendant denied coverage for services by Olsten Health Services, contending that the services
did not meet the skilled care level of service payable under defendant’s policy.
Plaintiff, in the meantime, paid for the nursing care services, which exceeded $425,000,
and filed a declaratory judgment action on September 11, 1997. Both parties subsequently
moved for summary disposition, with the issue being whether Olsten’s services qualified as
“skilled care” within the meaning of defendant’s policy. The trial court ruled that Lutz was
homebound and that he was receiving care from skilled health care providers determined by a
physician as necessary to the care of the insured. The trial court found that defendant had no
basis for denying coverage, and granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition.
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Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled on the
parties’ cross-motions for summary disposition after a hearing at which defense counsel failed to
appear and the trial court heard argument from plaintiff’s counsel. This Court reviews a trial
court’s decision to rule on a party’s motion for summary disposition without hearing oral
argument for an abuse of discretion. Fast Air, Inc v Knight, 235 Mich App 541, 549; 599 NW2d
489 (1999).
MCR 2.119(E)(3) authorizes a trial court to exercise its discretion to limit or dispense
with oral arguments on a motion where the trial court has before it a fully developed record of the
parties’ respective positions. American Transmission, Inc v Channel 7 of Detroit, 239 Mich App
695, 709; 609 NW2d 607 (2000); Fast Air, supra, at 550. Here, the trial court expressly stated
that it had read the parties’ briefs, reviewed the deposition transcripts, and understood the factual
and legal matters involved in the dispute. Defense counsel properly noticed the hearing and the
trial court attempted to locate defense counsel before holding the hearing in defense counsel’s
absence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with the hearing under these
circumstances. Asmus v Barrett, 30 Mich App 570, 577; 186 NW2d 819 (1971).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition where genuine issues of material fact existed. This Court reviews de novo a trial
court’s ruling regarding a motion for summary disposition. Henderson v State Farm and
Casualty Co, 460 Mich 348, 353; 596 NW2d 190 (1999). If a word or phrase in an insurance
contract is unambiguous and no reasonable person could differ with respect to application of the
term or phrase to the undisputed material facts, then summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) should be granted to the proper party. Id. If reasonable minds could disagree about
the conclusions to be drawn from the facts, a question for the factfinder exists and summary
disposition is not appropriate. Id.
In the present case, the issues presented below, and on appeal, are whether Paul Lutz is
“confined to the home” as defined in defendant’s policy and whether the services provided to
him are “skilled care” within the meaning of the policy. The policy states in pertinent part:
Home Health Care Services
This program provides an alternative to long-term hospital care by offering
coverage for care and services in the patient’s home.
The services described below must be:
prescribed by the attending physician,
provided and billed by a participating home health care agency, and
medically necessary (“Medically Necessary” is defined in “Section 2: the
Language of Health Care.”)
The following criteria for the program must be met:
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The doctor certifies that the patient is confined to the home because of the
illness.
This means that transporting the patient to a health care facility
(doctor’s office or hospital, except for outpatient physical therapy)
for care and services would be very difficult due to the nature or
degree of the illness.
The doctor prescribes home health care services and submits a detailed
treatment plan to the home health care agency.
The agency accepts the patient into its program.
Services Which are Payable
The following services must be provided by health care professionals employed
by the home health care agency or by providers who participate with the agency in
this program. The agency must bill BCBSM for the services. They are:
***
Skilled nursing care:
The care must be provided or supervised by a registered nurse
employed by the home health care agency.
Skilled care is defined in the policy as:
A level of care that can be given only by a licensed nurse to ensure the medical
safety of the patient and the desired medical result. Such care must be:
ordered by the attending physician,
medically necessary according to generally accepted standards of medical
practice, and
provided by a registered nurse (RN) or a licensed practical nurse (LPN)
supervised by a registered nurse or physician.
With respect to the question whether Paul Lutz is “confined to the home” within the
meaning of defendant’s policy, we find that a material factual dispute exists based on the
evidence submitted by both parties. Deposition testimony given by Dr. Francis Nwanko and Dr.
Charles McEwen supports defendant’s position that Lutz is not “confined to the home” because
their testimony indicated that Lutz was transported to medical appointments on infrequent
occasions (one or two times a year) and that the home health care agency nurses wheeled Lutz
outside to provide him the benefits of fresh air and sunshine. Dr. McEwen specifically did not
agree that a patient who is taken outside regularly for the benefits of fresh air and sunshine still
satisfied the definition of “confined to the home” under defendant’s policy.
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Plaintiff certainly presented evidence supporting its position that Lutz is “confined to the
home” within the meaning of the policy, specifically through Lutz’s treating physicians, Dr.
Bhaskar Devanagondi, Dr. Bilugali Sundara, and Dr. John Buday, as well as the deposition
testimony of Olsten Health Services’ pediatric case manager Janet Weller. Because both parties
have presented substantively admissible evidence in support of their positions regarding whether
Lutz is “confined to the home” within the meaning of defendant’s policy, the trial court erred in
granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trier of fact
must decide this issue.
With respect to the question whether the care provided to Lutz is “skilled care” as defined
in the policy, we again find that there is a question of fact based on the evidence submitted by
both parties. Here, Lutz’s mother, who is neither a registered nurse nor a licensed practical
nurse, provided most, although not all, of his care in the home. Further, there was a great deal of
evidence that Mrs. Lutz is medically sophisticated in that she educated herself and was adept
with her son’s care. Dr. Nwanko testified that although the treating physician ordered Lutz’s
nursing care, it was not medically necessary in keeping with accepted standards of medical
practice and as required by the definition of “skilled care” as defined in the defendant’s policy.
Dr. Nwanko concluded that if Mrs. Lutz, a layperson, could provide adequate care for her son,
then the care received by, provided to, or required for the patient could not meet the level of care
as described in the policy.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, provided evidence, specifically through the testimony of
Lutz’s treating physicians, that Lutz required skilled care. Further, services which are payable
under the policy include “skilled nursing care”, that is, the “care must be provided or supervised
by a registered nurse employed by the home health care agency.” Therefore, while Mrs. Lutz is
not a registered nurse or a licensed practical nurse, the policy indicates that if a registered nurse
supervises her, then the care might be covered under the policy. However, because there are
conflicting accounts as to whether the care provided to Lutz was medically necessary and
whether Mrs. Lutz’s care can properly be defined as “skilled nursing care,” there are material
factual disputes that must be resolved by the trier of fact.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to plaintiff
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because there are material factual disputes as stated above that must be
resolved by the trier of fact.
In light of our resolution of defendant’s second issue, we need not address the last two
issues raised by defendant, which were not, in any event, raised in the trial court.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. No
taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, neither party having prevailed in full.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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