IN THE MATTER OF CONTEMPT OF CARL WILSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of Contempt of CARL WILSON.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 224091
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-381010
RAYMOND YOUNG,
Respondent,
and
CARL WILSON,
Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Doctoroff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Carl Wilson was the Legal Aid and Defender Association attorney representing
the juvenile respondent in the underlying action. According to the trial court, when the verdict in
that matter was announced appellant “high-fived” his client and exclaimed “yes,” prompting the
court to order appellant out of the courtroom for the remainder of the trial.1 At a summary
proceeding held later that same day, the trial court found appellant’s conduct to be contemptuous
and fined him $250. Appellant appeals as of right. We reverse and remand for a hearing before
a different judge.
Because we find it to be dispositive, we address only appellant’s claim that the summary
proceedings instituted against him failed to accord him the minimum requirements of due
1
Others who witnessed the incident stated that rather than actually give his client a “high five,”
appellant merely raised himself from his seat, made a gesture with his arm in which he raised and
lowered his fist toward his body, and then clapped his hands together before exclaiming “yes”
while pointing at the jury.
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process of law. Although the issuance of a contempt order is generally reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, In re Contempt of Steingold, 244 Mich App 153, 157; 624 NW2d 504 (2000), where,
as here, the issuance of such an order implicates due process concerns, appellate review is de
novo. See In re Carey, 241 Mich App 222, 225-226; 615 NW2d 742 (2000).
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that no state
shall deprive any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”2
Nevertheless, the ability of a court to summarily punish contemptuous behavior committed in its
presence has long been recognized in Michigan both by statute, How Stat § 7258,3 and in the
cases, In re Wood, 82 Mich 75, 81-82; 45 NW 1113 (1890). Because, however, summary
punishment does not allow for many of the procedural safeguards viewed as essential to
fundamental fairness, “[s]ummary punishment always, and rightly, is regarded with disfavor.”
Sacher v United States, 343 US 1, 8; 72 S Ct 451; 96 L Ed 717 (1952).
Summary procedures are permissible only in cases where the contempt is “direct,” i.e.,
committed in the immediate presence and view of the court. See In re Contempt of Auto Club
Ins Ass’n, 243 Mich App 697, 712; 624 NW2d 443 (2000). However, the rationale for this
distinction in procedure is that, in the case of a contempt committed in the midst of proceedings,
the trial court may need to punish summarily in order to uphold its dignity and authority. People
v Kurz, 35 Mich App 643, 656; 192 NW2d 594 (1971). This same rationale is not applicable to
contempt sanctions that are imposed after the proceedings have concluded:
[W]here conviction and punishment are delayed, “it is much more difficult to
argue that action without notice or hearing of any kind is necessary to preserve
order and enable [the court] to proceed with its business.” [Taylor v Hayes, 418
US 488, 498; 94 S Ct 2697; 41 L Ed 2d 897 (1974), quoting Groppi v Leslie, 404
US 496, 504; 92 S Ct 582; 30 L Ed 2d 632 (1972).]
Thus, the Taylor Court held that “before an attorney is finally adjudicated in contempt and
sentenced after trial for conduct during trial, he should have reasonable notice of the specific
charges and opportunity to be heard in his own behalf.” Id. at 498-499 (emphasis added).
In this case, although appellant was ejected from the courtroom during trial, the trial court
convicted and sentenced appellant for contempt after it had concluded the proceedings. Because,
as in Taylor, the conviction and sentence were imposed after the proceeding, the rationale for
summary punishment did not exist and notice and hearing on the charges should have been
granted.4
2
Const 1963, art 1, § 17 provides the same protection.
3
Presently MCL 600.1711.
4
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that at the time appellant was ejected from the
courtroom all that remained of the proceedings was to poll and dismiss the jury. We nonetheless
find the circumstances presented here to necessitate adherence to the procedures required where
conviction and sentence for contempt are delayed. Despite the nearly-concluded nature of the
proceedings no citation for contempt was issued at the time appellant was ejected, nor was
appellant given any opportunity to speak in his behalf with respect to his conduct. See Taylor,
(continued…)
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Moreover, such hearing was required to be held before a judge other than that which
presided over the proceeding in which the alleged contemptuous behavior occurred. See Kurz,
supra at 659. Although Taylor, supra, suggests that a hearing before a separate judge is required
only in those circumstances where the presiding judge has “become embroiled in a running
controversy with [the contemnor],” id. at 502, Michigan has adopted a more stringent
requirement. As noted by this Court in Kurz, supra:
It is not in the interest of the sound administration of justice to encourage persons
charged with or convicted of criminal contempt to search the transcript of
proceedings and attempt to demonstrate that the trial judge acted out of personal
animosity, or became personally embroiled, or that his objectivity can reasonably
be questioned. [Id. at 659-660.]
See also In re Contempt of Scharg, 207 Mich App 438, 440-441; 525 NW2d 479 (1994) (holding
that “Kurz requires a hearing before an independent judge in all deferred summary contempt
citations, regardless of the actual objectivity of the court”).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order holding appellant in contempt and remand
for a hearing before a different judge. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Helene N. White
(…continued)
supra at 498 (“[e]ven where summary punishment for contempt is imposed during trial, ‘the
contemnor has normally been given an opportunity to speak in his own behalf . . . .’”) (Citation
omitted). Additionally, we note that it is not clear from the record that the trial court’s finding of
contempt was based solely on appellant’s conduct immediately following the verdict. As noted
by appellant, the trial court’s comments during trial and at the summary contempt proceeding
suggest that although it was this final outburst that prompted the court to initiate the summary
proceedings, its finding of contempt may have additionally been based on other conduct by
appellant during trial.
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