NORA KALLIEL V PETER YAMIN DDS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NORA KALLIEL,
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BOARD OF
REGENTS, d/b/a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
SCHOOL OF DENTISTRY,
No. 223948
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98-017139-CM
Defendant-Appellee.
NORA KALLIEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
PETER YAMIN, DDS, and PAUL BYER, DDS,
No. 223949
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98-004934-NH
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff appeals as of right the order granting summary
disposition to defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10) in this dental malpractice case
in which plaintiff filed an amended complaint against defendants alleging gross negligence
resulting in the permanent dislocation of her temporomandibular joint.
Defendants moved for summary disposition on the grounds that governmental immunity
barred suit against them and that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether
defendants Byer and Yamin were grossly negligent. Plaintiff argued that defendants were
estopped from using the defense of governmental immunity because of representations of quality
care in a patient’s rights and responsibilities brochure published by defendants. Plaintiff also
argued that, because defendants failed to establish that plaintiff’s claims did not amount to gross
negligence, summary disposition was improper. The trial court agreed with defendants and
granted summary disposition on those grounds. We reverse.
-1-
We review orders granting summary disposition de novo.
Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
tests the factual basis underlying the plaintiff’s claim. “When a motion under subrule (C)(10) is
made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” MCR
2.116(G)(4). In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court accepts plaintiff’s wellpleaded allegations as true and construes them in favor of the plaintiff. Witherspoon v Guilford,
203 Mich App 240, 243; 511 NW2d 720 (1994). If no facts are in dispute, the issue of whether
plaintiff’s claim is statutorily barred is a question of law. Id.
A government agency is immune from tort liability where the agency is performing a
governmental function. MCL 691.1407(1). The Board of Regents of the University of Michigan
is a governmental agency under MCL 691.1401(1)(c). A “governmental function” is “an activity
that is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or
ordinance, or other law.” MCL 691.1401(1)(f). The University of Michigan School of Dentistry
and its dental clinic are authorized by statute. MCL 390.1 et seq. Therefore, its operation
constitutes a governmental function.
Likewise, government employees are also immune from tort liability so long as they are
acting within the scope of their authority, their government agency is performing a governmental
function, and their conduct does not amount to “gross negligence.” MCL 691.1407(2). It is
undisputed that defendants Byer and Yamin were acting within the scope of their authority in
treating plaintiff. Likewise, as noted above, the University of Michigan’s operation of the dental
clinic is a governmental function. Thus, the only issue is whether the conduct of defendants
Yamin and Byer amounted to “gross negligence.”
Plaintiff contends that governmental immunity is an affirmative defense for which
defendants must plead supporting facts, and cites Patterson v Kleiman, 199 Mich App 191, 192;
500 NW2d 761 (1993) for that proposition. Patterson is factually distinct from the present case.
In Patterson, the plaintiff alleged ordinary negligence in support of a medical malpractice claim.
Id. The plaintiff never alleged gross negligence, and this Court found that, because the plaintiff
was not required to anticipate an affirmative defense, the plaintiff had no duty to allege gross
negligence. Id.
Unlike the plaintiff in Patterson, plaintiff did amend her complaint to allege gross
negligence against defendants. Having alleged gross negligence, plaintiff is required to set forth
facts showing gross negligence in order to survive summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 122-123; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); Jackson v
Saginaw Co, 458 Mich 141, 150-151; 580 NW2d 870 (1998). Thus, Patterson is not dispositive.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff had the burden of establishing that
a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendants’ conduct amounted to gross
negligence.
Gross negligence is defined as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack
of concern for whether an injury results.” MCL 691.1407(2)(c). Here, plaintiff alleged that
defendants were grossly negligent for requiring plaintiff to wait seven months between the time
of her root canal and the time she received permanent crowns, resulting in the “shifting of the
-2-
occlusion and the need for newly fitted crowns.” Plaintiff also alleged that defendant Byer
forced a crown onto a tooth that he knew did not fit the tooth. She alleged that the excessive
pressure and force used, as well as the grinding down of the crown for 2-1/2 hours, either caused
or contributed to the displacement of plaintiff’s temporomandibular joints and resulted in the
crowding and uneven spacing of plaintiff’s remaining teeth. She also alleged that defendants
failed to attach dental significance to plaintiff’s complaints of joint pain, discomfort and
dysfunction following the crown placement procedure and failed to advise plaintiff that she
suffered from a temporomandibular joint condition that required immediate treatment in order to
avoid permanent injury. Plaintiff also filed an affidavit of merit that set forth the applicable
standard of care, how defendants’ conduct breached that standard, and how this breach caused
the permanent dislocation of plaintiff’s temporomandibular joints. Keeping in mind that we
must give the benefit of any doubt to the nonmoving party and must be liberal in finding a
genuine issue of fact, Zine v Chrysler, 236 Mich App 261, 270; 600 NW2d 384 (1999), we
conclude that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether defendants’ conduct was “so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of
concern for whether an injury results.” Therefore, the trial court incorrectly dismissed plaintiff’s
complaint pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
As an alternative ground for reversal, plaintiff contends summary disposition should have
been denied because defendants waived or are estopped from claiming immunity by virtue of
their having published a patient’s rights and responsibilities brochure promising potential
patients adequate and appropriate care. Regardless of whether such a common-law exception to
governmental immunity exists, plaintiff has failed to establish detrimental reliance, an essential
element required for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply. Plaintiff presented no evidence
that she received defendants’ patient’s rights brochure, that she read it, or that she acted in
reliance on the promises of quality care in the brochure when she submitted herself to treatment
at the dental clinic. Thus, regardless of whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel may bar
governmental immunity under certain circumstances, plaintiff has failed to establish all the
elements necessary for equitable estoppel to arise. Conagra, Inc v Farmers Bank, 237 Mich App
109, 141; 602 NW2d 390 (1999).
Reversed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.