EMMETT CHASTAIN V GENERAL MOTORS CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EMMETT CHASTAIN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 222502
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 93-4415-NP
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Hood and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this product liability action, plaintiff Emmett Chastain appeals by right the May 10,
1999 judgment in favor of defendant. This judgment was entered pursuant to a five to one jury
finding that defendant was not liable for plaintiff’s injuries which arose when plaintiff was
involved in a single-car rollover accident. We affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings
A. The Accident
On March 25, 1991, plaintiff Emmitt Chastain, an employee of Cashman Equipment
Company (Cashman), located in Elko, Nevada, was given two boxes of parts to deliver to
another Cashman employee. That employee worked out of Cashman’s Round Mountain Gold
Mine Office. As was standard with such deliveries, plaintiff was to meet the Round Mountain
employee in Eureka, Nevada,1 at which time the boxes would be given to the Round Mountain
employee. In order to reach Eureka, plaintiff was provided with a company owned 1988
Chevrolet C/K pickup truck, one of several truck used for deliveries.
Before beginning the trip, plaintiff testified that he gave the truck a cursory look to “make
sure [the] tires were inflated,” that the gauges looked good and that “everything” looked alright
with the truck. Plaintiff also testified that he went to a gas station in order to “fill up” the truck,
put his seatbelt on, and began the trip. In order to reach Eureka, plaintiff began driving
1
It appears as if Eureka was the half-way point between Elko and Round Mountain. In any
event, it is undisputed that this was the city in which Elko and Round Mountain Cashman
employees would meet to exchange parts being delivered to the other location.
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southbound on State Highway 278 at a speed of sixty miles per hour. At the time plaintiff began
the trip, the weather was clear and dry. However, sometime during the trip it began to snow,
causing plaintiff to slow to a speed of approximately fifty miles per hour. Shortly thereafter,
plaintiff lost control of the truck. According to plaintiff, the truck began to slide toward the
opposite lane of traffic, then began traveling backwards, eventually going off the road, where it
hit a roadway marker and a shallow embankment, rolled over, and began hitting things in a “very
violent” manner. The plaintiff also testified that he was ejected from the truck through the
driver’s side window, landing on the ground on his back. Plaintiff found himself unable to move
his legs with no way to seek assistance. He remained on the side of the highway until he was
discovered by Jerry Sestanovich, a local rancher.
After being on the scene for about ten minutes, Sestanovich was able to stop a passing
truck and ask the driver to call for help. Approximately ten minutes later, officers from the
Lander and Eureka County Sheriff’s Departments, as well as emergency medical personnel,
arrived at the scene. It is undisputed that upon their arrival at the scene plaintiff, either
voluntarily or in response to questions asked of him, informed them that he was wearing his
seatbelt and therefore was confused and concerned about how he ended up outside of the truck.
B. Defendant’s Injuries
Plaintiff was treated at the scene by, among others, Dr. Rod Phillips. Dr. Phillips noticed
that while plaintiff appeared to be conscious and alert, he was complaining of pain in his neck
and abdomen areas and that his legs were cold and numb. Dr. Phillips also noticed that plaintiff
was ashen in color, having trouble breathing, spitting blood, and had a large contusion on his
back between his T-10 and T-12 vertebrae. Based on these symptoms and complaints, Dr.
Phillips believed that plaintiff probably suffered a spinal cord injury. Accordingly, after
plaintiff’s was stabilized, his neck and back were immobilized and he was transported by
ambulance to the Eureka Airport where he was then taken by plane to the Washoe Medical
Center. At Washoe Medical Center, Dr. Phillips initial assessment was proven to be correct –
plaintiff had fractured his spine between the T-11 and T-12 vertebrae. Plaintiff then underwent a
surgical procedure known as a bilateral fusion in which Harrington Rods were inserted in order
to stabilize his spine. Despite these medical efforts, plaintiff was rendered a paraplegic, being
unable to use his legs or feel any sensation below his waist. In addition to the lose of use in his
legs, plaintiff, who was aged twenty-three at the time of the accident, was left sexually
dysfunctional, has a neurogenic bladder,2 cardiovascular problems, and decubitus ulcers. As a
result, plaintiff requires attendant care to assist him with his daily routine.
2
A “neurogenic bladder” is defined as: “A urinary bladder functioning improperly or with
difficulty because of a lesion (injury or disorder) somewhere in the nervous system. Similarly, a
“cord bladder” is defined as: “A urinary bladder functioning improperly because of a lesion
(injury or disorder) in the spinal cord which affects the nerve mechanism controlling the
bladder.” Attorneys’ Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder (2000), p B-128.
In addition to the cord or neurogenic bladder, plaintiff lost control of his bowel functions as well.
As a result, in order to have a bowel movement, plaintiff must insert a suppository and then
digitally stimulate his rectum.
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C. Accident Investigation
The official accident investigation was conducted by Officer John Schweble of the
Nevada Highway Patrol, who arrived at the scene approximately two-and- one-half hours
following the accident, after plaintiff had been taken to the hospital and no one was present at the
scene.3 Officer Schweble examined the accident scene and truck, took photographs and
measurements, and drew a diagram. After returning to Eureka he also conducted interviews with
people who came to the aid of plaintiff immediately after the accident.
In examining the truck, Officer Schweble determined that the lack of tread on the rear
tires approached illegal levels. Officer Schweble also noted, based on the witness statement of
Sestanovich, that plaintiff was driving approximately fifty miles per hour and that the road
conditions were snowy and icy at the time of the accident.4 Therefore, Officer Schweble
concluded that, based on the conditions of both the weather and the tires, plaintiff was driving at
an unsafe speed, causing the truck to hydroplane and lose control. He also concluded, and was
permitted to testify at trial, that plaintiff was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident.
Officer Schweble reached this conclusion even though he never interviewed plaintiff; never
touched, examined, or tested the seatbelt; and had been informed by Officer Mark Salopek, of
the Eureka County Sheriff’s Department, that plaintiff told him and others at the scene that he
was wearing the seatbelt at the time of the accident.
D. The Complaint, Discovery Requests and Trial
In September 1993, plaintiff filed the instant complaint against defendant and AlliedSignal, Inc.5 Specifically, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the seatbelt, known as a Joint
Development Company (JDC) buckle was defective and that because of this defect, the buckle,
instead of restraining him, released either before or after the accident, causing him to be ejected
from the truck. Plaintiff contended that the buckle released either because it was “false latched”6
or because it was subject to inertial release.7
Prior to trial, on March 30, 1998, four years after the end of discovery, plaintiff filed a
motion to compel discovery. That motion requested production of the following materials: (1)
3
This is true even though officers from the Lander and Eureka County Sheriff’s Departments
were at the scene while plaintiff was still present.
4
The road being snowy and icy was also corroborated by the witness statement and testimony of
William Hicks, who was that state highway employee responsible for plowing the road at the
time of plaintiff’s accident.
5
Plaintiff and Allied-Signal reached settlement before trial; accordingly, Allied-Signal is not a
party to this appeal. The claim was brought against both defendant and Allied-Signal because
the seatbelt in question had been designed, tested, and manufactured by Allied-Signal on behalf
of defendant.
6
“False latch” means that a seatbelt buckle appears to be properly latched; however, for various
reasons, the seatbelt is not properly latched and therefore releases when force is applied.
7
“Inertial release” means that due to the force and acceleration of the crash, parts within the
seatbelt are moved, causing it to release from the lock.
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crash and sled tests conducted by General Motors in which the JDC buckle was found unlatched
at the conclusion of the tests; (2) inertial General Motors test incident reports (TIFS) which noted
an unlatching problem with the JDC buckle, especially TIRS for post-1993 C/K vehicles,; (3)
over 150 consumer reports of problems related to the JDC buckle; (4) documents pertaining to
preliminary evaluations, engineering analyses and recall of some C/K trucks, including
documents relating to the discovery of the conditions leading to the recall, and; (5) GM’s
“lawsuit list.”
Plaintiff’s motion was heard on April 13, 1998. However, in lieu of deciding the issue,
the trial court assigned the case to another judge in the hopes that it could be settled. After
settlement was impossible, the motion was again heard by the trial court. Because the trial court
believed that the requested information was irrelevant, the request was denied.8 Thus, the case
was scheduled for trial.
At trial, plaintiff called, among numerous witnesses, an engineering expert who testified
that the seatbelt was defectively manufactured and that as a result of this defect, the seatbelt was
more likely to release due to either “false latch” or inertial release. Specifically, plaintiff’s
expert, Stephen R. Syson, testified that a particular part on the seatbelt latch, known as the
banana slot or “L” shaped space is to have a maximum radius of two-tenths of a millimeter,
however, the seatbelt on the driver’s side of plaintiff’s truck had a radius of approximately one
millimeter. Therefore, according to plaintiff’s expert, because the radius of the banana slot was
about five times larger than it should have been, the seatbelt had a higher probability of being
false latched or coming unlatched due to inertial release.
Syson also testified that he was able to false latch the seatbelts in the truck driven by
plaintiff about one out of three times he attempted to do so.9 Syson went on to testify that
according to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 209, if a seatbelt is false latched it
is to supposed to unlatch whenever the force upon it is five pounds or less; however, the seatbelts
in plaintiff’s truck were, according to Syson’s tests and testimony, able to withstand anywhere
from six to over fifty pounds of force before the tongue would separate from the buckle. Syson
indicated during his testimony that this was unsafe because it meant that a falsely latched seatbelt
could remain buckled up to the time in which someone is involved in an accident, only then to
release during the accident, causing injury to the occupant.
In contrast to plaintiff’s theory, defendant sought to rebut plaintiff’s contention that
plaintiff’s seatbelt was defective or that it could have come unlatched during an accident.
Defendant called expert witnesses to testify that the seatbelt was not defective and that even if it
was defective, plaintiff’s seatbelt would not have come unlatched during this accident. Thus,
defendant’s main defense was that plaintiff was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the
accident. In an effort to prove this, defendant not only called Officer Schweble to testify that, in
8
Specifically, the court stated that it did not “think there was relevance because I don’t think it
would come in under 407 [subsequent remedial measures], and I’m going to deny your request.”
9
Syson testified that it is possible to attempt to achieve a false latch by holding down on the
seatbelt release button while inserting the seatbelt latch into the buckle.
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his opinion plaintiff was not wearing his seatbelt,10 but also called witnesses to testify that if
plaintiff had been wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident, plaintiff would have suffered
injuries to the left side of his arm, his left armpit, and the left side of his neck. In addition,
defendant relied on the testimony of plaintiff’s own witnesses to prove the supposition that there
would have been noticeable marks on plaintiff’s body, if he had, in fact, been wearing the
seatbelt at the time of the accident.
On March, 15, 1999, the jury returned a five to one verdict in favor of defendant.
Plaintiff now appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Officer Schweble’s Testimony
10
Specifically, Officer Schweble testified as follows:
Q. Can you tell the jury what your opinion is about whether the plaintiff was
wearing a seat belt?
A. As I indicated on my report that I indicated that I felt that he – that they were
not used that day.
Q. Now, what was it that you based that opinion on?
A. Because the defendant was ejected from the vehicle and the seatbelts were
there, you know, and the vehicle – I looked at them, I didn’t test them, but they
looked like they were in workable order and that’s where I formulated my opinion
because he was ejected.
***
Q. Does your past experience serve as the basis for your opinion here?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Can you tell us what it is about your past that had some affect on your opinion
here?
A. Because I have had other incidents where I have investigated accidents where
people have said they have their seat belt [sic] on and after questioning them a
little bit they have admitted that they didn’t.
Q. Is that one of the reasons that you concluded, based on what you saw at the
scene, that the plaintiff wasn’t wearing his seat belt?
***
A. Yes, I did.
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Plaintiff first contends that pursuant to Miller v Hensley, 244 Mich App 528; 624 NW2d
582 (2001), the trial court erred when it permitted Officer Schweble to provide lay opinion
testimony regarding plaintiff’s seatbelt use at the time of the accident.11 While we find this to be
a close question, we disagree.12
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v
Smith, 456 Mich 543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998). Close questions arising from the trial court’s
exercise of discretion on an evidentiary issue should not be reversed simply because the
reviewing court would have ruled differently. Id.; People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 289; 531
NW2d 659 (1995). The trial court’s decision on a close evidentiary question ordinarily cannot
be an abuse of discretion. Id. In addition, evidentiary errors are subject to a harmless error
analysis. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 491; 596 NW2d 607 (1999); People v Mateo, 453
Mich 203, 212; 551 NW2d 891 (1996); see also MCL 769.26 and MRE 103. Under the harmless
error rule, reversal of a jury decision is only warranted if, after reviewing the whole record, it is
apparent that a miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the improperly admitted evidence.
Lukity, supra; Mateo, supra.
In Miller, this Court indicated that investigating police officers are permitted to provide
lay opinion testimony when such testimony is based on the police officers own direct
observations and analysis of the accident scene. Id. at 531. Nonetheless, there, the Court held
that because the testimony of the officers in question was not rationally based on their own
perceptions as required by MRE 701,13 it was inadmissible. Id. In Miller, the trial court
permitted two police officers to testify that in their opinion the plaintiff was at fault for the
accident because they concluded that the defendant’s vehicle entered the intersection on a yellow
light. Id. In reversing, this Court stated that because
neither officer was present at the time of the collision[,] [t]he officers’
conclusions as to the color of the traffic light when defendant entered the
intersection were based solely on statement made by witnesses at the accident
scene. Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the officers’ opinions as to
11
See n 10, supra.
12
Plaintiff also challenges the testimony of Emergency Medical Technician Hillery Leslie as
being improper lay opinion testimony. However, because Leslie testified at trial by way of
deposition and plaintiff has failed to ensure that a transcript of Leslie’s testimony was made part
of the lower court record, any review of Leslie’s testimony would be speculative. Therefore, we
cannot review the propriety of Leslie’s testimony. Band v Livonia Associates, 176 Mich App 95,
103-104; 439 NW2d 285 (1989).
13
MRE 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
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fault were not based on their view of the vehicles and their observations of the
point of impact. [Id.]
The Court then found that because the evidentiary error was not harmless, it required reversal:
In this case, the admission of the officers’ testimony that plaintiff was at
fault for the collision, over plaintiff’s objection, involved the principal issue of the
case and the jury rendered a verdict in conformance with the officers’ improper
testimony. Further, contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, trial testimony
did not clearly establish that plaintiff caused the collision. Plaintiff testified that
the traffic light had turned red before she started to make her turn onto Campbell.
The eyewitness testified that he was unable to recall the color of the light at the
time defendant’s vehicle entered the intersection. Consequently, substantial
justice requires that we reverse the judgment for defendant and remand this matter
for a new trial. [Id.]
Here, because Miller requires us to undertake a harmless error analysis in order to
determine whether reversal is required, we will assume without deciding that Officer Scweble’s
testimony was improperly admitted and instead determine whether any error in admitting Officer
Schweble’s testimony was harmless. Lukity, supra; Mateo, supra. We conclude that it was.
Defendant’s engineering expert testified that because plaintiff would not have fit through
the loop of the webbing that was keeping him from getting out of the vehicle it would have been
impossible for plaintiff to be expelled from the truck if he had been wearing his seatbelt. In
addition, defendant put testimony in the record indicating that due to the force of leaving the
road, the seatbelts in the truck would have locked up early on in the accident sequence. Thus,
had plaintiff been wearing the seatbelt and it came unlatched, it would have locked in the
position it was prior to becoming unlatched and would have remained in that position until
someone unlocked it. Here, the seatbelt was locked fully in its dislodged position, showing no
signs of ever being pulled out from its “rest” position.
Moreover, plaintiff’s own doctor testified that if plaintiff had worn the seatbelt, it would
have likely caused bruising or injuries to the left side of defendant’s body; however, no such
bruising or injuries occurred here. This testimony was corroborated by one of the emergency
medical technicians at the scene, who testified that if someone was wearing a seatbelt during an
accident “there is usually a read mark or something” indicating that a seatbelt had been worn.
Based on this unchallenged testimony, it is apparent that the jury was free to disregard Officer
Schweble’s conclusion that plaintiff failed to use his seatbelt on the day in question and still
conclude that the seatbelt had not been worn. Because there was substantial unchallenged
testimony presented at trial regarding the likelihood that plaintiff was not belted at the time of the
accident, we conclude that any error in Officer Schweble’s testimony was harmless.14
14
In furtherance of this finding, we note that the jury was read the defendant’s theory of the case,
which, did not rely on Officer Schweble’s testimony, but instead relied on the physical and
scientific reasons as to why plaintiff was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident.
Specifically, the jury was informed that defendant’s theory of the case was as follows:
(continued…)
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B. Special Jury Instructions
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred by refusing to read his requested special
jury instruction. We disagree. We review a trial court’s decision regarding jury instructions for
an abuse of discretion. Joerger v Gordon Food Service, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 173; 568
NW2d 365 (1997). When a party so requests, a court must give a standard jury instruction if it is
applicable and accurately states the law. MCR 2.516(D)(2). Nonetheless, we will not find error
requiring reversal if, on balance, the trial court adequately and fairly conveyed the applicable law
and theories of the parties to the jury. Stevens v Veenstra, 226 Mich App 441, 443; 573 NW2d
341 (1997).
Plaintiff’s requested jury instruction stated:
I charge you under Michigan law that an automobile manufacturer like
General Motors Corporation is liable for negligence in manufacture or inspection
of parts of an automobile directly related to its safe operation even if the defective
part was supplied by others.
In lieu of the special instruction, the trial court provided the jury with the following jury
instruction, modeled after the first paragraph of SJI2d 15.05:
(…continued)
Plaintiff’s ejection was due to his failure to wear his seat belt. The JDC
seat belt buckle was not defective in any way. The buckle was thoroughly
designed and tested and complied with all Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards and General Motors’ specification.
The size of the radius and banana slots does not affect the buckle’s
resistance to initial [sic] unlatch or false latch.
False latch of the JDC buckle is possible only under conditions of
manipulation which are dissimilar to actual use. False latch is an extremely and
unusually difficult condition to achieve in conditions of actual use and
particularly when replicating the method of buckle up claimed by plaintiff in the
truck.
Inertial unlatch of the JDC buckle could not and did not in [sic] this slowspeed accident. The forces in this accident could not product inertial unlatch.
Plaintiff claimed he was belted at the scene because he was aware of state
law requiring belt use and he knew that there was a penalty for violating the law.
He was also aware of company policy requiring seat belt use and because he had
just been involved in an accident with the company truck, he also did not want to
accept responsibility for his life-altering mistake.
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If you decide that defendant General Motors Corporation was negligent
and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence, it is not a
defense that the conduct of Allied[-]Signal, who is not a party to this suit also may
have been cause of this occurrence.
The court did not provide the jury with the second paragraph of SJI2d 15.05.
After reviewing the record in the instant case, it is apparent that plaintiff only requested
the special jury instruction in the event that the trial court decided to instruct the jury with the
second paragraph of SJI2d 15.05. The record also reveals that plaintiff agreed with the trial
court’s jury instructions as given. Thus, because plaintiff acquiesced in the trial court’s decision
to read only the first paragraph of SJI2d 15.05 in lieu of the special jury instruction, plaintiff is
not entitled to any relief with regard to this issue. Hilgendorf v Saint John Hospital & Medical
Center Corp, 245 Mich 670, 683, 696; ___ NW2d ___ (2001); Dresselhouse v Chrysler Corp,
177 Mich App 470, 477; 442 NW2d 705 (1989). Further, because the trial court also instructed
the jury pursuant to SJI2d 25.31, and provided the jury with plaintiff’s theory of the case, which
pointed out that since defendant chose Allied-Signal to design and manufacture the seatbelts in
plaintiff’s truck, it was responsible for any defect in those buckles, it is evident that the jury was
not misled or confused by the failure to read plaintiff’s requested jury instruction and that it was
adequately and fairly conveyed the applicable law and theories of the parties. Hilgendorf, supra
at 696, quoting Grzesick v Cepela, 237 Mich App 554, 559; 603 NW2d 809 (1999); Steven,
supra at 442. Accordingly, because we are unable to find error that is inconsistent with
substantial justice, the jury verdict will not be reversed. Hilgendorf, supra.
C. Discovery Requests
Plaintiff further contends that the trial court erred when it denied its discovery request
that defendant be compelled to produce all crash and sled tests documents where the JDC buckle
released during the test and also erred when it denied plaintiff’s discovery request for all civil
claims, consumer complaints, and incident reports filed against defendant alleging that a JDC
buckle opened during an accident. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the information regarding
these tests is relevant because the tests involved the exact type of seatbelt plaintiff’s truck was
equipped with at the time of the accident and that even if inadmissible as a subsequent remedial
measure under MRE 407, the information should have been discoverable. Again, we disagree.
This Court review of a trial court’s decision to grant or deny discovery request is for an
abuse of discretion. Harrison v Olde Financial, 225 Mich App 601, 614; 572 NW2d 679 (1997);
Mercy Mt Clemens v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 219 Mich App 46, 50; 555 NW2d 871 (1996).
Here, plaintiff sought to discover tests and documents pertaining to vehicles
manufactured several years after the truck plaintiff was driving on the day in question. In
addition, the test results requested by plaintiff did not pertain to accidents similar to the one
plaintiff was involved in.15 Thus, it is impossible for us to conclude that had defendant provided
15
The recall involving 1994-95 C/K pickups dealt with concerns involving seatbelts releasing in
frontal collisions, not rollover accidents. In addition, the seatbelts involved in the recall involved
energy management loops that were not present on plaintiff’s seatbelt. See Appendix D at 2-3.
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plaintiff with the requested material, plaintiff would have been able to find evidence that made it
more probable that plaintiff’s seatbelt was negligently designed. See MRE 401. In addition,
because plaintiff never indicated how the requested material was substantially similar to
plaintiff’s accident, the court was within its discretion to deny the discovery request. See
Haberkorn v Chrysler Corp, 210 Mich App 354, 368-369; 533 NW2d 373 (1995).
We also note that a trial court is within its discretion to limit discovery when it becomes
excessive or abusive. In re Hammond, 215 Mich App 379, 387; 547 NW2d 36 (1996);
Hartmann v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 194 Mich App 25, 29; 486 NW2d 53 (1992). Here,
the additional discovery was requested eight years after the accident, almost five years after the
complaint was filed, and three years after discovery was closed. In addition, the trial had been
adjourned several times previously, plaintiff had indicated at the April 13, 1998 motion hearing
that it was almost ready for trial, and it is apparent that plaintiff sought the extra discovery in an
effort to open a new theory of the case. Based on these facts, we are unable to find an abuse of
discretion.
Finally, the fact that the trial court ostensibly denied the discovery request based on MRE
407 has no effect on our determination. Because the trial court reached the right result, this
Court should not reverse the trial court’s decision regarding this discovery request. See
Hilgendorf, supra at 685 n 8, citing Glazer v Lamkin, 201 Mich App 432, 437; 506 NW2d 570
(1993).
III. Conclusion
In sum, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s
discovery requests, did not err when it refused to read plaintiff’s special jury instruction, and
since any error in the admission of Officer’s Schweble’s testimony was harmless, we are not
persuaded that the jury verdict was in error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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