PEOPLE OF MI V DOMINGO A SIERRA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 220908
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-155085-FC
DOMINGO A. SIERRA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Doctoroff and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals his jury trial convictions for possession with intent to deliver more
than 650 grams of a controlled substance (cocaine), MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), and felony-firearm,
MCL 750.227b. We affirm.
Defendant asserts that the trial court committed clear error by allowing evidence of
statements he made to police on three occasions to be presented to the jury, asserting that his
knowledge of English was insufficient for him to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
waiver of his Miranda1 rights. We disagree.
We review de novo the trial court’s resolution of this issue, but review the factual
findings for clear error while deferring to the trial court’s resolution of credibility questions.
People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). We consider the question in the
totality of all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation in which the rights were
allegedly waived, and the burden is on the prosecutor to prove that waiver was proper by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 27.
Here, the trial court found that defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights on each occasion
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and we find no clear error in this ruling, as it was based
on a good deal of evidence, and on the trial court’s resolution of credibility questions. The trial
court considered the testimony of the officer to whom the statements were made, who testified
that he not only read defendant his Miranda rights each time, but explained them to him, and
questioned him to make sure he understood them. The officer testified that defendant did appear
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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to understand and that, although defendant’s English was not perfect, defendant demonstrated an
ability to understand most of what was said to him and to communicate during their
conversations. The trial court also had an opportunity to view the tape of two of the three
occasions on which the warnings were given, and the ensuing interviews, and to form its own
opinion regarding the level of defendant’s understanding. The court also had the opportunity to
hear defendant, who testified at the hearing on suppression of the statements, and to make
credibility determinations regarding his statements. Given all the evidence considered, and our
deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, we cannot say that it clearly erred in
determining that defendant understood the Miranda warnings, and intelligently and voluntarily
waived his rights.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he had sold
cocaine on several occasions during the week in which he was arrested, and also that the car
mechanic with him on the premises where the cocaine was found at the time of his arrest
expected defendant to pay him for the vehicle repairs with cocaine. Again, we disagree. We
review a trial court’s rulings on admission of evidence for abuse of discretion, People v
Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998), and found none here. The evidence was
not admitted as evidence of other bad acts evidence; rather, it was admitted as part of the res
gestae of the crime with which he was charged, to prove one of the elements, his intent, as
manifested by his actions, to distribute the cocaine. Such res gestae evidence has long been
recognized as being properly admissible. See People v Savage, 225 Mich 84, 86; 195 NW 669
(1923). The evidence was not inadmissible on the ground that it implies “that defendant had
been involved in other criminal transactions,” as there were no such other criminal transactions
at issue. People v McDaniel, 99 Mich App 582, 584; 297 NW2d 724 (1980). The trial court
carefully considered the standard required by MRE 404(b) governing admission of prejudicial
character evidence, took care to exclude any evidence of drug deals in which defendant had
participated on earlier occasions when the cocaine involved in the instant case was not allegedly
under his control, and excluded evidence that defendant may have paid his mechanic with
cocaine on earlier occasions. It is true that the mechanic, after the court ruled that this evidence
was not admissible, volunteered this information at a time when it was not directly responsive to
any question. No objection was made to this unsolicited statement, however, and under the plain
error standard of People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), it does not
provide a ground for reversal.
Similarly, defendant now complains for the first time on appeal that the mechanic
testified briefly regarding a friendship or romantic relationship between defendant and the
mechanic’s fourteen-year-old daughter, which he asserts was prejudicial, given that defendant
was then almost twice her age. Again, the Carines standard was not met. The references to any
relationship between defendant and the mechanic’s daughter were fleeting and fairly innocuous,
and the trial court took care to exclude any prejudicial evidence on this subject, including
photographs of defendant with the young woman.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the
search warrant. Specifically, defendant claims error because the affidavit contained false and
misleading information, including references to drug transactions conducted by another person
with a similar name. We disagree. To prevail on this claim, defendant must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit contained false statements, made with
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knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth, and that the false material
was necessary to establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant. People v Coy, 243 Mich
App 283, 314-315; 620 NW2d 888 (2000); People v Stumpf, 196 Mich App 218, 224; 492 NW2d
795 (1992).
Here, we agree with the trial court that the contents of the affidavit without the disputed
statements was sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The
affidavit included statements from confidential informants that drugs were being kept on the
premises, that the confidential informants had purchased them there and saw them kept in
abandoned vehicles on the property, and that a controlled buy of cocaine had just taken place at
the premises. With these overwhelming independent grounds for the issuance of the warrant,
probable cause existed without the erroneous references to the person with whom police
confused defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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