VED SOFTWARE SERV INC V JOSEPH SAHAYA S B FERNANDO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
VED SOFTWARE SERVICES, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
November 27, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 224393
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-019469-CK
JOSEPH SAHAYA S.B. FERNANDO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Neff and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff VED Software Services, Inc., appeals as of right the trial court’s order
dismissing this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. We decide this appeal without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E). We reverse.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
VED Software is a Michigan corporation that provides software, consulting, and
programming services to its clients. VED Software recruited and hired defendant Joseph
Fernando, a citizen of India, paying the cost for his move from India to Michigan in May 1999.
For three to four weeks, VED Software trained Fernando in Michigan, where he signed his
employment agreement. VED Software then assigned him to a client in California, where
Fernando moved in June 1999.
Fernando’s employment agreement with VED Software included a clause that generally
prohibited him from soliciting or providing services to VED Software’s clients or the clients’
employees without VED Software’s consent. This clause applied through two years after
Fernando left his employment with VED Software. The agreement also stated that “Employer or
Employee may bring suit without a jury under this Agreement in Oakland County, Michigan.”
In a November 1999 letter, Fernando informed VED Software that he was resigning. He
indicated that he had accepted an offer with the client to whom VED Software had assigned him.
In response, VED Software sent Fernando a letter reminding him of the provisions in the
employment agreement. Fernando apparently failed to heed VED Software’s reminder.
VED Software then sued Fernando in Oakland Circuit Court alleging breach of contract
and tortious interference with business relations and contract. Fernando moved to dismiss the
complaint on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction. However, VED Software argued that
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Fernando, through the employment agreement, consented to jurisdiction in Michigan and that
Michigan courts have jurisdiction over Fernando under the long-arm statute.1 The trial court
disagreed. Avoiding the issue whether Fernando consented to personal jurisdiction in Michigan,
the trial court concluded that Fernando’s contacts with Michigan were insufficient for courts of
this state to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Consequently, the trial court granted
Fernando’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(1), dismissing VED
Software’s complaint.
In this appeal, VED Software maintains that Fernando consented to personal jurisdiction
in Michigan. Further, it claimed, that the trial court erred in finding that Fernando lacked
sufficient minimum contacts with Michigan to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
II. Standard Of Review And Legal Standard For Summary Disposition
Review de novo is appropriate for an order granting summary disposition.2 A motion for
summary disposition may be granted under MCR 2.116(C)(1) when “[t]he court lacks
jurisdiction over the person or property.” Generally, whether to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant must be determined in light of the particular facts of the case.3 Consequently, it
makes perfect sense that the court rule require that, when determining whether personal
jurisdiction exists, the trial court must examine all the documentary evidence on the record.4
III. Personal Jurisdiction
MCL 600.705, Michigan’s long-arm statute concerning individuals, provides in relevant
part:
[T]he relationships between an individual or his agent and the state shall
constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this
state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over the individual and to enable
such courts to render personal judgments against the individual or his
representative arising out of the act or acts which create any of the following
relationships:
(1)
The transaction of any business within the state;
Courts construe the phrase “transaction of any business” broadly.5 “The word ‘any’ means just
what it says. It includes ‘each’ and ‘every.’ It comprehends ‘the slightest.’”6
1
See MCL 600.705.
2
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
3
Jeffrey v Rapid American Corp, 448 Mich 178, 187; 529 NW2d 644 (1995).
4
MCR 2.116(G)(5).
5
Sifers v Horen, 385 Mich 195, 199; 188 NW2d 623 (1971).
6
Id. at 199, n 2 (citations omitted).
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According to the record, Fernando traveled to Michigan to work for VED Software. He
signed his employment agreement in Michigan. He received training from VED Software for
approximately for three weeks in Michigan. Fernando received his paychecks in Michigan,
which were deposited in his account in a Michigan financial institution. Clearly, the business
VED Software and Fernando conducted with each other occurred in Michigan. Therefore, VED
Software provided sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of the statute.
Nevertheless, to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over a defendant, jurisdiction must
also satisfy due process.7 To determine whether exercising jurisdiction meets the constitutional
standard, courts apply a three-pronged test that focuses on the defendant’s contacts with the
state:
First, the defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in Michigan, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of this state’s laws. Second, the cause of action must arise from the
defendant’s activities in the state. Third, the defendant’s activities must be
substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendant reasonable.[8]
This test aims to ensure that exercising jurisdiction “‘does not offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice”’”9 by focusing on conduct that tends to reveal that the defendant
could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state.10
“The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the
defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.”[11]
There is no question that Fernando “purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in Michigan” by traveling from India to Michigan to gain employment with
VED Software, a Michigan corporation. He executed his employment contract, received
training, and, for a short period, resided in Michigan. Fernando also obtained and maintains a
financial account in Michigan, into which he deposited paychecks from plaintiff. As for VED
Software’s cause of action arising from Fernando’s activities in Michigan, Fernando breached
7
See Witbeck v Bill Cody’s Ranch Inn, 428 Mich 659, 666; 411 NW2d 439 (1987).
8
Jeffrey, supra at 186, quoting Mozdy v Lopez, 197 Mich App 356, 359; 494 NW2d 866 (1992).
9
Witbeck, supra at 666, quoting Int’l Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316; 66 S Ct 154; 90
L Ed 95 (1945) and citing Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 474; 105 S Ct 2174; 85
LEd2d 528 (1985).
10
Witbeck, supra at 667.
11
Id., quoting Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 253; 78 S Ct 1228; 2 L Ed 2d 1283 (1958).
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the employment contract signed in Michigan, affecting his Michigan corporate employer.
Finally, we do not need to decide whether Fernando actually consented to personal jurisdiction in
Michigan. Still, his activities in this state, added to the explicit clause in his contract with VED
Software referring to jurisdiction in Oakland County, only underscores the reasonableness of
personal jurisdiction in this case.
Being haled into court in Michigan certainly was not the product of Fernando’s
“‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts” with this state or VED Software’s unilateral
activities.12 Though there is likely some amount of burden Fernando will have to bear in
defending this suit while living in California, we cannot say that VED Software’s concern for
adjudicating this dispute in a convenient location is less important given Fernando’s rather
substantial contacts with VED Software in this state.13 Therefore, the trial court erred in granting
Fernando’s motion for summary disposition.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
12
Witbeck, supra at 667, quoting Keeton v Hustler Magazine, Inc, 465 US 770, 774; 104 S Ct
1473; 79 L Ed 2d 790 (1984).
13
See, generally, Witbeck, supra at 669.
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