PEOPLE OF MI V AARON EUGENE SCHEIB
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 225054
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 99-002169-FH
AARON EUGENE SCHEIB,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., Holbrook, Jr. and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2). The trial court sentenced defendant as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to
four to forty years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by allowing evidence to be presented
concerning his flight from police. Generally, a trial court’s decision to admit evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 122; 605 NW2d 28
(1999). An abuse of discretion will be found only where “an unprejudiced person, considering
the facts on which the trial court acted, would say there was no justification or excuse for the
ruling made.” People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 419; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
In the instant matter, however, because defense counsel failed to object to the
introduction of the flight evidence, the trial court’s discretion was never invoked. Accordingly,
defendant has forfeited appellate review of this issue. Nevertheless, defendant may avoid
forfeiture under the “plain error” rule where the following three requirements are met: (1) error
must have occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e. clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Generally, the
third requirement requires a showing of prejudice—that the error affected the outcome of the
lower court proceedings. Id. Once the defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate
court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Id. Reversal is warranted only
when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant, or
when an error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings” independent of the defendant’s innocence. Id. at 763-764.
“It is well established in Michigan law that evidence of flight is admissible” and
probative as to showing “consciousness of guilt.” People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 4; 532
-1-
NW2d 885 (1995). Here, in addition to fleeing, there was evidence that defendant attempted to
dispose of inculpatory evidence. In addition, eyewitnesses testified at trial. Therefore, this was
not a situation where the evidence of flight was the sole evidence of defendant’s guilt. See id.
Given the probative value of the evidence, we believe that the trial court would have been well
within its discretion to admit the flight evidence. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the
admission of the evidence of flight was erroneous, much less plainly erroneous, and we reject
defendant’s challenge to its admission.
Defendant also asserts that his sentence was improperly based upon the fact that he failed
to plead guilty. Again, defendant’s failure to object below would, in most circumstances, require
us to we review this issue solely to determine whether defendant may avoid forfeiture under the
“plain error” rule.1 Carines, supra at 763-764. However, defendant was sentenced under the
legislative sentencing guidelines; in fact, defendant’s four-year minimum sentence fell within the
recommended sentencing range of thirty-six to ninety months’ imprisonment. Thus, appellate
review of his sentence is precluded in the absence of scoring errors or the reliance on inaccurate
information. People v Bacbock, 244 Mich App 64, 73; 624 NW2d 479 (2000), citing MCL
769.34(10). Defendant does not allege a scoring error, nor does he contend that inaccurate
information was relied on in applying the guidelines. Therefore, we are statutorily required to
affirm his sentence.
Finally, defendant claims that defense counsel’s failure to object on the above grounds
deprived him of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Because defendant did
not request a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on this issue, our review is limited to the facts
on the record. Snider, supra at 423. A successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
requires a defendant to “show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the factfinder would not have convicted the
defendant.” Id. at 423-424. Having found no error with respect to either substantive issue raised
on appeal, we cannot conclude that defense counsel’s failure to object was deficient, nor can we
conclude that timely objections would have had any impact on the result of the proceedings.
Indeed, defense counsel is not required to make meritless objections. People v Kulpinksi, 243
Mich App 8, 27; 620 NW2d 537 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
1
Avoiding forfeiture in the instant matter would have been very unlikely given that the record
contains absolutely no indication that the trial court’s sentence was based, even in part, on
defendant’s failure to plead guilty. Although defendant may have rejected a plea offer, it does
not automatically follow that the trial court was aware of, or relied on, this fact during
sentencing.
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.