VINCENZA GIARDI V MITRO SOPOLIGA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
VINCENZA GIARDI,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 224150
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-000779-NI
MITRO SOPOLIGA,
Defendant,
and
DAVID ALLEN LAFORGE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Wilder and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment of no cause of action in this automobile
negligence case. We affirm.
After the conclusion of proofs, plaintiff’s counsel moved for a directed verdict and
claimed that there was no question of fact that plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of body
function as a result of the accident. The trial court denied this motion and submitted the case to
the jury. The jury found that defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s
injuries but that the injuries did not amount to a serious impairment of body function.
Thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was
against the great weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, noting that serious
impairment was an issue of fact for the jury to decide and that their verdict was supported by the
evidence.
The trial court’s ruling on a directed verdict motion is reviewed de novo. Meagher v
Wayne State University, 222 Mich App 700, 708; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). In reviewing the trial
court’s ruling, this Court views the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, grants that party every reasonable inference, and resolves any conflict in the
evidence in that party’s favor to decide whether a question of fact existed. Kubisz v Cadillac
Gage Textron, Inc, 236 Mich App 629, 634-635; 601 NW2d 160 (1999). A directed verdict is
appropriate only when no factual question exists upon which reasonable minds may differ,
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Meagher, supra, and is generally disfavored in a negligence case. Hunt v Freeman, 217 Mich
App 92, 99; 550 NW2d 817 (1996). The same standard of review applies to motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Smith v Jones, 246 Mich App 270, 273-274; 632
NW2d 509 (2001).
Because plaintiff filed this action in October 1997, it was subject to MCL 500.3135, as
amended. May v Sommerfield, 239 Mich App 197, 201; 607 NW2d 422 (1999). That statute
provides that a person is subject to tort liability for automobile negligence if the injured person
suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. MCL
500.3135(1). A serious impairment of body function is defined as “an objectively manifested
impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or
her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7). Whether a person suffered a serious impairment of body
function is a question of law for the court if there is no factual dispute about the nature and
extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, or there is a factual dispute but it is immaterial to the
determination of whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function. MCL
500.3135(2)(a). As this Court observed in Kern v Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich App 333, 338; 612
NW2d 838 (2000), “the Legislature overturned the Supreme Court’s DiFranco[1] decision by
codifying the tort threshold injury standards of Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d
22 (1982),” which had been overruled by DiFranco. Because the statutory definition of serious
impairment of body function is the same as that adopted in Cassidy, it is appropriate to refer to
Cassidy and cases decided thereunder in deciding this case. Kern, supra at 342.
In the instant case, there was a legitimate factual dispute whether defendant’s negligence
caused plaintiff to suffer a serious impairment of body function. The evidence indicated that
there was a minor collision, following which plaintiff was treated at a local hospital and released
with pain medication. She did not seek further medical treatment. At a regularly scheduled
doctor’s appointment two weeks later, plaintiff reported whiplash and was given pain
medication. It was not until after a second automobile accident that a doctor discovered
herniated discs in plaintiff’s neck and back. Although the doctor attributed that injury to the first
accident, he had not seen plaintiff before the second accident or reviewed any of her medical
records from the first accident. The doctor could not say if plaintiff’s condition would have been
the same but for the first accident. Thus, there was an issue of fact whether plaintiff had suffered
an objectively manifested injury in the first accident and therefore, the trial court properly denied
plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict or JNOV.
In reviewing a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the great
weight of the evidence, the trial judge must review the whole body of proofs to determine
whether the overwhelming weight of the evidence favored the losing party. People v Herbert,
444 Mich 466, 475; 511 NW2d 654 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by People v
Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 627; 576 NW2d 129 (1998); Bordeaux v Celotex Corp, 203 Mich App
158, 170; 511 NW2d 899 (1993). Where there is competent evidence to support the finding of
the jury, its verdict should not be set aside and a new trial granted solely because the trial court
would weigh and evaluate the evidence differently. The trial court cannot substitute its judgment
for that of the factfinder. Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App 185, 194; 600
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DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32; 398 NW2d 896 (1986).
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NW2d 129 (1999). Because the trial court must make every effort to reconcile seemingly
inconsistent verdicts, the jury’s verdict is to be upheld, even if arguably inconsistent, if there is
an interpretation of the evidence that provides a logical explanation for the verdict. Bean v
Directions Unlimited, Inc, 462 Mich 24, 31; 609 NW2d 567 (2000). Credibility of witnesses is a
question for the jury and the trial court cannot disturb the jury’s evaluations of credibility absent
exceptional circumstances that are not present here. Lemmon, supra at 643-644, 647. The jury
may disbelieve the most positive evidence, even when it stands uncontradicted. Cebulak v
Lewis, 320 Mich 710, 719; 32 NW2d 21 (1948).
The trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
McPeak v McPeak (On Remand), 233 Mich App 483, 490; 593 NW2d 180 (1999). The trial
court’s determination that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence is given
substantial deference. Bouverette v Westinghouse Elec Corp, 245 Mich App 391, 403; 628
NW2d 86 (2001). In reviewing the trial court’s decision, this Court must engage in an in-depth
analysis of the record. Arrington v Detroit Osteopathic Hosp Corp (On Remand), 196 Mich App
544, 560; 493 NW2d 492 (1992).
The evidence showed that plaintiff had a medically identifiable injury, that being
herniated discs. However, as noted above, there was a genuine issue of fact whether that injury
was the result of the accident caused by defendant or by a subsequent accident in which
defendant was not involved. Moreover, the evidence failed to conclusively establish that any
injury caused by defendant significantly affected plaintiff’s ability to lead a normal life. Miller v
Purcell, 246 Mich App 244, 249-250; 631 NW2d 760 (2001). Indeed, plaintiff’s activities were
not restricted, she could still do housework, albeit with difficulty, and the only change in her
activities was that she had discontinued bowling. Id. Moreover, the jury’s verdict was not
inconsistent. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion
for a new trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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