PEOPLE OF MI V TRAVIS BOSWELL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 228359
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 73-007043
TRAVIS BOSWELL,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s
motion for relief from judgment of conviction.1 Defendant and his brother were convicted of two
counts of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, and one count of assault with intent to commit
murder, MCL 750.83, in 1973. After defendant’s appeal, defendant filed a motion for relief from
judgment. The trial court appointed counsel, limited defendant’s issues, and then granted
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment. The trial court found that defendant was denied the
effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel because the same counsel represented both
defendant and his brother, and this dual representation constituted a conflict of interest. We
reverse.
Both defendant and his brother worked at the Lear Siegler plant in Detroit for a short time
in June and/or July 1973. In July 1973, when they returned together to get their final paychecks,
they argued with a security guard, Lester Drum, who ordered them off the plant property. After
Drum unsnapped his gun, defendant and his brother agreed to leave. Before leaving, however,
1
The procedure for motions for relief from judgment is contained in subchapter 6.500 of the
Michigan Court Rules and was added by order of March 30, 1989, and was effective October 1,
1989. People v Jackson, 465 Mich 390, 395; 633 NW2d 825 (2001). In the instant case,
defendant’s conviction occurred before the effective date of subchapter 6.500. Although the
issue was not raised in the instant appeal, we note that our Supreme Court recently held that
subchapter 6.500 procedures do apply to convictions that occurred before the effective date of the
rule. Jackson, supra at 391.
-1-
defendant asked Drum if Drum thought he was the only man in the city who had a gun and
threatened to come back and blow Drum’s head off, but that Drum would never know when.
Drum testified that on September 10, 1973, defendant’s brother opened the door to the guard
shack and shot Drum and two other security guards, while defendant stood silently next to his
brother. There was no evidence that defendant had a gun. The other two security guards died.
Drum survived two gunshot wounds. Although one other witness could identify defendant’s
brother, no witnesses could identify defendant other than Drum. Defendant and his brother were
represented by the same attorney at trial and presented alibi defenses.
The prosecution first argues that defendant’s motion for relief from judgment was barred
by MCR 6.508(D)(2) because defendant had raised the argument of ineffective assistance of
counsel in a prior appeal. Indeed, this Court’s review of defendant’s prior appeals reflects that
defendant raised numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims and claims that the trial court
erred by not questioning defendant and his brother about the joint legal representation.
Defendant asserts that MCR 6.508(D)(2) does not preclude this particular appeal because he has
not previously raised these exact issues. Giving defendant the benefit of the doubt, we can agree
that defendant did not previously argue that his representation by the same attorney who was
defending his brother constituted a conflict of interest.
The prosecution argues that defendant’s motion should fail because defendant did not
establish good cause for failing to raise this issue in earlier appeals or proceedings and actual
prejudice as required by MCR 6.508(D)(3). With this, we agree.
The Michigan Supreme Court addressed the requirements of “cause” under MCR 6.508
in People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 378 (Boyle, J.), 402 (Cavanagh, J.); 535 NW2d 496 (1995):
“Cause” for excusing procedural default is established by proving ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, pursuant to the standard set forth in Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), or by showing
that some external factor prevented counsel from previously raising the issue.
Defendant did not argue that some external factor prevented counsel from raising the issue.
Instead, he argued that the issue was not raised because of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. The trial court found that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue
because appellate counsel also operated under a conflict of interest because he too represented
both defendant and his brother.
In People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 556; 581 NW2d 654 (1998), our Supreme Court
recently addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on an actual conflict of
interest. The Court in Smith first stated that to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
under Strickland, a defendant must establish that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to
deny defendant a fair trial.” Smith, supra. With regard to a conflict of interest claim, the Smith
Court held that “a defendant ‘must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer’s performance.”’ Id., quoting Cuyler v Sullivan, 446 US 335, 350; 100 S Ct 1708; 64
L Ed 2d 333 (1980). The Smith Court further adopted the Cuyler standard that “[p]rejudice is
presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented conflicting
-2-
interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’”
Smith, supra at 557.
Here, defendant’s appellate counsel on his direct appeal represented both defendant and
his brother. It appears that appellate counsel filed one brief and that the brief only contained
arguments that related to both defendant and his brother, as this Court did not separately address
any issue for either defendant or his brother. Even the argument that the trial court failed to
question defendant and his brother about their choice to be represented by the same counsel was
raised as to both defendant and his brother. We may not, however, automatically conclude that
appellate counsel suffered a conflict of interest as appellate counsel could have addressed this
issue without prejudicing defendant’s brother’s case. This Court would have separately reviewed
defendant’s brother’s issues if defendant had abandoned his alibi defense and instead argued that
he was merely present while his brother shot the guards. Therefore, we conclude that under these
specific facts, no conflict of interest existed as to appellate counsel.
If appellate counsel was not ineffective because of a conflict of interest, the next question
becomes whether he was ineffective for failing to raise the conflict of interest issue with regard to
trial counsel. The Reed Court described ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the
following manner:
Dealing with the defaults in reverse order, we first observe that under the
deferential standard of review, appellate counsel’s decision to winnow out weaker
arguments and focus on those more likely to prevail is not evidence of ineffective
assistance. Nor is the failure to assert all arguable claims sufficient to overcome
the presumption that counsel functioned as a reasonable appellate attorney in
selecting the issues presented. The question is whether a reasonable appellate
attorney could conclude that the comments made by the prosecutor were not
worthy of mentioning on appeal. [Reed, supra at 391(Boyle, J.), 402 (Cavanagh,
J.) (citation omitted).]
This Court must determine if a reasonable appellate attorney could conclude that no meritorious
appellate issue existed in regard to whether trial counsel were ineffective because he jointly
represented both defendants. After reviewing the record, we conclude that defendant has not
established that trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest. Here, the trial court in this case
concluded that a conflict of interest “necessarily occurred” because the only defense available to
defendant’s brother was an alibi defense, whereas defendant also had the “mere presence”
defense. We conclude, however, that the “mere presence” defense, though technically
“available,” was not a viable defense under the facts of this case. Just two months before the
shootings, defendant and his brother had previously threatened the type of revenge against Drum
that occurred. The “mere presence” defense was highly implausible in light of defendant’s
involvement in the previous altercation and his close, albeit silent, presence while security guards
were deliberately shot. See People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370, 378; 220 NW2d 393 (1974) (aiding
and abetting “includes the actual or constructive presence of an accessory, in preconcert with the
principal, for the purpose of rendering assistance, if necessary”). Although his strategy did not
work, trial counsel evidently believed an alibi defense was better than a mere presence defense,
which we agree was implausible. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502
-3-
(2000) (counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position); People v Stewart (On Remand),
219 Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 715 (1996) (this Court will not second-guess matters of trial
strategy, and the fact that a strategy did not work does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel). Although the prosecution did not present any direct evidence that defendant performed
acts or gave encouragement that assisted his brother in committing the crime or that defendant
intended the commission of the crime, People v Norris, 236 Mich App 411, 419-420; 600 NW2d
658 (1999), those elements could be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt from Drum’s testimony
that two months before the shooting, defendant threatened to come back to the plant and shoot
him.
As the “mere presence” defense was not a viable defense, this issue was a weaker
argument to be winnowed out and was not worthy of mentioning on appeal. Reed, supra at 391
(Boyle, J.), 402 (Cavanagh, J.). Therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to
raise the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel in joint representation, and defendant has not
shown good cause for failing to raise this issue in previous appeals. Id. at 378, 391 (Boyle, J.),
402 (Cavanagh, J.).
Further, defendant has not established actual prejudice pursuant to MCR 6.508(D)(3).
MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b) defines actual prejudice in the following manner:
As used in this subrule, “actual prejudice” means that, . . . in a conviction
following a trial, but for the alleged error, the defendant would have had a
reasonably likely chance of acquittal; . . . in any case, the irregularity was so
offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that the conviction
should not be allowed to stand regardless of the effect on the outcome of the
case; . . . .
It is impossible to determine how the jury would have voted had defendant presented a
“mere presence” defense instead of an alibi defense. However, the question here is whether
acquittal would have been reasonably likely had defendant presented a mere presence defense.
MCR 6.508(D)(3). It was Drum’s testimony that implicated defendant in the shooting. Drum
testified that in July 1973, defendant threatened, “to blow Drum’s brains out,” and that on
September 10, 1973, defendant arrived with and stood by as his brother shot Drum and the two
other security guards.
Certainly, when considering defendant’s threat to Drum, it could be inferred beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant assisted his brother and intended for his brother to shoot Drum
and the other security guards. That is, they returned as promised to “settle a score.” This Court
cannot find that it is reasonably likely that defendant would have been acquitted had he presented
a mere presence defense. Considering the facts that led up to2 the shooting, we believe that
defendant’s contention that he was merely present would greatly strain credibility, and it is highly
2
Had there been no prior altercation or threats, we might conclude differently. But that is not the
case.
-4-
unlikely that “but for” the error, “defendant would have had a reasonably likely chance of
acquittal.”
We reverse.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.