PEOPLE OF MI V SHAWN GALE ROSENBROOK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 215007
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 97-020404-FC
SHAWN GALE ROSENBROOK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and White and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
and conspiracy to commit larceny, MCL 750.157(a) and MCL 750.357, following a jury trial.
We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the shooting death of Chuck Hadley, a marijuana
dealer in the Charlotte area, at defendant’s father’s house in Bellevue on November 25, 1997,
two days before Thanksgiving. Originally, defendant, then eighteen years old, and his friend
Matthew Harton, seventeen years old, planned to “gank” Hadley (i.e., steal or rob him of his
drugs or money), but they eventually decided to kill him to take over his drug territory. Harton
was a member of a gang in Charlotte called the Jungle People Vice Lords, which is affiliated
with the Vice Lords and nationally affiliated with the “People Nation.” Tim Rodriguez, the selfstyled leader of the gang, appointed Harton as the enforcer of gang discipline and encouraged
him to recruit new members. Defendant was not a member of the gang, but Harton sought to
recruit him with Rodriguez’s approval. Although defendant and Rodriguez never discussed the
plan to kill Hadley, Rodriguez approved of Harton’s and defendant’s plan to kill Hadley.
Rodriguez provided the weapon, a .22 caliber handgun.
On the evening of the Tuesday before Thanksgiving 1997, defendant lured Hadley to his
father’s house under the pretext of “hooking” Hadley up with marijuana. Meanwhile, Harton
drove from Charlotte to Bellevue and waited for defendant to arrive with Hadley. Harton then
emerged from the darkness and shot Hadley to death. After the shooting, Harton gave defendant
the gun to hide, and then helped defendant move the body to a gravel pit area behind the house.
Defendant picked up the shell casings, and Harton washed the blood from the driveway.
Defendant and Harton split the money that was taken from Hadley’s wallet. On the following
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evening, defendant and his friend, Michael Rahe, moved the body to some tall grass next to a
pond on Mr. Handricks’ farm, a neighbor of defendant’s father.
On the following day, defendant told his father of his involvement in Hadley’s shooting
death. Defendant’s father contacted Detective Benden of the Charlotte Police Department and
informed him that defendant had been an eyewitness to Hadley’s murder. Later that day,
Detectives Benden and Kellogg tape-recorded an interview with defendant in which defendant
denied that he knew that Harton was going to shoot Hadley, claiming only that he and Harton had
discussed “ganking” Hadley for his money or drugs. As a result of defendant’s interview, the
police arrested Harton, Rodriguez and the other gang members. On the following day, the
detectives continued their investigation and re-interviewed defendant to focus on why Harton
happened to be present at defendant’s father’s house. After the second interview, defendant was
arrested and charged with open murder, conspiracy to commit open murder, and felony-firearm.
Subsequently, defendant was interviewed by Michigan State Police Sergeant John
Palmatier for the purpose of a polygraph examination on December 4 and 11, 1997. In the first
statement to Palmatier, defendant claimed that he and Harton planned only to “gank” Hadley, and
that he was surprised when Harton shot him. However, in the second statement to Palmatier,
defendant admitted that before the murder, he, Harton and Joshua Hansen, another member of the
gang, had talked about killing Hadley to take over his drug territory. The prosecutor then
charged defendant with first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to murder, and felonyfirearm. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the lesser included offenses of seconddegree murder and conspiracy to commit larceny from a person, but acquitted of the felonyfirearm charge.
I
On appeal, defendant first claims that he was denied a fair trial when Sergeant Palmatier
testified that he believed that Harton was telling the truth. We disagree. Our review of the trial
transcript reveals that the testimony in question falls within the “invited error” rule. People v
Collins, 63 Mich App 376, 381-382; 234 NW2d 531 (1975). Specifically, defense counsel, while
questioning Sergeant Palmatier about how he used Harton’s statement in his interrogation of
defendant, elicited Palmatier’s testimony that he believed that Harton was telling the truth. The
record indicates that defense counsel plainly expected Palmatier’s response to his line of
questioning. As the prosecution notes, defense counsel’s questions and Palmatier’s responses
were consistent with their previous exchange during the Walker1 hearing. Thus, defense counsel
clearly anticipated Palmatier’s responses to his questions. In addition, defense counsel,
immediately after eliciting Palmatier’s testimony that he believed that Harton was telling the
truth, attempted to call into question Palmatier’s basis for believing Harton. In the context of his
cross-examination, it is evident that defense counsel purposely elicited Palmatier’s testimony that
he believed that Harton was telling the truth in order to show that Palmatier improperly
prejudged defendant’s guilt. As “invited error,” defendant waived the issue, and thus there is no
“error” to review. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
1
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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II
Next, defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding that defendant’s statements in
the November 28, 1997 taped-recorded interview with Detective Benden were given voluntarily.
We again disagree.
When reviewing a trial court's determination of voluntariness, this Court must examine
the entire record and make an independent determination, People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383,
386; 605 NW2d 374 (1999), and will affirm unless left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake was made, People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d 822 (2000).
Deference is given to the trial court’s assessment of the weight of the evidence and credibility of
the witnesses, and the trial court’s findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous.
Sexton (After Remand), supra; People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 543; 575 NW2d 16 (1997).
In determining voluntariness, the court should consider all the circumstances, including: the
duration of the defendant's detention and questioning; the age, education, intelligence and
experience of the defendant; whether there was unnecessary delay of arraignment; the
defendant’s mental and physical state; whether the defendant was threatened or abused; and any
promises of leniency. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988). No single
factor is determinative. Sexton (After Remand), supra at 753. A promise of leniency is merely
one factor to be considered in the evaluation of the voluntariness of a defendant's statements.
People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 120; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).
In this case, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant’s statements were
voluntary. Although defendant claims that his confession was induced by a promise of leniency,
the trial court rejected his claim as lacking credibility:
It does not make any sense to the Court that the defendant would
incriminate himself in a robbery, particularly a robbery that ultimately ended up in
a murder, under some belief that if he did so he would be allowed to go home and
that he would be not arrested or not charged. Ultimately he was arrested and
cha[r]ged with murder. And the defendant’s statement that he still thought that he
was just being in some type of protective custody again does not seem to be
reasonable or credible. In fact, it goes contrary to common sense.
Although defendant claims that he gave the statement because he had a “subjective expectation
of leniency,” the trial court found Detective Benden’s testimony more credible. The court also
found that its review of the tape did not show that “Detective Benden was prompting or was
leading the defendant into saying things,” but that “the defendant was making a statement of his
own volition.” Our review of the record shows that the trial court did not clearly err in finding
that defendant’s statements in the November 28, 1997 taped-recorded interview were voluntary.
Sexton (After Remand), supra at 752.
III
Next, defendant claims that he was denied his right to a fair trial because his statements to
Sergeant Palmatier at the polygraph examinations on December 4 and 11, 1997 were made
pursuant to a plea bargain, and are thus inadmissible under MRE 410. Our Supreme Court has
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held that the protections of MRE 410 may be waived. People v Stevens, 461 Mich 655, 668-669;
610 NW2d 881 (2000). Even if we accept defendant’s argument that these statements were made
in the course of plea negotiations, defendant consulted with his attorney before both polygraph
examinations and signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights acknowledging that his
statements could be used against him. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting
defendant’s statements to Sergeant Palmatier on December 4 and 11, 1997.
IV
Defendant next contends that his statements to Sergeant Palmatier were admitted in
violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. We disagree. With respect to defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, “[t]he existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel depends upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”
People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 274; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). The record indicates that
defendant agreed to take the polygraph examinations in order to demonstrate his continued
cooperation with the police and to show his limited involvement in the homicide. As the trial
court noted, “the first statement made to the polygraph operator was at the initiation by the
defendant’s attorney.” The trial court also noted that the second statement was “also given as a
result of conversations between the prosecutor and defense attorney.” Also, defendant was
advised that he could consult with his attorney at any time, and the record shows that defendant
did in fact interrupt the proceedings of the second polygraph examination to confer with his
attorney. See McElhaney, supra at 275-276.
Nor is there any basis to defendant’s claim that he did not provide a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his Miranda2 rights. As the trial court properly found, defendant was
advised through his defense attorney that anything he said before, during or after the polygraph
examinations could be used against him. We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in
finding that defendant’s statements to Sergeant Palmatier before and during the polygraph
examinations on December 4 and 11, 1997 were voluntarily given.
Defendant argues that “Detective Palmatier’s main objective in administering the
polygraph examination was to interrogate the Defendant in an attempt to elicit incriminating
statements, as opposed to testing the truthfulness of prior statements.” A review of the record
indicates the polygraph examinations were administered for the purpose of determining whether
defendant was being truthful with regard to his claim of limited involvement in the homicide, not
to elicit admissions from defendant. We note our concern that there was some question whether
Palmatier’s charts supported his assertion that there was a 93% likelihood that defendant was
being truthful at the first polygraph examination. However, the trial court found that Palmatier’s
assertion was not the basis of a ruse to extract a second statement from defendant. Affording the
proper deference to the trial court’s superior ability to judge credibility, Sexton (After Remand),
supra at 752, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s findings in this regard were clearly
erroneous.
2
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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V
Next, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss all the charges or to
grant him a new trial based upon the alleged failure of the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory
evidence. Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963); People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 666; 521 NW2d 557 (1994); People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 280;
591 NW2d 267 (1998). Contrary to defendant’s claim, he suffered no prejudice by the failure of
the prosecution to comply with the discovery rules by informing the defense that the police had
interviewed Handricks and searched his premises in December 1997. As the trial court pointed
out, defendant suffered no prejudice because the evidence was not lost, but was presented at trial.
Further, we note that Handricks’ testimony did not contradict Rahe’s testimony that he saw
defendant hide a bag of his bloody clothes in Handricks’ barn on the Wednesday night before
Thanksgiving. Nor was Handricks’ testimony inconsistent with Rahe’s testimony that defendant
was inside Handricks’ house for about ten minutes and told him (Rahe) that Handricks told
defendant to remove the body from his property. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor’s failure to disclose
exculpatory information.
VI
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to
determine Harton’s competency to testify, or, in the alternative, to order an independent
psychological examination of his competency under MRE 601. People v Breck, 230 Mich App
450, 457; 584 NW2d 602 (1998); People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 597; 470 NW2d 478
(1991). Contrary to defendant’s claim, there was no overwhelming medical and psychiatric
evidence that Harton was “a sociopathic liar with no sense of obligation to testify truthfully,” nor
was there any evidence indicative of a “compelling reason” to warrant a psychological
evaluation. See People v Payne, 90 Mich App 713; 282 NW2d 456 (1979). As the prosecution
observes, Harton testified at the preliminary examination and at trial, and there was no indication
that he was not competent to testify. Further, we note that Harton’s testimony was corroborated
by the physical evidence surrounding Hadley’s murder and the testimony given by Joshua
Hansen and Mike Rahe, as well as by defendant’s own admissions.
VII
Finally, there was sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of second-degree murder,
MCL 750.317.
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence following a jury trial, this Court must
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 478 (1992), amended 441
Mich 1201 (1992). A prosecutor need not negate every reasonable theory of innocence, but must
only prove his own theory beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of whatever contradictory
evidence the defendant provides. People v Quinn, 219 Mich App 571, 574; 557 NW2d 151
(1996). Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which arise from the evidence can
constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757;
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597 NW2d 130 (1999). All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the
prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
In People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112, 125; 600 NW2d 370 (1999), this Court
discussed the elements of second-degree murder:
The offense of second-degree murder consists of the following elements:
“(1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4)
without justification or excuse.” People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 463-464; 579
NW2d 868 (1998). . . . The element of malice is defined as “the intent to kill, the
intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful
disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause
death or great bodily harm.” Id. at 464. Malice for second-degree murder can be
inferred from evidence that the defendant “intentionally set in motion a force
likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” People v Djordjevic, 230 Mich App
459, 462; 584 NW2d 610 (1998). The offense of second-degree murder does not
require an actual intent to harm or kill, but only the intent to do an act that is in
obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences. Goecke, supra at 466.
In this case, the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution was
sufficient to prove the essential elements of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Before the murder, defendant and Harton talked about killing Hadley to take over his territory as
a drug dealer. Specifically, the evidence established that defendant agreed to set up Hadley by
arranging to sell him one-half pound of marijuana at the house of defendant’s father, who was
out of town at the time of the killing. Defendant lured Hadley to his absent father’s house on the
pretext of selling him marijuana. At the house, Harton shot Hadley four times in the head.
Defendant and Harton then split approximately $500 that defendant took from Hadley’s wallet.
Thereafter, defendant assisted Harton in covering the body in plastic and dragging it to a gravel
pit and disposing of the shell casings, the murder weapon and the bloody plastic wrap in a
dumpster. After the murder, defendant admitted to his friend, Michael Rahe, that “Me and Matt
killed Chuck” before they moved the body to tall grass next to a pond on Mr. Handricks’ farm.
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second-degree murder.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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