PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS WILLIAM KLOOSTERMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 6, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 223716
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 98-002362-FH
THOMAS WILLIAM KLOOSTERMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Doctoroff and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of manufacturing marijuana, MCL
333.7401(2)(d)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(d)(iii), possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d);
MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(d), possession of less than twenty-five grams of cocaine, MCL
333.7403(2)(a)(v); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(v), and maintaining a drug house, MCL
333.7405(1)(d); MSA 14.15(7405)(1)(d). Following these convictions, the court sentenced
defendant as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, and second drug offender,
MCL 333.7413(2); MSA 14.15(7413)(2), to a term of five years’ probation, with the first six
months to be served in jail. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions resulted from evidence discovered at his home following a
consent search conducted by members of the Kent Narcotics Unit on February 12, 1998. That
search, however, was prompted by the discovery of marijuana within the defendant’s car earlier
that same evening, for which defendant was charged with one count of possession of marijuana
with intent to deliver. MCL 333.7401(2)(d); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(d).1
Sometime before February 12, 1998, Detective Scott Malkewitz of the Walker Police
Department received information from a confidential informant that an individual driving a gray
four-door Volvo had been selling marijuana from his car at the Deltaplex stadium where he
worked. After locating a gray four-door Volvo in the parking lot of the Deltaplex, Malkewitz
traced the vehicle’s license plate to defendant. Malkewitz then began a surveillance of
1
This charge was brought separately from defendant’s other convictions and is not before this
Court in this appeal.
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defendant. On February 12, 1998, Malkewitz’ surveillance of defendant began at defendant’s
home and continued to the Deltaplex lot. Malkewitz contacted a canine handler from the
narcotics unit so that the dog could smell for drugs from the exterior of the car. The dog handler
arrived with the dog at the Deltaplex and ran the dog around the exterior of defendant’s
unoccupied car. During this run, the dog “alerted” on both the trunk and passenger compartment
of the car.2
Malkewitz sent two patrol officers into the Deltaplex to locate defendant and bring him to
the car. When the officers returned with defendant, defendant was advised that the police had
information that marijuana was being sold from a gray four door Volvo and that the dog had
alerted on both the trunk and the passenger compartment of his vehicle. Defendant was asked for
consent to access the vehicle’s interior.
Without hesitation, defendant opened the trunk and permitted a search of the trunk. No
contraband was found. Malkewitz then reminded defendant that the dog had also alerted on the
passenger compartment and asked defendant to unlock the vehicle to permit a search of that area.
Defendant refused, and Malkewitz told him that the dog alert gave him probable cause to enter
the vehicle. Malkewitz advised defendant that he would break a window to gain access if
defendant did not open the vehicle for them. Defendant then stated that there was a “quarter on
the front seat” and reluctantly unlocked the vehicle. The dog alerted to a brown paper bag on the
front seat, which when opened, was discovered to contain approximately one quarter pound of
marijuana.
Defendant argues that his convictions must be reversed as a result of trial counsel’s
failure to raise, or timely raise, the following two challenges to the search of his automobile:
first, that the drug-sniffing dog had not been shown to be sufficiently reliable to support a finding
of probable cause to search the vehicle; and second, that even assuming such probable cause
existed with respect to the vehicle’s trunk, the officers lacked sufficient cause to extend the
search to the passenger compartment after finding no contraband within the trunk. Defendant
further argues that because a timely challenge to the dog’s reliability would have resulted in a
finding that the search of defendant’s vehicle was unlawful, the instant convictions, which rest
upon the evidence subsequently discovered in his home, must be reversed because the officers’
suspicion that there might be additional contraband at the home was derived from the unlawful
search of defendant’s vehicle. After review of the record in this matter, we find each of these
contentions to be without merit.
In reviewing a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court
is to determine, first, whether counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable; and second,
whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s defective performance. People v Mitchell,
454 Mich 145, 164; 560 NW2d 600 (1997); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d
797 (1994); People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Regarding the
second requirement, defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
2
“Alerted” is a term of art used by narcotics officers to indicate that a dog detected the possible
presence of narcotics in a particular area of a car.
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the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613
NW2d 694 (2000); People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 5; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). Here, as discussed
below, because the search of defendant’s vehicle was properly supported by probable cause
defense counsel's failure to raise, or otherwise timely argue these alternate grounds for
suppression, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See People v Flowers, 222
Mich App 732, 737-738; 565 NW2d 12 (1997) (counsel is not required to argue a frivolous or
meritless position); See also People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 59; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
With respect to the police dog’s qualifications to support a finding of probable cause to
search the vehicle, defendant argues that the dog had not been shown to be reliable and that trial
counsel was ineffective in allowing its handler to testify concerning the animal’s positive
reactions to the trunk and passenger compartment without timely objection. We disagree.
In People v Clark, 220 Mich App 240, 243-244; 559 NW2d 78 (1996), this Court
observed that, as a general rule, the reliability of a police dog’s positive reaction will be
established upon proof of the animal’s training and certification:
While we agree that in certain cases it will be important to examine the
dog’s training, health, or other such circumstances, we conclude that in the usual
case, . . . all that is necessary to find the dog’s alert to be reliable is evidence of
the dog’s training and certification. [Id. at 244. (Emphasis added.)]
Here, the dog’s handler testified that she had been working with the dog since December 1997,
during which time the two had “put in about 150 hours” of training at a facility in northern Ohio,
where they had been certified in the detection of illegal drugs. Because defendant has identified
no authority or rationale that would remove this matter from the “usual case,” and thus require
further examination of the dog’s qualifications, we conclude that the evidence of record was
sufficient to support the dog’s reliability to support a finding of probable cause. Id. Thus,
inasmuch as a more timely objection to the animal’s qualifications would not have resulted in an
outcome different than that actually achieved, we do not believe that defendant is entitled to
relief as a result of counsel’s failure to raise such a challenge in a more timely manner. Toma,
supra; Hoag, supra.
Similarly, we reject defendant’s contention that counsel was ineffective in failing to argue
that, even assuming that there was probable cause to search the vehicle’s trunk, the officers
lacked sufficient cause to extend the search to the passenger compartment after finding no
contraband within the trunk. Defendant’s argument in this regard is premised upon this Court’s
opinion in People v Martinez, 192 Mich App 57; 480 NW2d 302 (1991), wherein police officers
acting on information that the defendant was selling drugs in the parking lot of his workplace
approached the defendant’s vehicle after observing three men enter the car shortly after a shift
change. Id. at 58-59. Although the officers later testified at a suppression hearing that at the
time they approached the vehicle, they had no indication of illegal activity taking place, one
officer testified that upon reaching the vehicle he observed what he believed to be a marijuana
cigarette on the front passenger’s lap. Id. at 59. At that point, the officer identified himself and
convinced the passenger to open the vehicle’s door. Id. at 60. When the door opened, the officer
could no longer see the marijuana cigarette and thus requested that the passenger empty his
pockets; however, no marijuana cigarette was found. Id. The officer then searched the passenger
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side of the car but was unable to find the cigarette. Id. At that point, the second officer requested
that the defendant, who was seated behind the steering wheel, get out of the car. Id. As the
defendant left the vehicle, the officer observed a shopping bag located inside the car and asked
for permission to search the bag. Id. Despite the defendant’s denial of such permission, the
officer searched the bag and found marijuana. Id.
On appeal, this Court found that although the officers possessed probable cause to search
the vehicle for the cigarette, the officers’ search of the shopping bag was improper because “the
failure to find the cigarette in the vehicle or on any of its occupants rendered any further search
unreasonable.” Id. at 62-64. In the instant matter, defendant argues that like the search of the
bag in Martinez, supra, the officers’ failure to find drugs in the trunk of his car rendered any
further search of the vehicle unreasonable. However, unlike the officers in Martinez, supra, as a
result of the dog’s separate positive reaction to the passenger compartment the officers in the
instant matter had probable cause to extend their search of the vehicle past the “empty” trunk and
into the car’s interior. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel as a result of his trial counsel’s failure to raise the proffered challenge to the
officers’ search of the interior of defendant’s vehicle. See Flowers, supra at 737-738.
Because we conclude that defendant has not established that the evidence found within
the vehicle would have been suppressed had counsel raised the foregoing challenges, defendant’s
additional claim, that the instant convictions must be reversed because the officers’ search for
contraband at his home was derived from an unlawful search of defendant’s vehicle must also
logically fail.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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