PEOPLE OF MI V RAYMONT BALDWIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 6, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 221857
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-007444
RAYMONT BALDWIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Doctoroff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of first-degree premeditated
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b). The trial court sentenced
defendant to life imprisonment without parole. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to allow a rational trier of fact
to find that it was he who committed the charged killing. We disagree. In reviewing a claim that
insufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction, this Court views the evidence de
novo in the light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether a rational trier of fact
could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371; 415 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
The standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all
reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.
The scope of review is the same whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.
“Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence
can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” [Id., quoting People
v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).]
Although much of the evidence in this case consisted of testimony that was at times
contradictory, it is the province of the trier of fact to assess credibility. People v Lemmon, 456
Mich 625, 636-647; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). That being said, we find that the prosecution
presented sufficient evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that it was defendant
who committed the murder.
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Despite telling school personnel that he had not seen the victim, Ernestine Johnson, for a
period of approximately three months before her murder, defendant admitted during his
testimony at trial that he had in fact met with Johnson at the Heritage Inn Hotel on May 12,
1998; only days before her body was found by police in the trunk of her burned out car. At the
time she was found, Johnson, who had been strangled to death, was wrapped in a blanket that
was later identified as one stolen from the room occupied by defendant at the Heritage Inn on
May 12, 1998. There was also evidence that the fire that had burned Johnson’s vehicle was
deliberately set by dousing the interior with gasoline, and that defendant had, early in the
morning on the day after Johnson’s disappearance, gone to the home of his girlfriend to wash his
shoes and clothes, which were nonetheless found to have gasoline on them. In addition, several
people who saw defendant after Johnson’s car had been found testified that defendant’s face had
been burned and that he had shaved off his goatee. Moreover, on the day after Johnson
disappeared, defendant and his girlfriend pawned jewelry belonging to Johnson.
In addition to the foregoing evidence, defendant later attempted to evade arrest by
ramming an law enforcement vehicle and then fleeing on foot. See People v Adams, 430 Mich
679, 693; 425 NW2d 437 (1988) (flight is circumstantial evidence showing consciousness of
guilt). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a
rational trier of fact could find that it was defendant who killed Johnson.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to present
rebuttal evidence regarding the specific room occupied by defendant at the Heritage Inn on May
12, 1998. Specifically, defendant asserts that because this evidence could have been offered in
the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, the evidence was inadmissible on rebuttal. We disagree.
“Admission of rebuttal evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be
disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 398; 547 NW2d
673 (1996).
In, Figgures, supra, our Supreme Court held that the prosecutor properly impeached the
defendant by bringing forth evidence on rebuttal indicating that the defendant had a history of
harassing the complainant, his ex-wife, when the evidence directly impeached the defendant’s
claim that he was reconciling with her. In doing so, the Court stated:
Rebuttal evidence is admissible to “contradict, repel, explain or disprove
evidence produced by the other party and tending directly to weaken or impeach
the same.” The question whether rebuttal is proper depends on what proofs the
defendant introduced and not on merely what the defendant testified about on
cross-examination.
Contrary to the dissent’s insinuation, the test of whether rebuttal evidence
was properly admitted is not whether the evidence could have been offered in the
prosecutor’s case in chief, but, rather, whether the evidence is properly responsive
to evidence introduced or a theory developed by the defendant. As long as
evidence is responsive to material presented by the defense, it is properly
classified as rebuttal, even if it overlaps evidence admitted in the prosecutor’s
case in chief. [Id. at 399 (Citations omitted).]
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Here, the prosecution offered in its case-in-chief testimony from the hotel manager that
defendant had moved from room 241 to room 104 (the room from which the blanket found
wrapping Johnson’s body was stolen). On direct and cross-examination, defendant denied
having moved to room 104. In rebuttal, the prosecution offered the testimony of the hotel clerk
who was on duty when defendant changed rooms, as well as that of the hotel manager regarding
business records indicating that room 241 was re-rented that night to a different customer.
Unlike the circumstances found in the cases cited by defendant, the fact addressed by the rebuttal
testimony was relevant to a material issue that had been raised in the prosecutions case-in-chief;
i.e., the origins of the blanket in which the victim’s body was wrapped and defendant’s
connection to that item. Given defendant’s subsequent denial of that connection, the trial court
did not err in permitting rebuttal testimony to directly impeach defendant’s testimony.
See
People v Pesquera, 244 Mich App 305, 314; 625 NW2d 407 (2001).
III
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor made a number of improper statements to the
jury that denied him due process and a fair trial. Generally, this Court reviews claims of
prosecutorial misconduct on a case by case basis, examining the remarks in context to determine
whether the defendant received a fair and impartial trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). However, where, as here, a defendant fails to object to an alleged
prosecutorial impropriety, the issue is reviewed for plain error. Carines, supra at 752-753, 764;
People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). Therefore, to avoid forfeiture
of this issue, defendant must demonstrate plain error that affected his substantial rights, i.e., that
affected the outcome of the proceedings. Carines, supra at 763-764; Schutte, supra. We find no
such error on this record.
In challenging the prosecutor’s conduct at trial, defendant first argues that the prosecutor
improperly argued facts not in evidence during closing argument. However, although a
prosecutor may not make a statement of fact to the jury that is unsupported by the evidence, he is
nonetheless free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate
to the theory of the case. Bahoda, supra at 282. Here, it is clear from a reading of the lower
court record that contrary to defendant’s assertion, the prosecutor, in making the challenged
statements, did not misstate or mischaracterize the evidence. Rather, the prosecutor argued the
evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they related to the prosecution’s theory
of the case. Therefore, the challenged statements do not constitute plain error that affected the
defendant’s substantial rights.
We similarly reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly expressed a personal
opinion as to the defendant’s credibility. A prosecutor may argue from the facts that the
defendant or another witness is not worthy of belief. People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358,
361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996). In this case, the prosecutor’s remarks about defendant’s credibility
were not improper given the evidence presented at trial indicating that defendant lied to the
police, his employer, on his tax forms, and when asked about the last time he had seen Johnson.
Defendant further argues that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof when
he stated: “Where is this girl that drove him around? Where is this woman that gave him the
jewelry? Where is the chain that Ernestine allegedly bought him? Where is the pager? Where
are these things?” Again we find no error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. A prosecutor
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may comment on a defendant’s failure to call witnesses to corroborate his version of the events.
People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 104-116; 538 NW2d 356 (1995). Arguing that a witness or
evidence does not exist attacks the credibility of the theory presented and does not shift the
burden of proof. Id.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly made a statement of personal
knowledge when he informed that jury he knew defendant’s Air Jordans “are not cheap tennis
shoes.” In context, the purpose of the statement was to show that defendant, who did not usually
put his leather tennis shoes in the washing machine, did so in this case because he was more
concerned with cleaning the incriminating gasoline from them than with preserving their
appearance. There was testimony presented to show that washing his shoes was not something
defendant had ever done before and that the shoes may have had gasoline on them. Thus, we
find the challenged statement to be permissible argument based on facts presented at trial.
Defendant has therefore failed in his burden of establishing plain error affecting his substantial
rights.
IV
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel as a result of
his trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements during
closing argument. Again, we disagree. As discussed above, the challenged remarks were proper
argument based on the facts presented at trial. Therefore, defense counsel’s failure to object did
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor was defendant so prejudiced that he
was deprived of a fair trial. See People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000); see
also People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998) (“trial counsel cannot be
faulted for failing to raise an objection or motion that would have been futile.”).
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Helene N. White
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