INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER SERVICES V WALBRO CORP
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER SERVICES,
INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
November 6, 2001
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellant,
V
No. 220202; 223935
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-719871-CK
WALBRO CORPORATION, WALBRO
AUTOMOTIVE CORPORATION and U.S.
COEXCELL,
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/ThirdParty Plaintiffs/Third-Party CounterDefendants-Appellees,
and
JOHN H. HOBSTETTER,
Third-Party Defendant,
and
THE LOVAT GROUP, INCORPORATED,
Third-Party Defendant/Third-Party
Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and McDonald and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 220202, International Container Services, Inc. (“ICS”) and The Lovat
Group, Incorporated (“Lovat”) appeal as of right from an order granting summary disposition in
favor of defendants Walbro Corporation, Walbro Automotive Corporation and U.S. Coexcell
(“USC”) (collectively referenced as “Walbro”). In that case, ICS and Lovat also raise an issue
pertaining to the trial court’s order granting Walbro’s motion for partial summary disposition.
-1-
Finally, in Docket No. 223935, ICS and Lovat appeal by leave granted from an order awarding
attorney fees and costs in favor of Walbro. We affirm in Docket No. 220202 and reverse in
Docket No. 223935.
I. Promissory Estoppel
In Docket No. 220202, ICS and Lovat first argue that the trial court erroneously granted
Walbro’s motion for summary disposition with respect to ICS’ promissory estoppel claim
because sufficient evidence was presented to create a question of fact regarding each element of
promissory estoppel. We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary
disposition de novo. Crown Technology Park v D&N Bank, FSB, 242 Mich App 538, 546; 619
NW2d 66 (2000). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
this Court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morales v AutoOwners Ins Co, 458 Mich 288, 294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998). A motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact,
entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
To establish a claim of promissory estoppel, a party must prove the following: (1) there
was a promise, (2) the promisor reasonably should have expected the promise to cause the
promisee to act in a definite and substantial manner, (3) the promisee did in fact rely on the
promise by acting in accordance with its terms, and (4) the promise must be enforced to avoid
injustice. Crown, supra at 548-549; Novak v Nationwide Mutual Ins Co, 235 Mich App 675,
686-687; 599 NW2d 546 (1999).
To support a claim of estoppel, a promise must be definite and clear. A
promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified
manner, made in a way that would justify a promisee in understanding that a
commitment has been made. [Schmidt v Bretzlaff, 208 Mich App 376, 379; 528
NW2d 760 (1995).]
Reliance on a promise is reasonable only if that reliance is induced by an actual promise.
Ypsilanti Twp v General Motors Corp, 201 Mich App 128, 134; 506 NW2d 556 (1993). In
determining whether a promise existed, a court must objectively examine the words and actions
surrounding the situation as well as the nature of the relationship between the parties and the
circumstances surrounding their actions. Novak, supra at 687. In addition, a promise must be
distinguished from a mere statement of opinion, a prediction of future events, or a party’s wish or
desire for something to happen. First Security Savings Bank v Aitken, 226 Mich App 291, 312;
573 NW2d 307 (1997), overruled on other grounds Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446;
597 NW2d 28 (1999). The doctrine of promissory estoppel should be applied only where the
facts are unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented is undoubted. Novak, supra at 687.
ICS and Lovat contend that Walbro promised to “support the establishment of ICS” while
refraining from entering the drum-leasing market itself. Such a vague statement does not
constitute a definite and clear promise upon which to establish a claim for promissory estoppel.
Schmidt, supra at 379. As the trial court’s opinion shows, “support” may be construed in a
variety of different ways. In any event, in support of their argument, ICS and Lovat maintain that
-2-
Walbro agreed to provide “support” to ICS by allowing it a longer period of time for payment
than it allowed other buyers and by selling drums to ICS at a lower cost than to other buyers.
The evidence, however, does not establish that Walbro agreed to either of the above provisions.
Although the purported container supply agreement addressed the payment terms and
price of the drums, the evidence showed that the parties had not reached a final understanding on
the proposed terms of that agreement. At the time of Gary Vollmar’s termination, the agreement
remained unexecuted, and further negotiations were necessary. Even John Hobstetter admitted
that the parties had never agreed upon the exact price that USC would charge ICS for drum
bodies. Because the parties never agreed on the terms of the container supply agreement, ICS
and Lovat’s contention that Walbro agreed to allow ICS a longer period of time for payment and
agreed to sell drums to ICS at a lower price than to other buyers is not supported by the record.
ICS and Lovat also maintain that Walbro agreed to “support the establishment” of ICS by
ensuring that Walbro would not enter into the leasing business itself. While Vollmar indicated to
Hobstetter that Walbro would not be entering into the leasing market, such a representation could
not have reasonably been interpreted as a blanket promise to “support the establishment” of ICS.
Moreover, ICS and Lovat do not explain how an assurance not to enter the leasing business
constitutes a promise to “support the establishment” of ICS. Because Walbro’s representation
that it would not enter the leasing business did not constitute a promise to “support the
establishment” of ICS, ICS and Lovat’s argument fails.
ICS and Lovat further argue that Walbro promised to sell drums to ICS in order for it to
lease the drums to its customers. The evidence shows, however, that no such promise was made.
Prior to Vollmar’s termination, he was negotiating the container supply agreement with Bradley
Czajka, Daniel Fraser, and Hobstetter in an effort to reach a final agreement. Walbro was also
stockpiling drums in a Florida warehouse for the purpose of selling the drums to ICS once an
agreement was reached. Vollmar admitted that Walbro would benefit from the establishment of
ICS because USC would profit from its drum sales to ICS. However, notwithstanding the
actions taken in anticipation of the agreement, both parties understood that an agreement was
necessary before Walbro would furnish ICS with drums.
Although the surrounding
circumstances indicated that both parties desired to reach an agreement and anticipated reaching
an agreement, such wishes and desires did not constitute a promise on behalf of Walbro to sell
drums to ICS. Novak, supra at 687; Aitken, supra at 313. For the foregoing reasons, we
conclude that the trial court properly granted Walbro’s motion for summary disposition on ICS’
promissory estoppel claim.
II. Tortious Interference
ICS and Lovat next contend that the trial court improperly granted summary disposition
in favor of Walbro on ICS’ claim and Lovat’s counterclaim for tortious interference with
business relations. We disagree. To establish tortious interference with a business relationship, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2)
knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the defendant, (3) an intentional
interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or
expectancy, and (4) resultant damage to the plaintiff. BPS Clinical Laboratories v Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Michigan (On Remand), 217 Mich App 687, 698-699; 552 NW2d 919 (1996);
-3-
Lakeshore Community Hospital, Inc v Perry, 212 Mich App 396, 401; 538 NW2d 24 (1995). To
establish that a lawful act was done with malice and without justification, the plaintiff must
demonstrate with specificity the affirmative acts by the defendant that corroborate the
defendant’s improper motive. BPS, supra at 699. Where the defendant’s actions were motivated
by legitimate business reasons, its actions do not constitute improper motive or interference. Id.
ICS and Lovat cannot show that ICS had a valid business relationship with either Freshco
or Florida Quality Products. BPS, supra at 698-699; Lakeshore, supra at 401. Hobstetter
admitted that ICS had only prospective customers and no actual customers, and further admitted
that neither Freshco nor Florida Quality Products had executed a lease agreement with ICS.
Because ICS had no valid business relationship with either company, the question becomes
whether ICS had a valid business expectancy with either Freshco or Florida Quality Products.
Hobstetter and Czajka testified that they expected that both companies would sign lease
agreements with ICS. However, the record fails to support those expectations. Pat Schirard of
Freshco testified that he had been dealing with Stephen Kipp from USC regarding leasing plastic
drums. Further, Schirard testified that he believed that Kipp represented USC. When Schirard
heard of ICS, he was confused as to the division between USC and ICS. All of his negotiations
regarding the drums had occurred with Kipp and all representations were made by Kipp.
Schirard then received a lease agreement for his signature from ICS, and Hobstetter expressed a
sense of urgency to execute the agreement. Schirard was confused because the lease agreement
was from ICS and not from USC, and the deal had not been negotiated specifically enough to be
executed at that point. Kipp ended up negotiating the agreement with Schirard for several more
weeks before Freshco executed a lease agreement with USC. Therefore, while Hobstetter and
Czajka expected that Freshco would execute a lease agreement with ICS, the evidence shows that
such an expectancy was not well-founded, considering the relatively early stage of negotiations
and the fact that Schirard was confused by Hobstetter’s role in the deal.
Likewise, the record fails to support Hobstetter’s and Czajka’s expectations that Florida
Quality Products would execute a lease agreement with ICS. Jack West, of Florida Quality
Products, testified that his first communication with ICS was his receipt of the ICS lease
agreement signed by Hobstetter. Hobstetter then telephoned West to inquire about the status of
the lease agreement. West telephoned Kipp immediately afterward because he was confused
about Hobstetter’s position in the matter. Kipp had never represented that he was from a
company other than USC, and West assumed that USC would be the entity leasing the drums.
Ultimately, Florida Quality Products executed a lease agreement with USC. Considering West’s
confusion as to ICS’ position in the matter, Hobstetter’s and Czajka’s expectations of an
imminent lease agreement with Florida Quality Products were not supported by the record.
In any event, ICS and Lovat cannot show that Walbro’s lawful actions were done with
malice and without justification because Walbro’s actions were motivated by legitimate business
reasons. BPS, supra at 699. Freshco had previously purchased drums from USC, and both
Freshco and Florida Quality Products ultimately executed lease agreements with USC.
Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary disposition in favor of Walbro on ICS’
tortious interference claim against Walbro and Lovat’s counterclaim against Walbro.
-4-
III. Conversion
ICS and Lovat next argue that the trial court erroneously granted summary disposition in
favor of Walbro on ICS’ claims for conversion and misappropriation. We disagree. Conversion
has been defined as “‘any distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over another’s personal
property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein.’” Head v Phillips Camper Sales &
Rental, Inc, 234 Mich App 94, 111; 593 NW2d 595 (1999), quoting Foremost Ins Co v Allstate
Ins Co, 439 Mich 378, 391; 486 NW2d 600 (1992). “The gist of conversion is the interference
with control of the property.” Sarver v Detroit Edison Co, 225 Mich App 580, 585; 571 NW2d
759 (1997). Initially, actions for conversion were limited to tangible chattels, but over time, the
doctrine of conversion was extended to include intangible rights. Id. at 585-586, citing Prosser &
Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 15, p 102.
ICS and Lovat argue that Walbro converted ICS’ contractual rights under its lease
agreements with Freshco and Florida Quality Products. The evidence indicates, however, that
ICS had no contractual rights with either company. Neither Freshco nor Florida Quality Products
executed lease agreements with ICS. In fact, Hobstetter admitted that ICS had no actual
customers, but only prospective customers. Because no lease contract existed between ICS and
Freshco or Florida Quality Products, Walbro could not possibly have converted any contractual
rights derived from such lease agreements.
ICS and Lovat also argue that Walbro converted the contract form and language
developed by ICS and utilized in its lease agreement. To establish its claim for conversion, ICS
must prove that it had an exclusive right of ownership in the ideas allegedly converted. Sarver,
supra at 586-588. The record fails to show that ICS had an exclusive right of ownership in the
lease agreement form or the language contained in the form. Vollmar and Hobstetter worked
together to develop a lease agreement which was acceptable to both parties. In a 1997
memorandum, Hobstetter asked Vollmar to review the lease form and advise Hobstetter if he had
any changes to make to the agreement. Additionally, Hobstetter offered to allow a Walbro
attorney to review the lease agreement instead of obtaining outside counsel, and Kipp provided
Hobstetter with sample lease agreements from USC to assist Hobstetter in the development of the
lease form. ICS did not attempt to assert an exclusive right of ownership in the form until after
Hobstetter provided copies of the purported Freshco and Florida Quality Products leases to
Daniel Hittler. Only after voluntarily sending the proposed lease agreements to Hittler did ICS
contend that the information contained therein was confidential, proprietary information of ICS.
Considering the above evidence, we conclude that ICS cannot establish that it had an exclusive
right of ownership in the lease agreement form or the language contained in the form. We
conclude that the trial court properly granted summary disposition in favor of Walbro on ICS’
conversion and misappropriation claim.
IV. Breach of Contract
ICS and Lovat next contend that the trial court erroneously granted Walbro’s motion for
partial summary disposition, finding that ICS’ breach of contract claim was barred by the statute
of frauds. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for
summary disposition de novo. Crown, supra at 546. When reviewing a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as
-5-
true and construes them most favorably to the nonmoving party. Fante v Stepek, 219 Mich App
319, 321-322; 556 NW2d 168 (1996). This Court considers affidavits, admissions, depositions,
and other documentary evidence along with the pleadings. Peters v Dep’t of Corrections, 215
Mich App 485, 486; 546 NW2d 668 (1996). A motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7) is properly granted where no factual development could provide a basis for recovery.
Id. Furthermore, whether the statute of frauds bars a contract claim is a question of law which
this Court reviews de novo on appeal. Zander v Ogihara Corp, 213 Mich App 438, 441; 540
NW2d 702 (1995).
Agreements that, by their own terms, are not to be performed within one year are void
unless in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. MCL
566.132(1)(a). Further, the statute of frauds provides that contracts for the sale of goods for the
price of $500 or more are not enforceable unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a
contract for sale has been made and signed by the party to be charged. MCL 440.2201; Power
Press Sales Co v MSI Battle Creek Stamping, 238 Mich App 173, 177; 604 NW2d 772 (1999).
ICS and Lovat argue that a question of fact existed regarding the existence of a contract
and contend that the circumstances surrounding the negotiations of the container supply
agreement evidenced Walbro’s intent to be bound by the agreement, notwithstanding the fact that
it was not signed by a Walbro representative. Regardless of the surrounding circumstances,
however, enforcement of an agreement that is within the statute of frauds is barred unless it is in
writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. MCL 440.2201. Contrary
to ICS and Lovat’s argument, the surrounding circumstances did not exempt the container supply
agreement from the operation of the statute of frauds. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant
of Walbro’s motion for partial summary disposition on ICS’ breach of contract claim.
V. Attorney Fees and Costs
In Docket No. 223935, ICS and Lovat argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
award attorney fees and costs in favor of Walbro because ICS and Lovat had already filed their
claim of appeal with this Court. Jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
Bass v Combs, 238 Mich App 16, 23; 604 NW2d 727 (1999). Once a claim of appeal is filed
with this Court, the trial court may not amend or set aside the judgment or order appealed from
except pursuant to an order of this Court, by stipulation of the parties, or as otherwise provided
by law. MCR 7.208(A); Co-Jo, Inc v Strand, 226 Mich App 108, 118; 572 NW2d 251 (1997);
Admiral Ins Co v Columbia Casualty Ins Co, 194 Mich App 300, 314; 486 NW2d 351 (1992).
This provision has been interpreted by this Court to deny a trial court jurisdiction to grant a party
costs and attorney fees after a claim of appeal is filed, unless the trial court’s final order or
judgment expressed an intent to award such costs and fees. Co-Jo, supra at 118-119; Admiral,
supra at 314-315.
In the instant case, the trial court entered its final order granting Walbro’s motion for
summary disposition on April 29, 1999, and the order made no mention of an award for costs and
attorney fees. On May 27, 1999, Walbro filed its motion for costs and attorney fees, and on June
9, 1999, ICS and Lovat filed their claim of appeal. The trial court thereafter granted Walbro’s
motion, on July 2, 1999. However, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction on June 9,
1999, when ICS and Lovat filed their claim of appeal with this Court. Co-Jo, supra at 118-119;
-6-
Admiral, supra at 314-315. Although Walbro’s motion for costs and fees was filed while the
trial court still had jurisdiction over the case, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant costs and
fees in favor of Walbro on July 2, 1999.
Walbro argues that, pursuant to MCR 7.208(I), the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule
on Walbro’s motion for costs and attorney fees. MCR 7.208(I) provides:
The trial court may rule on requests for costs or attorney fees under MCR 2.403,
2.405, 2.625 or other law or court rule, unless the Court of Appeals orders
otherwise.
However, MCR 7.208(I) did not take effect until February 1, 2000.1 Because ICS and Lovat filed
their claim of appeal before MCR 7.208(I) took effect, Walbro’s argument fails.
ICS and Lovat also argue that the trial court erred by awarding Walbro the full amount of
attorney fees requested notwithstanding ICS’ challenge the reasonableness of the fees. Because
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award such costs and attorney fees, however, we need not
address this issue.
We affirm the trial court’s orders granting summary disposition in favor of Walbro. We
reverse the trial court’s order awarding attorney costs and fees in favor of Walbro. Affirmed in
part and reversed in part. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, neither party having
prevailed in full.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
McDonald, J. did not participate.
1
See Staff Comment to 1999 Amendment of MCR 7.208.
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.