PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD L BROWN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 6, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219898
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 98-009284
RICHARD L. BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Cavanagh and R. S. Gribbs*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced as
a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to an enhanced term of twelve to twenty-five years’
imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction and a consecutive two-year term for the
felony-firearm conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that error requiring reversal occurred when the trial court asked defense
counsel, in the presence of the jury, whether defendant was aware of his right to remain silent
before defendant testified. Because defendant did not preserve this issue with an appropriate
objection to the court’s inquiry, we review this issue for plain error affecting defendant's
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-767; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). We agree
that it is preferable for a court to question a witness regarding his right to remain silent outside
the jury's presence. People v Dyer, 425 Mich 572, 578, n 5; 390 NW2d 645 (1986); People v
Clark, 172 Mich App 407, 416; 432 NW2d 726 (1988). In this case, however, the court's
question did not affect defendant’s substantial rights because it was not inherently intimidating, it
did not dissuade defendant from testifying, and it actually may have enhanced defendant's
credibility in the jurors' eyes. See People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 516-520; 597 NW2d 864
(1999). Accordingly, this issue does not warrant appellate relief.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury
on the no-duty-to-retreat rule in accordance with CJI2d 7.17. We disagree. Because the facts
showed that the victim was shot while defendant was outside his home, on or near his driveway,
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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and there was no evidence that the victim ever entered defendant's home, the no-duty-to-retreat
rule did not apply. People v Kulick, 209 Mich App 258, 264-265; 530 NW2d 163 (1995),
remanded for reconsideration on other grounds 449 Mich 851 (1995); People v Szymarek, 57
Mich App 354, 356-357; 225 NW2d 765 (1975); People v Godsey, 54 Mich App 316, 319-321;
220 NW2d 801 (1974); People v Paxton, 47 Mich App 144, 147-149; 209 NW2d 251 (1973).
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury in response to the
jury’s request to have certain testimony read back. The court informed the jury that the
testimony it requested could not be read back because it would take a few days to transcribe the
testimony. The court then instructed the jury to resume deliberations. The court never informed
the jury that it could have the requested testimony read to it at a later point if necessary.
We find no merit to defendant's claim that the trial court resolved this issue without
allowing input from the attorneys. The court discussed the instructions that it planned to give to
the jury and asked if there were any objections to the instructions. Defense counsel did not
object.
Although the court instructed the jury to resume deliberations because the transcripts
were not available, it did not entirely foreclose the possibility of reading back the requested
testimony at a later time. See MCR 6.414(H); People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 57; 549 NW2d
1 (1996). In any event, because defense counsel approved the court’s instructions, any error was
waived. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-215, 218-219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on
reckless or wanton use of a firearm, consistent with CJI2d 11.26. We disagree.
A court is required to instruct on a lesser included misdemeanor offense where (1) there is
a proper request made, (2) there is an "inherent relationship" between the greater and lesser
offenses, (3) the requested instruction for the misdemeanor offense is supported by a "rational
view" of the evidence, (4) the defendant has adequate notice if he did not make the request, and
(5) no undue confusion or other injustice would result. People v Corbiere, 220 Mich App 260,
262-263; 559 NW2d 666 (1996); People v Malach, 202 Mich App 266, 276; 507 NW2d 834
(1993).
A requested instruction on a lesser included misdemeanor offense is supported by a
rational view of the evidence when "proof on the element or elements differentiating the two
crimes [are] sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent
of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense." People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252, 262263; 330 NW2d 675 (1982), quoting United States v Whitaker, 144 US App DC 344, 347; 447
F2d 314 (1971).
CJI2d 11.26 provides as follows:
[The defendant is charged with the crime of/You may also consider the
lesser charge of*] reckless [use/handling] of a firearm. To prove this charge, the
prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
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[recklessly/heedlessly/willfully/(or) wantonly] [used/carried/handled/(or) fired] a
gun without reasonable caution for the rights, safety, or property of others.
CJI2d 11.26 is based on MCL 752.863a,1 which is a misdemeanor. The instruction applies
where a gun is negligently or accidentally discharged, not where it is intentionally fired. Here,
defendant admitted intentionally firing the gun, although he claimed that he was only intending
to scare the victim. On these facts, the instruction was not applicable.
Defendant argues that his attorney was ineffective for not moving to suppress two
statements that he gave to the police. In order for this Court to reverse due to ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so prejudiced him that he was denied the
right to a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Defendant
must overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466 NW2d 315 (1991). To establish
prejudice, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v Johnnie Johnson, Jr, 451
Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). The burden is on defendant to produce factual support
for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57
(1999).
Because defendant did not raise this issue in the trial court, our review is limited to the
record. A review of the record fails to reveal any support for defendant’s claim that his
statements should have been suppressed. Defendant has not met his burden of showing that
defense counsel was ineffective.
Defendant further claims that counsel was ineffective for not properly preserving the
matters previously discussed in this opinion. We disagree. While counsel could or should have
objected to some of the matters, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to do so.
Defendant has not met his burden on this issue.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the
prosecutor to question him about how he was shot and lost the use of his legs. We find no abuse
of discretion in admitting this testimony. Defendant opened the door to the line of questioning
when he testified that he had never felt as helpless in his life as when he was attacked by the
victim. In response, the prosecutor questioned defendant about how he was previously shot,
which left him paralyzed. Contrary to what defendant argues, the prosecutor’s question did not
involve the injection of improper evidence of prior bad acts under MRE 404(b). Moreover,
because the trial court did not allow any reference to the reason why defendant was shot or by
1
Formerly known as MCL 752.a863, which provides:
Any person who shall recklessly or heedlessly or wilfully or wantonly use,
carry, handle or discharge any firearm without due caution and circumspection for
the rights, safety or property of others shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
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whom, the question was not unfairly prejudicial under MRE 403. See People v Sabin (After
Remand), 463 Mich 43, 57-58; 614 NW2d 888 (2000).
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors' civic duty
during closing argument. Because defendant did not object to the challenged remarks, we limit
our review to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra; People v
Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). Considered in context, the prosecutor's
remarks did not involve a blatant attempt to urge the jurors to decide the case based upon a civic
duty to convict. Plain error has not been shown.
Defendant argues that his sentence of twelve to twenty-five years' imprisonment for
second-degree murder violates the principle of proportionality. We disagree. Defendant was
sentenced as an habitual offender. This Court's inquiry when reviewing sentencing decisions in
the case of habitual offenders is limited to determining if the trial court abused its discretion.
People v Alexander, 234 Mich App 665, 679; 599 NW2d 749 (1999). This Court reviews
sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion by applying the principle of proportionality and
determining if the sentence imposed is proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances
surrounding the offense and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1
(1990).
Here, defendant’s sentence, even as enhanced, was still within the recommendation of the
sentencing guidelines. Contrary to what defendant argues, there is no indication that the court
gave undue weight to his prior conviction. Defendant has not shown that his sentence amounted
to an abuse of discretion.
Finally, defendant argues that the court's comments during voir dire, that the jury should
not consider his handicap, were inconsistent with the court's final instructions on self-defense,
wherein the court told the jury that it should take into account the relative strength of defendant
and the victim when deciding if self-defense applied. During voir dire, the court emphasized
several times and questioned the jurors about whether they could decide this case without
prejudice or sympathy for defendant because of his handicap. We do not believe that the court's
instructions were inconsistent. The court's earlier comments were aimed at determining whether
the jurors could decide this case without prejudice or sympathy because defendant was
handicapped. The court also instructed the jury to decide the case on the evidence and law as
instructed. The court did not tell the jury that defendant's handicap could not be considered for
any purposes. Accordingly, this issue does not warrant relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
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