ANGELA CAVINESS V RICHARD DEWATERS III
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANGELA L. CAVINESS, f/k/a ANGELA L.
DEWATERS,
UNPUBLISHED
November 2, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 231982
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 97-081525
RICHARD DEWATERS, III,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: K.F. Kelly, P.J., and White and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from an order granting defendant’s motion for change
of custody. We reverse and remand.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
The parties’ married shortly after their son was born on April 10, 1996. The marriage,
however, lasted approximately one year and the plaintiff filed for divorce on September 17,
1997. The judgment of divorce provided both parties with joint legal and physical custody.
Pursuant to the parenting time provisions of the divorce judgment, the parties’ son spent
alternating weeks with each parent, both of whom lived in Jackson at the time. Defendant moved
for a change in custody arguing that because plaintiff moved to Howell, joint physical custody
was no longer possible. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that an established
custodial environment existed with both parents stating:
The court should first start out by indicating that the court finds that there is an
established custodial environment. Ordinarily there would need to be clear and
convincing evidence to change that environment; however, the court has
determined and I would think – I think counsel agrees, that there is a necessity for
a change in custody at this time due to the move to the Howell area and the need
particularly when the child is in school for him to be in on [sic] community and
that the current custodial plan, now, which allows each parent to have the child on
a rotating basis, is not able to be accomplished due to that move.
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The court would find that then the – the court’s determination as to the custody
and what’s in the child’s best interest would be by a preponderance of the
evidence, since there is a need for a change from the current alternating physical
custody.
The trial court then reviewed the best interest of the child factors and concluded, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that a change of custody was in the minor child’s best interest.
Plaintiff brought the instant appeal arguing that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard
and further arguing that the trial court’s factual findings were against the great weight of the
evidence.
II. Burden of Proof
First, plaintiff argues that the trial court committed a clear legal error when it applied the
preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether a change in custody from an
established custodial environment was in the minor child’s best interests. We agree.
There are three different standards of review applicable to child custody cases. The clear
legal error standard applies where the trial court errs in its choice, interpretation or application of
the existing law. LaFleche v Ybarra, 242 Mich App 692, 695; 619 NW2d 738 (2000).1
Findings of fact are reviewed pursuant to the great weight of the evidence standard. In accord
with that standard, this court will sustain the trial court’s factual findings unless “[t]he evidence
clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Id. And, discretionary rulings are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion, including a trial court’s determination on the issue of custody. Id.
Where an established custodial environment exists, a court may order a change of custody
only if clear and convincing evidence is presented that the change is in the child's best interest.
MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides in relevant part that:
The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a
new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless
there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the
child.
The Legislature’s intent underlying the Child Custody Act was to “[m]inimize the
prospect of unwarranted and disruptive change of custody orders and to erect a barrier
against removal of a child from an `established custodial environment’ except in the most
compelling cases. Baker v Baker, 411 Mich 567; 309 NW2d 532 (1981) [emphasis
added]; See also Ireland v Smith, 214 Mich App 235; 542 NW2d 344 (1995). This
pivotal legislative mandate is only served when trial courts apply the correct evidentiary
standard to issues relating to child custody. If the trial court finds that an established
custodial environment exists, then the trial court can only change custody if the party
bearing the burden presents clear and convincing evidence that the change serves the best
1
See also Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 20; 614 NW2d 183 (2000); McCain v McCain,
229 Mich App 123, 129; 580 NW2d 485 (1998).
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interest of the child. Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17; 614 NW2d 183 (2000) (citing
Rummelt v Anderson, 196 Mich App 491, 494; 493 NW2d 434 (1992)). This higher
standard also applies when there is an established custodial environment with both
parents. Jack v Jack, 239 Mich App 668; 610 NW2d 231 (2000).2 On the contrary, if the
court finds that no established custodial environment exists, then the court may change
custody if the party bearing the burden proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
change serves the child’s best interests. Id. (citing Mann v Mann, 190 Mich App 526,
531; 476 NW2d 439 (1991)).
In the case sub judice, the trial court found that the joint physical custody arrangement
resulted in an established custodial environment in both parties’ homes. Thus, neither plaintiff’s
nor defendant’s established custodial environment may be disrupted except upon a showing, by
clear and convincing evidence, that such a disruption is in the children’s best interests. Jack,
supra. However, the trial court expressly declined to apply the clear and convincing evidence
standard and instead opted for the less burdensome preponderance of the evidence standard. The
trial court thus committed clear legal error requiring reversal by failing to apply the appropriate
evidentiary standard.
III. Change of Circumstances
The plaintiff’s move to the Howell area constituted the sole rationale upon which the trial
court entertained the motion to change custody. Upon remand, it may very well be that there will
be insufficient clear and convincing evidence to support a change of custody. However, even
where there insufficient evidence to support a change of custody, a party may still request a
modification in parenting time. In the instant case, this is particularly appropriate where all
parties acknowledged that the prior weekly parenting time schedule is no longer tenable.
Upon remand, the trial court should consider whether plaintiff set forth a change in
circumstances sufficient to justify a modification in the parenting time arrangement, but not a
change in custody. Parenting time shall be granted in accordance with the best interests of the
child and in a frequency, duration, and type reasonably calculated to promote a strong
relationship between the parent and the child. MCL 722.27a(1). Indeed, it is presumed to be in
the best interests of the child for the child to have a strong relationship with both parents. MCL
722.27a(1). Thus, the best interest of the child controls when fashioning an appropriate parenting
time schedule. Deal v Deal, 197 Mich App 739, 742; 496 NW2d 403 (1993).
2
In Jack, supra, the trial court failed to make a finding regarding the existence of an established
custodial environment. This Court recognized that remand was required unless there was
sufficient evidence on the record “[f]or this Court to make its own determination of this issue by
de novo review.” Jack, supra at 670. On de novo review of the record, this Court ruled that the
children looked to both parents equally and that as a result, an established custodial environment
existed with both parents. Because the trial court in Jack did not find that both parents
established a custodial environment, this Court held that the trial court committed clear legal
error and remanded the case so that the trial court could determine whether clear and convincing
evidence existed to warrant a change in custody.
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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