PEOPLE OF MI V RICKEY ANDRE HOPSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 2, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 225652
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 99-403230-FC
RICKEY ANDRE HOPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Jansen and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to
deliver 225 grams or more but less than 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(1)(ii) and MCL
750.157a, and furnishing false identity information to the police, MCL 257.324(1)(h). He was
sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to twenty to fifty years’
imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction and ninety days’ incarceration for the furnishing
false identity information conviction. He appeals as of right and we affirm.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of
conspiracy. In determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a
conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d
748 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences may be sufficient to prove the
elements of a crime. Id. at 526.
To be convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the
prosecution must prove: (1) defendant possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory
minimum as charged; (2) the coconspirators possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory
minimum as charged; and (3) defendant and his coconspirators possessed the specific intent to
combine to deliver the statutory minimum as charged to a third person. People v Justice (After
Remand), 454 Mich 334, 349; 562 NW2d 652 (1997). Conspiracy is a partnership in criminal
purposes and under the partnership, two or more people must voluntarily agree to effectuate the
commission of a criminal offense. Id. at 345. The essence of the offense lies in the unlawful
agreement because the crime is complete upon the formation of the agreement. Id. at 345-346.
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Taken in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence adduced at trial indicated
that at approximately 5:15 a.m. on July 16, 1999, three vehicles were traveling very close
together on I-94. Michigan State Police Troopers James Coleman and Michael Troutt were
parked in the median of the expressway and noted that the three vehicles were within one car
length of each other. Because the vehicles were traveling at about seventy miles an hour, the
state troopers followed them because the vehicles were traveling too close together at that rate of
speed and traffic was otherwise very light. The state troopers followed the vehicles for about six
miles and noted that the vehicles were clearly traveling in a caravan because the second and third
vehicles closely mimicked the lead vehicle’s moves regarding lane changes and speed variations.
Trooper Coleman then positioned his patrol vehicle between the first two vehicles and
activated the lights. The first vehicle pulled over, but the second vehicle had to be cut off by the
troopers before it pulled over. The third vehicle was stopped by a Benton Township Police
Officer. Trooper Coleman approached the first vehicle, in which defendant was the driver and
there was a passenger (who initially gave a false identification and was later identified as
William Powers). Defendant did not have a driver’s license or any other identification and
identified himself as “Dion Bruessard.” Defendant told Trooper Coleman that they were
traveling to Benton Harbor to meet some women; however, the passenger indicated that they
were traveling to Cedar Point for a family reunion. Trooper Troutt talked with the driver of the
second vehicle, James Thomas, who claimed that he had been in Chicago and was on his way
back to Detroit when he met the people in the other two vehicles at a welcome center in New
Buffalo and they invited him to go to Kalamazoo. Thomas then consented to a search of his
vehicle and Trooper Troutt found a white plastic bag in the trunk containing 590 grams of
cocaine.
The third vehicle, stopped by Benton Harbor Police Officer Tom Vaught, also contained
only one person, Ralph Washington, who did not have a driver’s license. Washington claimed
that he was not traveling with the other two vehicles and that he was driving from Chicago to
Kalamazoo.
There was also testimony about the relationship between the four men. Powers’
girlfriend, Sharita Hegler, testified that on July 15, 1999, Powers borrowed her vehicle to visit his
sick grandmother in Chicago. At the time of the stop, Hegler’s vehicle was that being driven by
Washington. Hegler testified that Powers and Washington are cousins and that Powers and
defendant are friends.
Michigan State Police Detective Sergeant Willie Mays interviewed defendant. Defendant
initially stated that he did not know Thomas or Washington. However, defendant later stated that
Powers had borrowed defendant’s mother’s vehicle in Chicago to drive to Kalamazoo and
defendant was following Powers when Powers pulled off at a rest stop in New Buffalo. At that
point, defendant began to drive his mother’s vehicle, the lead vehicle. Defendant denied any
knowledge of the cocaine found in Thomas’ vehicle; however, defendant admitted that he did
deal drugs, although Powers was the only person who had the “weight” to get 590 grams of
cocaine.
Detective Sergeant Mays also provided expert testimony in the area of sales and
distribution of cocaine. Detective Sergeant Mays specifically testified that a caravan is two or
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more vehicles traveling together when transporting drugs and that the purpose is to protect
against robbery. The vehicles also divert police attention from the vehicle actually transporting
the drugs, such as by swerving in a lane to be pulled over for a traffic ticket.
Defendant testified in his own behalf at trial and denied that he had any knowledge of the
cocaine. He acknowledged that he and Powers were friends and further testified that Powers
picked up defendant at his grandmother’s house in Chicago and brought Thomas and Washington
with him. Defendant gave conflicting testimony regarding his knowledge of Thomas and
Washington, stating both that he knew and did not know them. Defendant maintained that he
was not aware of the cocaine, although he admitted that he knew that Powers was a drug dealer.
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that there was
sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conspiracy conviction. Contrary to defendant’s
argument, direct proof of the conspiracy is not necessary. Id. at 347. Rather, “proof may be
derived from the circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties.” Id. Here, the conspiracy was
shown by the fact that the three vehicles were being driven in a caravan, that defendant knew
Powers well and knew that he was a drug dealer, that defendant also knew Thomas and
Washington, that the men gave false identification information to the police, and that the men
gave conflicting statements about the purposes of their trips. Further, the police found a
substantial quantity of cocaine in the trunk of the middle vehicle with a street value of about
$100,000. Under these circumstances, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant conspired
with others to transport with the intent to later distribute the cocaine.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting hearsay
statements of Washington, Powers, and Thomas. The decision to admit evidence is within the
trial court’s discretion and will be reversed only where there is an abuse of discretion. People v
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Where the decision regarding the admission
of evidence involves whether a rule of evidence or statute precludes such admissibility, the
question is one of law and is reviewed de novo. Id.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
MRE 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions. MRE 802.
MRE 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a
party and is a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course of and in furtherance of
the conspiracy on independent proof of the conspiracy.
The statements, giving false identifications and regarding the nature of their travels and
that they did not know each other, were admitted at trial through the testimony of the three police
officers involved in stopping the three vehicles. The trial court’s decision to allow the statements
was ultimately premised on two reasons: (1) that the statements did not constitute hearsay
because they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and (2) that the statements were
not hearsay under MRE 801(d)(2)(E) as statements made by coconspirators made during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. We agree that the statements did not constitute hearsay as defined
in MRE 801(c), therefore, we need not determine whether MRE 801(d)(2)(E) is applicable.
Here, the statements given by Washington, Powers, and Thomas to the police officers
were of their identities (which were false), the nature of their trip, and that they were not
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traveling together or did not know each other. The statements were not offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted by the three men. Rather, the statements were offered to
prove the conspiracy. Because the men gave false identities, gave inconsistent reasons for the
nature of their travels, and claimed not to know each other, this evidence tends to show that the
men were lying to cover the real purpose of their trip because 590 grams of cocaine was found in
the trunk of the second vehicle and because there was later testimony clearly linking the four
men. Accordingly, the statements were not hearsay because they were not admitted to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, but were offered to prove the conspiracy.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements made by
Washington, Powers, and Thomas because the statements were not hearsay.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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