SHARON S MYHRE V V WALTER G MYHRE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHARON S. MYHRE,
UNPUBLISHED
October 26, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 222404
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-814723-DM
WALTER G. MYHRE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: K.F. Kelly, P.J., and Hood and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce entered September 1,
1999. We reverse and remand for further findings of fact.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
The parties were married two separate times. The first marriage lasted four years,
ending in 1983. The default judgment of divorce ending this first marriage did not
provide alimony to the wife and did not address either party’s pension or retirement
benefits. On December 20, 1991, approximately eight years after their first marriage
ended, the parties remarried. Six years and five months thereafter, on May 11, 1998, the
wife filed for divorce a second time.
The trial in this matter mainly focused on the division of property and spousal
support. According to the testimony adduced at trial, the wife began to experience
significant health problems near the end of the first marriage. The record reveals that the
wife suffers from multiple adhesions that grow around her organs, which requires
extensive surgery to correct. Because of this condition, the wife is unable to work. She
began to receive Social Security Disability benefits on or about November 27, 1984,
which continue to date.
After taking evidence, the trial court rendered its decision on May 12, 1999.
Neither the parties nor counsel for the parties were present during the proceeding wherein
the trial court rendered its ultimate disposition. Notwithstanding, a review of the record
reveals that the trial court failed to address all of the requisite spousal support and
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property division factors in rendering its decision. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment
and remand for further findings of fact.
II. Alimony
Plaintiff first challenges the amount of alimony awarded her. This Court reviews
a trial court’s factual findings relative to an award of alimony for clear error. Moore v
Moore, 242 Mich App 652, 654; 619 NW2d 723 (2000). Whether to award alimony and
the amount actually awarded are dispositional rulings that this Court reviews de novo.
Ianitelli v Ianitelli, 199 Mich App 641, 642; 502 NW2d 691 (1993). The lower court’s
decision should only be overturned when we are left with the firm conviction that the
decision was inequitable. McDougal v McDougal, 451 Mich 80, 87; 545 NW2d 357
(1996).
Pursuant to MCL 552.23, the trial court enjoys discretionary authority to award
alimony “as it considers just and reasonable in light of all the circumstances.” Ianitelli,
supra at 642-643. (Citing Demman v Demman, 195 Mich App 109, 110, 489 NW2d 161
(1992)). Eleven distinct factors outline the “circumstances” which the trial court must
consider when fashioning an alimony award: (1) the past relations and conduct of the
parties, (2) the length of the marriage, (3) the abilities of the parties to work, (4) the
source and amount of property awarded to the parties, (5) the parties' ages, (6) the
abilities of the parties to pay alimony, (7) the present situation of the parties, (8) the needs
of the parties, (9) the parties' health, (10) the prior standard of living of the parties and
whether either is responsible for the support of others, and (11) general principles of
equity. Lee v Lee, 191 Mich App 73, 80; 477 NW2d 429 (1991).
In the case at bar, the record is devoid of any clear factual findings on these very
specific factors justifying the trial court’s decision to award alimony. At best, the trial
court considered the parties’ past relations, the length of the marriage, and the parties’
respective ages. Beyond noting that the wife is “in poor health,” the trial court did not
make mention of the other factors upon which it ultimately determined that $150.00 per
week in alimony was “just and reasonable” “in light of all the circumstances.” Ianitelli,
supra at 642-643. Consequently, there is an insufficient record upon which to review the
trial court’s determination. Review is impossible when the lower court failed to make
sufficient findings of fact. Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 159; 485 NW2d 893 (1992).
When the court has failed to do so, the case must be remanded. Id. at 163. Because the
trial court did not consider all of the relevant factors governing its discretionary decision
to award alimony, we vacate the judgment and remand for further factual findings in this
regard. Daniels v Daniels, 165 Mich App 726, 732; 418 NW2d 924 (1988). On remand,
the lower court shall make specific findings of fact on all of the requisite factors
underlying its ultimate determination. Sands v Sands, 442 Mich 30, 34; 497 NW2d 493
(1993); Ianitelli, supra at 643.
III. Pension Benefits
Next, plaintiff appeals the trial court’s limitation on her award of defendant’s
pension benefits to only those that accrued during their second marriage. Plaintiff
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requested fifty percent of all defendant’s pension benefits, or at least the addition of those
accruing during the parties’ first marriage to each other two decades ago. Although we
need not reach the issue whether the alimony award and the property division were
equitable, some instruction regarding premarital pension benefits is warranted. Such
benefits may be awarded whenever it is just and reasonable, under the circumstances.
McMichael v McMichael, 217 Mich App 723, 730-731; 552 NW2d 688 (1996); Booth v
Booth, 194 Mich App 284, 291; 486 NW2d 116 (1992). The parties’ ability to pay along
with their character and situation constitute relevant circumstances. Id.
Pension benefits that accrued during a previous marriage between the parties may
still be divided if the issue was not actually determined in the original divorce and, at that
time, the court was not required to consider the pension. McMichael, supra at 727-728.
Michigan’s statute requiring courts to consider the parties’ pension benefits, MCL
552.18, was not enacted until 1985, two years after the parties’ first divorce. See 1985
PA 43. The evidence indicates that the pension issue was neither previously addressed or
resolved in the first divorce. Therefore, the pension benefits are subject to division if just
and reasonable. McMichael, supra at 727-728, 730-731.
IV. Attorneys Fees
Plaintiff also argues that the lower court erred when it denied plaintiff’s request
for attorney fees. A court may award a divorcing party attorney fees when necessary to
enable that party to prosecute or defend the suit. Maake v Maake, 200 Mich App 184,
189; 503 NW2d 664 (1993). The requesting party, however, must allege facts at trial that
sufficiently demonstrate an inability to carry on the lawsuit. Kosch v Kosch, 233 Mich
App 346, 354; 592 NW2d 434 (1999). Here, plaintiff failed to offer any evidence
regarding the amount of attorney fees she incurred. Further, the issue is not reviewable
on appeal because plaintiff failed to include it in her questions presented. MCR
7.212(C)(5); Greathouse v Rhodes, 242 Mich App 221, 240; 618 NW2d 106 (2000). An
issue not properly set forth in the statement of questions presented is waived. Caldwell v
Chapman, 240 Mich App 124, 132; 610 NW2d 264 (2000). We therefore decline to
address this issue.
V. Reassignment to Different Judge
Upon remand, counsel for plaintiff requests a different judge. Remand to a
different judge is appropriate where it is unreasonable to expect the trial judge to set aside
“previously expressed views . . . without substantial difficulty.” See Ireland v Smith, 214
Mich App 235, 250; 542 NW2d 344 (1995). A review of the record in the case at bar
does not indicate that the trial court would experience “substantial difficulty” setting
aside its previous findings. Nor has plaintiff demonstrated any actual bias or prejudice on
the part of the trial court. B&B Investment Group v Gitler, 229 Mich App 1, 17; 581
NW2d 17 (1998). However, on remand, we caution the trial court to consider and resolve
the substantive issues presented in the matter brought before it, disregarding any personal
feelings on the propriety of no-fault divorce in Michigan.
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Reversed and remanded for findings of fact regarding the award of alimony and
the division of defendant’s premarital pension benefits. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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