PEOPLE OF MI V PATRICK SEAN MALONEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 23, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 225310
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 1999-164759-FH
BRIAN DEWITT WESLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227209
Lenawee Circuit Court
LC No. 99-008329-FH
PATRICK SEAN MALONEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K.F. Kelly, P.J., and Hood and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases defendants appeal by delayed leave granted their judgments of
sentence and post-conviction orders denying resentencing. We affirm in both cases. Although
defendants were convicted of different offenses, they are represented by the same counsel and
raise virtually identical arguments on appeal.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
A. People v Wesley, Docket No. 225310
In February, 1999, defendant Wesley admitted that he acquired $970.00 by false
pretenses. Consequently, he pleaded guilty to false pretenses over $100 in contravention of MCL
750.218, and of being a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12. On September 17, 1998, the date
of the offense, MCL 750.218 apportioned punishment based on the value of the item acquired by
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false pretenses. If the value exceeded $100, the offense was categorized as a felony punishable
by a maximum term of ten years in prison.
Effective January 1, 1999, 1998 PA 312 amended MCL 750.218. The amendment
created a new scheme whereby the penalty was determined using the value of the item together
with the offender’s prior record. In pertinent part, the amended statute provided that if the value
of the item was at least $200 but less than $1,000 and the defendant had a prior conviction of
false pretenses, the offense was punishable by a maximum term of five years in prison. MCL
750.218(4)(b). In March 1999, the trial court sentenced defendant Wesley as an habitual
offender to two and one-half to fifteen years in prison. The trial court sentenced defendant under
the version of MCL 750.218 in effect at the time of the offense.
Defendant Wesley filed a post-judgment motion for resentencing, arguing that he was
entitled to be resentenced under the amended version of MCL 750.218 to take advantage of the
more lenient sentencing provisions of that statute. Defendant Wesley relied on our Supreme
Court’s plurality opinion in People v Schultz, 435 Mich 517; 460 NW2d 505 (1990), wherein the
Court held that two criminal defendants were entitled to the ameliorative benefits from reduced
penalty provisions in amended versions of the statutes under which they were convicted,
notwithstanding the fact that the amendments became effective subsequent to the dates of the
offenses. Justice Archer, writing for himself and Justices Levin and Cavanagh, concluded that
because the goals of indeterminate sentencing would continue to be served by application of
ameliorative amended statutes and because a contrary interpretation would produce anomalous
results, the general savings statute, MCL 8.4a,1 did not mandate a different conclusion. Id., 532533. Justice Boyle concurred in the result only.
The trial court denied defendant Wesley’s motion for resentencing, finding that the
amended version of MCL 750.218 created an entirely new statutory scheme.
B. People v Maloney, Docket No. 227209
On April 7, 1999 defendant Maloney pleaded guilty to receiving or concealing stolen
property over $100 in contravention of MCL 750.535. The value of the property involved was
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That statute provides:
The repeal of any statute or part thereof shall not have the effect to release
or relinquish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute or any
part thereof, unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute
and part thereof shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of
instituting or sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of
such penalty, forfeiture or liability.
MCL 8.4a was enacted to avoid application of the common-law rule articulated in People v
Lowell, 250 Mich 349, 353; 230 NW 202 (1930), that in the absence of a savings clause or
general savings statute, the repeal of a penal statute would defeat any pending prosecutions under
that statute. Schultz, supra, 539 (Brickley, J., dissenting).
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approximately $300. In August, 1998, when the offense occurred, MCL 750.535 provided that if
the value of the stolen property exceeded $100, the offense was categorized as a felony
punishable by a maximum term of five years’ imprisonment. Effective January 1, 1999, 1998 PA
311 amended MCL 750.535. The amendment provided that if the value of the stolen property
was at least $200 but less than $1,000, the offense was categorized as a misdemeanor punishable
by a maximum term of one year in jail. MCL 750.535(4)(a). After violating probation,
defendant Maloney was sentenced to two to five years in prison. The trial court sentenced
defendant Maloney under the version of MCL 750.535 in effect at the time of the offense.
Defendant Maloney filed a post-judgment motion for resentencing, arguing that he was
entitled to be resentenced under the amended version of MCL 750.535 to take advantage of the
more lenient sentencing provisions contained therein. Defendant Maloney relied on Schultz,
supra. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Schultz was not binding precedent because
it was a plurality opinion and was applied as precedent only in cases involving sentences for
controlled substance offenses. In addition, the trial court concluded that MCL 8.4a compelled
the conclusion that the version of the statute in effect at the time of the offense determined the
applicable penalty.
II. Analysis
Statutory interpretation is an issue of law which we review de novo on appeal. People v
Denio, 454 Mich 691, 698; 564 NW2d 13 (1997).
On appeal, each defendant argues that Schultz entitles them to benefit from the more
lenient sentencing provision contained in the amended version of the statute under which they
were convicted. Defendants assert that Schultz is controlling, notwithstanding its status as a
plurality decision, and emphasize that both our Supreme Court and this Court have applied the
Schultz rule and granted resentencing in controlled substance offenses. See, e.g., People v Suggs,
447 Mich 998; 525 NW2d 463 (1994); People v Sammons, 191 Mich App 351, 376; 478 NW2d
901 (1991). We disagree and affirm the sentence in each case.
Technically, the decision rendered in Schultz is not binding precedent for the reason that
it is a plurality opinion. The opinion did not command a clear majority, as the justices did not
agree on the precise basis for the decision. This particular decision has, however, been applied
in cases involving controlled substance offenses on the rationale that defendants in similar
positions (i.e., sentenced under statutes amended by the same legislation that amended the
statutes at issue in Schultz) are entitled to similar treatment. People v Scarborough, 189 Mich
App 341, 344; 471 NW2d 567 (1991). The decision in Schultz has not been applied in cases
involving something other than controlled substance offenses even though the decision itself was
released over a decade ago.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Schultz constitutes binding precedent, it is distinguishable
and does not compel resentencing in the instant cases. Legislative enactments to existing law,
including penal statutes, generally are applied prospectively. The only exceptions are when the
Legislature expressly provides for retroactive application of amendatory legislation or when the
amendment concerns procedural or remedial matters, as opposed to substantive law. People v
Russo, 439 Mich 584, 594; 487 NW2d 698 (1992); MCL 8.4a. In both of the cases currently at
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bar, the amendatory legislation affected substantive alterations to both MCL 750.218 (false
pretenses), and MCL 750.535, (receiving or concealing stolen property), in that the amendments
reconfigured the felony/misdemeanor classifications and altered the value elements of each
offense to create new statutory schemes. The existence of these substantive alterations, coupled
with the lack of language in the amendatory legislation expressly providing for retroactive
application thereof, precludes application of the ameliorative sentencing provisions contained in
MCL 750.218 and MCL 750.535 to the instant cases. MCL 8.4a; Russo, supra. We thus affirm
the trial court’s decisions.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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