WILLIAM RICHARDSON V NATIONAL-STANDARD CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM RICHARDSON,
UNPUBLISHED
October 19, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 225454
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 98-003942-CL
NATIONAL-STANDARD COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Jansen and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this wrongful discharge action, plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s
November 4, 1999, order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff was discharged in January 1998 after approximately thirty-five years of
employment with defendant as part of a reduction in force (RIF). We affirm.
The events giving rise to this appeal occurred in January 1998. On January 30, 1998,
defendant’s management at its Corbin, Kentucky plant informed plaintiff that his services were
no longer needed. During his deposition plaintiff testified that he was not surprised about his
termination because business at the Corbin plant had declined. Specifically, plaintiff testified
that his department manufactured the wire used in airbags, and that the demand for airbags had
diminished. However, plaintiff further testified that he was not told exactly why he was being
terminated, although he recognized that defendant was undergoing an RIF.1
After plaintiff wrote to defendant seeking an explanation for his termination, defendant’s
director of administration in Niles, Michigan, Michael Conn, replied in a letter dated March 31,
1998. Specifically, Conn explained that plaintiff was terminated as part of the RIF, and that
while plaintiff’s lengthy duration of employment with defendant was duly considered, he was
chosen to be terminated because of past “write-ups in [plaintiff’s] file over the last couple of
years” as well as frequent verbal admonitions. In his September 19, 1999, affidavit in support of
defendant’s motion for summary disposition, Conn averred:
1
The record reveals that plaintiff was disgruntled about his termination, and that he thought that
other employees should have been terminated instead of him because of his seniority and
superior ability.
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[Plaintiff’s] employment with [defendant] was terminated due to a decision by
[defendant] to reduce the total number of employees at its Corbin, Kentucky plant
as a means of reducing its operating costs. There was no other reason for
[plaintiff’s] termination.
Plaintiff filed this wrongful discharge action on October 16, 1998. The complaint alleged
that plaintiff was terminated without just cause, and that “[d]efendant refused to transfer
[p]laintiff to other positions for which plaintiff had the experience, despite plaintiff’s request to
do so and in violation of its contract with plaintiff.” As relevant to this appeal, defendant moved
for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) on September 20, 1999, arguing that
plaintiff’s employment was at will. Defendant further argued that even if plaintiff could only be
terminated for cause, his termination as part of the RIF was just cause as a matter of law. In
response, plaintiff argued that the RIF did not provide just cause for his discharge, because he
was replaced by another employee, Ralph Centers. Plaintiff also argued that he was entitled to
transfer to another position instead of being terminated.
Ruling from the bench, the trial court concluded that genuine fact issues existed regarding
whether plaintiff’s employment was terminable for cause. However, the trial court went on to
observe that plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim was deficient because his termination as part of
the RIF constituted just cause as a matter of law. Moreover, the trial court rejected plaintiff’s
argument that he was replaced by another employee following his discharge. Likewise, the trial
court determined that plaintiff did not have a legitimate expectation of being transferred to
another position within defendant’s organization instead of being discharged.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant of summary disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under [MCR
2.116(C)(10)], a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions,
admissions and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered
evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich
109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).]
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the RIF did not provide just cause for his termination
because he was replaced by another employee. We disagree.
Even if we were to agree with the trial court’s determination that plaintiff’s employment
was terminable only for cause, the well-settled law of this state is that termination of
employment as part of a RIF amounts to just cause as a matter of law. McCart v J Walter
Thompson USA, Inc, 437 Mich 109, 114; 469 NW2d 284 (1991); Clement-Rowe v Michigan
Health Care Corp, 212 Mich App 503, 506; 538 NW2d 20 (1995). Plaintiff does not challenge
the legitimacy of the RIF, nor does he assert that it was a mere pretext for otherwise
discriminatory action. See, e.g., Ewers v Stroh Brewery Co, 178 Mich App 371, 378-379; 443
NW2d 504 (1989). Rather, plaintiff contends that the RIF is not a defense under the
circumstances of the present case because he was replaced by a coworker.
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In support of his argument, plaintiff points to a decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Barnes v Gencorp, Inc, 896 F2d 1457 (CA 6, 1990).2 In Barnes,
the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant for age discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 29 USC § § 621 et seq,3 after their
employment was terminated as part of a RIF. As relevant to the present case, the Barnes court
concluded that a plaintiff alleging age discrimination in the context of a RIF must produce
“additional, direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to show that the employer
singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons” in addition to his or her prima
facie case. Barnes, supra at 1465. Consequently, pursuant to Barnes, the standard prima facie
claim of age discrimination is modified when a plaintiff is discharged as part of a RIF. See
Godfredson v Hess & Clark, Inc, 173 F3d 365, 371 (CA 6, 1999).4
After setting forth this heightened standard for a prima facie case of age discrimination in
the context of a RIF, the Barnes court made the following comments that plaintiff argues are
applicable in the present case.
It is important to clarify what constitutes a true work force reduction case. A
work force reduction situation occurs when business considerations cause an
employer to eliminate one or more positions within the company. An employee is
not eliminated as part of a work force reduction when he or she is replaced after
his or her discharge. However, a person is not replaced when another employee
is assigned to perform the plaintiff’s duties in addition to other duties, or when
the work is redistributed among other existing employees already performing
related work. A person is replaced only when another employee is hired or
reassigned to perform the plaintiff’s duties. See Sahadi [v Reynolds Chemical,
636 F2d 1116, 1117 (CA 6, 1980)]. [Barnes, supra at 1465 (emphasis supplied).]
2
Plaintiff also relies on an unpublished federal decision, Wolf v Lacy Diversified Industries,
unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan,
issued December 7, 1993 (Docket No. 1:92-CV-510). In Lacy, the plaintiff filed suit against the
defendant alleging age discrimination and wrongful discharge. Evaluating the plaintiff’s age
discrimination claim, the Lacy court concluded that the plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence to create a genuine factual dispute regarding whether he was replaced by a younger
worker. In a cursory fashion without detailed analysis, the Lacy court further concluded that
because the plaintiff had put sufficient evidence to show that he was replaced as relevant to his
age discrimination claim, “plaintiff could prevail on his [wrongful discharge] claim as well.” Id.
at 4.
3
The Barnes plaintiffs also alleged age discrimination in violation of Ohio state law.
4
Likewise, in Michigan, a plaintiff discharged during a RIF is required to “adduce additional
proofs in order to establish discrimination.” Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700,
717; 565 NW2d 401 (1997).
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Plaintiff argues that this standard for determining the existence of a true RIF is also
applicable in the wrongful discharge context.5 In contrast, defendant summarily rejects
plaintiff’s reliance on Barnes, arguing that once the trial court determined that plaintiff was
discharged as part of the RIF, “inquires into collateral issues such as the retention of all or part of
the work previously performed by [plaintiff] [are] completely irrelevant.”
In Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 177; 579 NW2d 106 (1998), our
Supreme Court recognized that to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff
must demonstrate, in addition to other factors, that he or she was replaced by a younger
employee. In this vein, the Lytle Court quoted the above holding from Barnes regarding a true
RIF. Id., n 27. Thus, to the extent that our Supreme Court has approved of the Barnes standard
as a basis for discerning what constitutes a true RIF, it has done so only in the context of
reviewing the replacement element of a prima facie claim of discrimination.
Where no claim of pretext is alleged, we believe that any inquiry by this Court into
defendant’s organization of its operations following plaintiff’s discharge for cause is
unnecessary. As our Supreme Court has recognized in a different context, “[a] court should be
most reluctant to interfere with the business judgment and discretion of [corporate management]
in the conduct of corporate affairs.” Dumas v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 437 Mich 521, 531; 473
NW2d 652 (1991) (opinion by Riley, J.), quoting In re Butterfield Estate, 418 Mich 241, 255;
341 NW2d 453 (1983). Because defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment as part of the RIF,
plaintiff’s claim of wrongful discharge cannot succeed. McCart, supra at 114.
On appeal, plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that defendant
was not required to transfer him to another position instead of discharging him. Plaintiff has
waived this issue on appeal by failing to cite any meaningful authority in support of his
argument. See Caldwell v Chapman, 240 Mich App 124, 132-133; 610 NW2d 264 (2000) (“A
party may not merely announce a position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationale the
basis for the claim”).6
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
5
We note that plaintiff has failed to direct our attention to a published Michigan case as
authority for this proposition.
6
To the extent that plaintiff does cite authority in this portion of his brief on appeal, he merely
reiterates his earlier argument that his employment with defendant was terminable only for
cause. However, plaintiff fails to develop any coherent argument articulating how these cases
support his claim that he was entitled to transfer to another position rather than being discharged.
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