PEOPLE OF MI V RALPH LEO WASHINGTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 225653
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 99-403234-FH
RALPH LEO WASHINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Gage and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver more
than 225 but less than 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii), conspiracy to deliver
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii), and possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d). He
appeals of right. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The evidence established that defendant participated in a three-car caravan from Chicago
en route to Kalamazoo and the second car in the caravan contained 591 grams of cocaine. The
evidence also established that, even though defendant neither drove nor rode in the second car, he
knew there was cocaine hidden in its trunk.
I
Defendant first claims the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his
statement to the police because the statement was involuntary in that it was induced by a promise
of leniency. We disagree.
A confession may not be introduced into evidence unless the prosecution proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s statements were voluntary. People v
Etheridge, 196 Mich App 43, 57; 492 NW2d 490 (1992). The determination whether a
confession was voluntary is a question of law for the trial court. People v Walker (On
Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). In reviewing the trial court’s findings,
this Court examines the entire record to make an independent determination of voluntariness.
Etheridge, supra at 57. However, this Court will defer to the trial court’s superior ability to
assess the credibility of the witnesses and will reverse the trial court’s factual findings only if
they are clearly erroneous. Id.
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In determining the voluntariness of a statement, a trial court should consider whether a
promise of leniency induced the inculpatory statement. People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113,
120; 575 NW2d 84 (1997). Defendant contended that the detective who interviewed him
promised him he could go home if he confessed. The detective, however, testified that he told
defendant he would talk to the prosecutor if defendant cooperated.
The trial court believed the interviewing detective’s testimony over that of defendant.
Deferring to the trial court’s superior ability to make factual findings and credibility
determinations, we accept the lower court’s credibility determinations and conclude the trial
court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28;
592 NW2d 75 (1998).
Furthermore, although defendant argues the detective’s statement that he would “talk to
the prosecutor” if defendant would “cooperate” amounts to a promise of leniency rendering
defendant’s confession involuntary, we have held that a promise to speak with the prosecutor
concerning a defendant’s willingness to cooperate does not amount to a “promise of leniency.”
Givans, supra at 120. Because the detective’s promise to speak to the prosecutor was not a
promise of leniency, it does not render defendant’s confession involuntary. Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress his
inculpatory statement.
II
Defendant next claims the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt the charges of possession with intent to deliver and conspiracy to possess with intent to
deliver cocaine.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find
that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). The standard of review is deferential –
a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in
support of the jury verdict. Id. The prosecutor is bound to prove the elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt; it need not negate every reasonable theory consistent with innocence
to discharge its responsibility. Id.
A.
To establish the crime of possession with intent to deliver, a prosecutor must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance; (2)
the defendant intended to deliver this substance to someone else; (3) the substance possessed was
cocaine and the defendant knew it was cocaine; and (4) the substance was in a mixture that
weighed the charged amount proscribed under the statute. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376,
389; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
Although defendant argues the prosecutor failed to establish the first element, that
defendant knowingly possessed cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt, we find the prosecutor
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established possession under an aiding and abetting theory. We have held that a defendant does
not have to physically possess cocaine in order to be convicted of aiding and abetting possession
with intent to deliver. People v Steve Jones, 201 Mich App 687, 688; 506 NW2d 599 (1993).
Moreover, to establish aiding and abetting, a prosecutor must show that (1) the crime charged
was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave
encouragement which assisted in the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the
commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time
he gave aid and encouragement. People v Izarraras-Placante, 246 Mich App 490, 495-496; 633
NW2d 18 (2001).
Here, the evidence established that defendant was helping those in the car containing the
cocaine maintain possession of it because defendant participated in a caravan designed to protect
the car carrying the cocaine from being pulled over by the police. Because, viewing the evidence
in a light favorable to the prosecutor, the proffered evidence established that defendant helped his
cousin and the driver of the second car in the caravan maintain possession of the cocaine, a
reasonable jury could have found that the prosecutor established possession beyond a reasonable
doubt. We therefore conclude there was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s conviction of
possession with intent to deliver more than 225 but less than 650 grams of cocaine, MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(ii). Nowack, supra.
B.
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented in support of his
conspiracy conviction, arguing the prosecutor failed to present evidence from which a reasonable
jury could have found that defendant conspired to possess with intent to deliver cocaine between
225 and 649 grams. Defendant maintains that for purposes of the conspiracy charge, the
prosecutor was required to establish that defendant knew the exact quantity or weight of the
cocaine being transported and that the proofs are deficient in this regard.
To establish the statutory offense of criminal conspiracy, a prosecutor must show a
combination or agreement, express or implied, between two or more persons, to commit an
illegal act. MCL 750.157a; People v Meredith (On Remand), 209 Mich App 403, 407-408; 531
NW2d 749 (1995). Direct proof of the conspiracy is not essential; proof may be derived from the
circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties. People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334,
347; 562 NW2d 652 (1997). However, any inferences drawn must be reasonable to ensure that it
may accurately be ascertained what particular substantive offense was intended by the
coconspirators. Id. at 348. With regard to the specific conspiracy charged herein, conspiracy to
possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the prosecutor must establish that
(1) [T]he defendant possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory
minimum as charged, (2) his coconspirators possessed the specific intent to
deliver the statutory minimum as charged, and (3) the defendant and his
coconspirators possessed the specific intent to combine to deliver the statutory
minimum as charged to a third person. [Id. at 349 (emphasis added).]
In a recently released decision construing the above phrase, “the specific intent to deliver
the statutory minimum as charged,” our Supreme Court in People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 630-3-
631; 628 NW2d 540 (2001), held that “[t]his Court’s holding [in Justice] unambiguously calls
for the prosecution to prove (in a conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver charge), not just
that the defendant conspired to possess with intent to deliver some or any amount of cocaine, but
‘the statutory minimum as charged.’”1 [Emphasis added.] In reversing this Court’s decision to
the contrary, the Mass Court explained:
The prosecution argues that Justice should not be applicable here because
(1) the crime charged in Justice was the specific intent crime of possession with
intent to deliver, whereas the crime herein was the general intent crime of
delivery, and (2) Justice involved multiple small transactions that were
aggregated, whereas the case at bar involved only one transaction. It has also been
suggested that Justice was wrongly decided and that we should hold that
knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is not an element of a
conspiracy offense. We find unpersuasive these criticisms of and efforts to
distinguish Justice. We are satisfied that Justice properly concluded that
knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is an element of the crime of
conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, and that this holding is consistent
with a correct interpretation of our controlled substance and conspiracy statutes.
This is because our conspiracy statute, MCL 750.157a, makes it a crime to
conspire with another to commit “an offense.” And, as previously explained,
there are four separate delivery offenses depending on the amount of contraband
involved. The fact that Justice required the prosecution to establish the statutory
charged amount is fully consistent with requiring the prosecution to prove which
delivery offense a defendant conspired to violate and with the fact that conspiracy
is a specific intent crime. [Id. at 632-634, (footnotes omitted).]2
The Mass Court further noted that
if one conspires to deliver an unspecified amount of cocaine one would, at
a minimum, be guilty of conspiring to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine.
Thus, a defendant would not, as stated by the Court of Appeals, “avoid all
criminal liability”; rather, he would be convicted of a felony and could face a
twenty-year term of incarceration.
We further disagree with the Court of Appeals that
1
Mass was decided in the context of determining the propriety of jury instructions given by the
trial court on the charges of delivery of cocaine and conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver
between 225 and 649 grams of cocaine.
2
The Mass Court, supra at 635-639, further held that pursuant to Apprendi v New Jersey, 530
US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), knowledge of drug quantity is an element of a
controlled substance conspiracy offense which must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond
a reasonable doubt if the quantity increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory minimum.
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“a defendant could avoid conspiracy liability because, although he knew
the rough extent of the amount of cocaine involved in a drug transaction, he did
not know the exact measurement with scientific precision, i.e., whether 224 or
226 grams of cocaine were involved.” Id. [People v Mass, 238 Mich App 333,
337; 605 NW2d 322 (1999).]
Once again, this analysis is flawed. If the prosecution proved to a jury that
a defendant had conspired to deliver a significant amount of cocaine, but the jury
was not sure if the defendant knew 224 grams or 226 grams were involved, the
jury would properly convict such a defendant of conspiracy to deliver more than
50 grams but less than 225 grams of cocaine. Such a defendant would not avoid
conspiracy liability. Rather, such a defendant would be properly convicted of a
felony and would face at least a presumptive ten- to twenty-year term of
incarceration.20
________________________________________________________________________________________________
20
To reiterate, the prosecution is not required to show the defendant knew the
precise or specific amount. However, if the prosecution charges a defendant with
conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance above the lowest amount of less than
50 grams, it must submit evidence showing the defendant agreed to commit the
more serious offense. [Id. at 631-632.]
__________________________________________________________________
Thus, pursuant to Mass and Justice, supra, a defendant’s knowledge of the amount of the
controlled substance -- “the statutory minimum charged” -- is a necessary element of the offense
of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver. Accordingly, a defendant (such as defendant
herein) charged with conspiracy to deliver 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams, of
cocaine may be found guilty of that specific charge “only if the prosecution has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant conspired to deliver, not just some amount of cocaine, but at
least 225 grams of cocaine.” Mass, supra at 645-646. See also id. at 630.
In the instant case, the only evidence of record introduced by the prosecution regarding
defendant’s knowledge of the quantity of cocaine being transported in the caravan consisted of
the testimony of a state police detective sergeant who interviewed defendant after the caravan
was stopped and he was arrested. The detective testified that during the interview, defendant,
after initially denying any knowledge of the cocaine, admitted that the cocaine was being
transported in the caravan. The caravan was instigated by defendant’s cousin, who was
characterized by defendant as a “street pharmacist.” According to the detective, defendant told
him that he saw his cousin give the cocaine to another participant, and he witnessed this
individual, the driver of the second car, place the cocaine in the trunk of the vehicle. The
detective testified that “All he [defendant] knew was that it [the cocaine] was in a white bag,
white grocery type bag . . . a white Block Buster bag.”3 However, the record is devoid of any
3
Defendant testified at trial and denied telling the detective that he was aware that cocaine was
(continued…)
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further testimony which might indicate defendant’s knowledge of the amount of cocaine
contained in the white bag, and it would be unreasonable to infer such knowledge merely from
the size or description of the bag. Thus, we conclude that proof of a requisite element of the
conspiracy count -- defendant’s knowledge of the “statutory minimum as charged” (225 grams) -is lacking and the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proof in this regard. Mass, supra;
Justice, supra.
Nonetheless, defendant does not altogether avoid conspiracy liability. As the Mass Court
held, “if one conspires to deliver an unspecified amount of cocaine one would, at a minimum, be
guilty of conspiring to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine.” Mass, supra at 631. Thus, in the
absence of any other deficiencies in the conspiracy proofs, see text infra, we reverse defendant’s
conviction of conspiracy to deliver at least 225 grams of cocaine and remand to allow the trial
court to enter a conspiracy to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine conviction and to sentence
defendant on this count. Id. at 646.
Defendant’s additional argument that the record is devoid of any evidence that defendant
intentionally entered into an agreement with his coconspirators to deliver the cocaine is without
merit. The prosecutor was not required to provide direct proof that defendant agreed with his
coconspirators to deliver cocaine; where a person knows that others have conspired to break the
law and cooperates knowingly to further the object of the conspiracy, that person becomes a party
to the conspiracy. Meredith, supra at 412.
The evidence introduced at trial established that defendant agreed to drive a car to
Kalamazoo for his cousin, whom he knew to be a drug dealer, and that his cousin would buy
something for defendant in return. The evidence also established that defendant saw his cousin
with the white plastic bag containing cocaine, witnessed his cousin hand the bag over to the
driver of the second car in the caravan, and saw him place that bag in the trunk of the second car.
Thus, when defendant agreed to take part in the caravan from Chicago to Kalamazoo, he knew
the purpose of the trip was to transport the cocaine.
Because defendant knew that his cousin and the driver of the second car agreed to
transport the cocaine to Kalamazoo, and because he agreed to help them accomplish this
objective by participating in the caravan, defendant became a party to the conspiracy. Further,
because the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have
concluded that defendant intended to “further, promote, advance, or pursue an unlawful
objective,” Justice, supra at 347, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s
conspiracy conviction.
(…continued)
being transported or that he saw the cocaine being put into the trunk of the car. Although
defendant acknowledged possession of marijuana, in his testimony he disavowed any knowledge
that the caravan was transporting cocaine, stating that he was “just asked to drive a car.”
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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