PAULINE SPRAGUE V ESTATE OF JAMES HASLETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PAULINE SPRAGUE, PAUL WOODFORD, and
SUSAN WOODFORD,
UNPUBLISHED
October 16, 2001
Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellants,
v
No. 222786
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 97-85874-CH
ESTATE OF JAMES H. HASLETT
Defendant-Appellee,
and
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF MERIDIAN
Intervening-Defendant/CounterPlaintiff/Third-Party-Appellee,
and
ALDEN P. THOMAS, MARY JOSEPHINE VAN
VECHTEN, CAROL INGALL, and NORTH
SHORE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,
Intervening-Defendants.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs, who sought title to a parcel of land on the north shore of Lake Lansing in
Meridian Township under a theory of adverse possession, appeal as of right the order awarding
title to Meridian Charter Township (the township). The township intervened in this case and
pleaded facts suggesting that it, rather than plaintiffs, had adversely possessed the parcel and that
it acquired a prescriptive easement over the parcel. Ultimately, the trial court found that the
township acquired the parcel under a default by the record titleholder. We affirm.
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Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions for summary
disposition against the Township. We review de novo a trial court’s grant or denial of summary
disposition. Asset Acceptance Corp v Robinson, 244 Mich App 728, 730; 625 NW2d 804
(2001). A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(9) seeks a determination whether the opposing
party has failed to state a valid defense to the claim asserted against it. In re Smith Estate, 226
Mich App 285, 288; 574 NW2d 388 (1997). A motion brought under this subrule is tested by the
pleadings alone, with the court accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true. Id. The test is
whether the defendant’s defenses are so clearly untenable as a matter of law that no factual
development could possibly deny a plaintiff's right to recovery. Id.
When reviewing a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition for
failure to state a valid defense, both the affirmative defenses and the denials of the allegations in
the complaint may be taken into consideration. See Hanon v Barber, 99 Mich App 851, 855856; 298 NW2d 866 (1980). If a defendant denies an allegation in the complaint that is crucial to
a plaintiff’s case – so that if the defendant were to prove the allegation false the plaintiff would
not prevail – then summary disposition for failure to state a valid defense should be denied. Id.
See, e.g., August v Poznanski, 383 Mich 151, 155; 174 NW2d 807 (1970) (the Court set aside a
summary judgment not because of disputed facts, but because the denial of material facts
constitutes the pleading of a valid defense).
To establish adverse possession, a claimant must show that its possession is actual,
visible, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, under cover of claim or right, and continuous and
uninterrupted for the statutory period of fifteen years. West Michigan Dock & Market Corp v
Lakeland Investments, 210 Mich App 505, 511; 534 NW2d 212 (1995). Plaintiffs’ amended
petition to quiet title claimed an interest by adverse possession and set forth facts in support of
this claim. The township denied all or part of eight of plaintiffs’ fourteen allegations in the
petition. If the township were to prove that the allegations in these paragraphs were false,
plaintiffs could not prevail on their adverse possession claim. Hence, the trial court properly
denied the motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) because the interveners
stated a valid defense by denying the material facts in plaintiffs’ complaint. Hanon, supra.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual
support for a claim. Asset Acceptance, supra at 730. A court may rely on affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, or any other documentary evidence in deciding whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists. Id. If the opposing party presents documentary evidence establishing the existence of
a material factual dispute, the motion should not be granted. Id. The township presented
affidavits from eight local residents that contradicted plaintiffs’ claims that their possession was
visible, open, notorious, exclusive, and uninterrupted. These affidavits alone established the
existence of a material factual dispute, thus precluding a grant of summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred when it granted the township’s motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Adverse possession must be proved with clear
and cogent evidence. Killips v Mannisto, 244 Mich App 256, 260; 624 NW2d 224 (2001). Clear
and cogent evidence
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is more than a preponderance of evidence, approaching the level of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. That is to say, the standard is much like “clear and
convincing evidence.” Thus, in an adverse possession case, for a party to
establish possession by “clear and cogent evidence,” the evidence must clearly
establish the fact of possession and there must be little doubt left in the mind of
the trier of fact as to the proper resolution of the issue. Thus, where there is any
reasonable dispute, in light of the evidence, over the question of possession, the
party has failed to meet his burden of proof. [McQueen v Black, 168 Mich App
641, 645 n 2; 425 NW2d 203 (1988).]
As noted, two of the elements required for adverse possession are exclusivity and
hostility. West Michigan, supra at 511. Even where a plaintiff shows continuous and
uninterrupted use, the element of exclusivity can be undermined by evidence that others used the
property, were not prevented from trespassing, and paid some of the property taxes. Dunlop v
Twin Beach Park Ass’n, Inc, 111 Mich App 261, 267; 314 NW2d 578 (1981). The township
presented affidavits from eight local residents stating that they often entered on and used the
disputed parcel and were not prohibited from going on the land. One local resident indicated that
she paid the 1992 and 1993 taxes on the parcel. Although plaintiffs argued that these affidavits
were inaccurate or not dispositive, the affidavits more than make it clear that under the “clear and
cogent evidence” standard, plaintiffs would not have been able to prove that their possession was
exclusive. Therefore, the township’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
was properly granted.
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred when it failed to rule on their motion for
summary disposition of the township’s counterclaim under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Plaintiffs
presented only the most cursory explanation of their position and cited no authority to support it.
Although plaintiff failed to properly present this issue, Mann v Mann, 190 Mich App 526, 536537; 476 NW2d 439 (1991), we may review the record for plain error. Kern v Blethen-Coluni,
240 Mich App 333, 335-336; 612 NW2d 838 (2000). To avoid forfeiture under the plain error
rule, three requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e.,
clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights. Id.; People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The record clearly reveals that the trial court failed to explicitly rule on plaintiffs’ motion
under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The question, however, is whether the court’s failure to rule on
plaintiffs’ motion affected their substantial rights.
The township claimed it acquired title to the land under the theories of either adverse
possession or prescriptive easement. With regard to adverse possession and prescriptive
easements, this Court has stated:
To establish adverse possession, the claimant must show that its
possession is actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, under cover of
claim or right, and continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of fifteen
years. An easement by prescription requires similar elements, except exclusivity.
Mutual use or occupation of property with the owner’s permission is insufficient
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to establish adverse possession. Further, permissive use of property, regardless of
the length of the use, will not result in an easement by prescription. [West
Michigan Dock, supra at 511. (Citations omitted.)]
The township’s counterclaim alleged that the disputed parcel had been used as a park and
as a public access to Lake Lansing by township residents, that the township’s possession of the
disputed parcel had been actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and
uninterrupted, and that the township had possessed, maintained, and used the disputed parcel for
over fifteen years. It set forth specific factual allegations in support of these general allegations.
It set forth specific factual allegations regarding the utility lines that the township had installed
under the disputed parcel. The township’s statement of title, as required under MCR 3.411(C),
was attached to the counterclaim. The township therefore alleged all the required elements of
both adverse possession and prescriptive easement and set forth specific facts in support of each
claim. Had the trial court considered plaintiffs’ motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the motion
would have been properly denied. Therefore, because plaintiffs’ two other motions under MCR
2.116(C)(9) and (10) were denied, allowing the township’s claims to stand, plaintiffs’ substantial
rights were not affected. The failure to rule on plaintiffs’ motion does not require reversal.
Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred in finding that the township acquired a
prescriptive easement over the disputed parcel. In a quiet title action, we review the trial court’s
factual findings for clear error. Gorte v Dep’t of Transportation, 202 Mich App 161, 171; 507
NW2d 797 (1993). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Kent Co Rd Comm v Hunting, 170
Mich App 222, 232-233; 428 NW2d 353 (1988). Actions to quiet title are equitable, and this
Court reviews the circuit court’s holdings de novo. Gorte, supra at 165.
The township submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that the trial
court adopted in toto. The record substantially supports the thirty-four allegations set forth by the
township. Thus, no mistake has been made and this Court will not reverse the trial court’s
adopted findings. Plaintiffs also argue that Bachus v W Traverse Twp, Emmet Co (On Remand),
122 Mich App 557; 332 NW2d 535 (1983), precluded a judgment in favor of the township.
However, Bachus does not address the relationship between assessed taxes and the requirements
for a prescriptive easement and, therefore, it completely fails to support plaintiffs’ argument.
Further, and fatal to plaintiffs’ stance on this issue, is the fact that plaintiffs never disputed that
the township may have had a utility easement. The trial court did not err in finding that the
township acquired a prescriptive easement.
Lastly, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it quieted title to the disputed parcel
in the township. Plaintiffs’ argument that the township failed to prove that the quitclaim deeds
from the heirs of the record titleholders conveyed good title to the township is misplaced.
Plaintiffs did not contest the validity of these default judgments. Where a default judgment has
been entered against a party, the court may grant the relief requested in the complaint. See MCR
2.601(A) and (B). The trial court properly quieted title in the township against the interests of
the defaulted third-party defendants.
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Plaintiffs argue here, too, that Bachus, supra at 557, precluded a judgment in favor of the
township. The present case is distinguishable from Bachus because plaintiffs were not record
titleholders of the disputed parcel. They were, instead, claimants under adverse possession, just
as the township was. Plaintiffs voluntarily assumed responsibility for maintaining the disputed
parcel, whereas in Bachus the defendant usurped portions of the plaintiffs’ parcels to create a
township park. Bachus, supra at 560-561. Here, plaintiffs voluntarily chose to pay the taxes on
the disputed parcel without first establishing ownership, whereas in Bachus the plaintiffs were
already owners of their parcels and were being taxed as an incident of their ownership. Id.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, Bachus does not stand for the general proposition that a
township is always precluded from adversely possessing a parcel on which it assesses taxes.
Finally, plaintiffs state, without supporting argument, that MCL 600.5801, the statute of
limitations for real actions, somehow defeats the township’s claim of adverse possession.
Nothing in MCL 600.5801 applies in any way to the merits of this case. The trial court
committed no error of fact or law when it quieted title in the township.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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