LESLIE WAKNIN V RICHARD CHAMBERLAIN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LESLIE WAKNIN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 12, 2001
Plaintiff-CounterdefendantAppellant,
v
No. 224042
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 96-000433-NO
RICHARD CHAMBERLAIN,
Defendant-CounterplaintiffAppellee.
Before: Collins, P.J., and Hoekstra and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right a judgment of no cause of action that the trial court entered
following a jury trial on plaintiff’s assault and battery claims against defendant for alleged
incidents occurring in July 1995, and on May 6, 1996. We affirm.
Before trial, defendant made two motions in limine. One motion asked the trial court to
exclude defendant’s criminal conviction of assault and battery arising out of the May 6, 1996
incident. Relying upon Wheelock v Eyl, 393 Mich 74; 223 NW2d 276 (1974), the trial court held
that defendant’s criminal conviction was inadmissible for purposes of establishing liability. The
second motion requested that plaintiff be precluded from presenting any witnesses or exhibits
because plaintiff had failed to file with the court, as directed in the pretrial order, his list of
witnesses and exhibits. In response to this motion, the trial court only allowed as witnesses and
as an exhibit respectively the people and the photograph listed in plaintiff’s answers to
interrogatories. Because plaintiff failed to list a sheriff deputy in the answers, the trial court
refused to allow the deputy to testify. Following trial and the jury’s verdict of no cause of action,
plaintiff filed a motion for new trial. In that motion, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in
excluding defendant’s prior criminal conviction for assault and battery. The trial court denied the
motion on the same grounds as stated before trial, and on the alternative basis that the evidence
was more prejudicial than probative pursuant to MRE 403. On appeal, plaintiff again challenges
the trial court’s rulings on the motions in limine.
Regarding the exclusion of defendant’s criminal conviction, we are not persuaded that
plaintiff is entitled to relief. Plaintiff argues that the rule announced in Wheelock, supra, did not
survive the subsequent adoption of the Michigan Rules of Evidence in 1978 and that defendant’s
-1-
conviction was admissible under MRE 403. Whether to admit evidence is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and we will not disturb that decision on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. Price v Long Realty, Inc, 199 Mich App 461, 466; 502 NW2d 337 (1993). “An
abuse of discretion is found only if an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the
trial court acted, would say there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made.” Gore v
Rains & Block, 189 Mich App 729, 737; 473 NW2d 813 (1991).
Even assuming, as plaintiff suggests, that Wheelock is no longer good law, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant’s previous conviction for
assault and battery. Although the trial court originally did not base its decision on MRE 403, the
trial court explained on the record when denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial that regardless
of the Wheelock decision, it determined that under MRE 403, the probative value of defendant’s
conviction would clearly be outweighed by the prejudicial effect, stating that “clearly the
prejudicial effect would be tremendous. Essentially, school would be out,” and characterizing
such an admission as “a bombshell against a defendant in a civil case.” Here, the trial court
conducted the appropriate analysis under MRE 403 and we are not convinced that there is no
justification or excuse for the ruling made. We find no abuse of discretion.
Nor did the trial court err in disallowing use of defendant’s conviction for impeachment
purposes. MRE 609 provides for the impeachment of a witness by evidence of a conviction of a
crime only when the crime contained an element of dishonesty, false statement, or theft, none of
which are involved in an assault and battery conviction. We find no error.
Next, we find without merit plaintiff’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion when
it excluded the testimony of a sheriff deputy as a sanction for plaintiff’s failure to comply with
the pretrial order in the case that required the parties to submit a list of witnesses and exhibits
before trial. The failure of a party to file a witness list is sanctionable. MCR 2.401(I)(2).
Grubor Enterprises, Inc v Kortidis, 201 Mich App 625, 628-629; 506 NW2d 614 (1993). We
review the trial court’s decision regarding whether a witness may testify after a party has failed to
file its witness list for an abuse of discretion. Carmack v Macomb County Community College,
199 Mich App 544, 546; 502 NW2d 746 (1993). Here, we conclude that the sanction that the
trial court imposed was a reasonable and measured response. The trial court allowed plaintiff to
call all the witnesses that he had identified in his answer to defendant’s interrogatories, as well as
himself. The sheriff deputy was not named in the interrogatories. We find no abuse of discretion
in this method of sanctioning plaintiff for the failure to properly disclose his witnesses before
trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.