PEOPLE OF MI V NOE FLORES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 2, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 224593
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-006077
NOE FLORES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Cavanagh and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecutor appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting defendant’s motion
to suppress evidence and dismissing the charges without prejudice.1 We reverse and remand for
trial.
On June 5, 1999, at approximately 3:00 a.m., the Detroit Police Department’s Narcotic
Division executed a search warrant on defendant’s residence, located at 7835 Senator Street in
the city of Detroit. The warrant authorized the search at the residence for controlled substances
(particularly cocaine, heroine, and marijuana), illegal guns, and proceeds obtained from illegal
activity. As a result of the search, the police confiscated cocaine, marijuana, and $4,000 from
defendant’s residence.2 It is undisputed that both the money and drugs were found after
defendant admitted their presence in the home and directed the police officers to their location.
Defendant was then charged with possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine with intent to
deliver, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), and possession of less then five kilograms of marijuana with
intent to deliver, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii).
1
Although the December 7, 1999 transcript reveals that defendant moved for dismissal, the
written order dismissing the case states that the case was dismissed pursuant to the court’s
motion.
2
The cocaine, which weighed about twenty-five kilos was found in two boxes in the basement of
the home, whereas the money was found in a kitchen cabinet. The record does not reveal where
the marijuana was found; however, its presence in the home has not been challenged.
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Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence confiscated under the search
warrant, arguing that the police did not comply with the tabulation statute, MCL 780.655,3 and
that the exclusionary rule required the evidence to be suppressed.4 MCL 780.655 states in part:
When an officer in the execution of a search warrant finds any property or
seizes any of the other things for which a search warrant is allowed by this act, the
officer, in the presence of the person from whose possession or premises the
property or thing was taken, if present, or in the presence of at least 1 other
person, shall make a complete and accurate tabulation of the property and things
so seized. The officer taking property or other things under the warrant shall
forthwith give to the person from whom or from whose premises the property was
taken a copy of the warrant and shall give to the person a copy of the tabulation
upon completion, or shall leave a copy of the warrant and tabulation at the place
from which the property or thing was taken.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the police violated MCL
780.655 and that based on People v Moten, 233 Mich 169; 206 NW 506 (1925), People v
Sobczak-Obetts, 238 Mich App 495; 606 NW2d 658 (2000), and People v Tennon, 70 Mich App
447; 245 NW2d 756 (1976), the evidence must be suppressed.
On appeal, the prosecutor argues that the statutory requirement to leave the search
warrant and affidavit at the scene of the search are ministerial and that since these deficiencies
had been remedied after charges were filed against defendant, the trial court erred when it
suppressed the evidence. We agree.
A lower court’s factual findings in a suppression hearing are reviewed for clear error and
will be affirmed unless the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. People v Custer, 242 Mich App 59, 64; 618 NW2d 75 (2000), reversed, in part, on
other grounds, ___ Mich ____; 630 NW2d 870 (2001). See also People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439,
448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983) and People v Lombardo, 216 Mich App 500, 504; 549 NW2d 596
(1996). However, with regard to the trial court’s ultimate ruling on the suppression motion, our
3
According to defendant, the police failed to complete the tabulation sheet in the presence of
himself or one of his family members and also neglected to leave a copy of the search warrant,
affidavit, and tabulation sheet at the residence. Defendant also indicated that he was not
provided with a copy of the warrant, affidavit, and tabulation until July 19, 1999, when it was
faxed by the prosecutor to defense counsel.
4
Defendant also moved to have the evidence suppressed based on the police officers’ failure to
“knock and announce” their presence. See MCL 780.656. However, the trial court found that
pursuant to People v Stevens, 460 Mich 626; 597 NW2d 53 (1999), any alleged failure to knock
and announce would not lead to the exclusion of evidence and denied the motion. Defendant
also moved for suppression of the statements he made to the police as being violative of the Fifth
Amendment. The trial court suppressed the statements defendant made at the home, but not the
statements made at the police station. None of these rulings have been challenged on appeal by
either party.
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review is de novo. Custer, supra, citing People v Garvin, 235 Mich App 90, 96; 597 NW2d 194
(1999).
Here, the trial court suppressed the evidence against defendant, in part, by relying on this
Court’s opinion in Sobczak-Obetts, supra. However, since the trial court’s decision in the case at
bar, our Supreme Court has reversed this Court’s decision in Sobczak-Obetts, holding that
weapons seized pursuant to a federal search warrant were not properly excluded from evidence in
a state prosecution on the grounds that a copy of the affidavit in support of the search warrant
was not provided to the defendant at the time of the execution. 463 Mich 687, 689, 710; 625
NW2d 764 (2001). In finding that the weapons should not be excluded from evidence, the Court
relied extensively on its decision in People v Stevens, 460 Mich 626; 597 NW2d 53 (1993),
which held that where the discovery of the evidence was independent of the officers’ failure to
comply with the statutory “knock and announce” requirement, MCL 780.656 did not require
exclusion of the evidence. The Court stated:
As in Stevens, we now hold that suppression of the evidence seized in this
case is not an appropriate remedy for the statutory violation at issue. Nothing in
the language of § 5 provides any basis to infer that it was the legislators’ intent
that the drastic remedy of exclusion be applied to a violation of the statute.
Furthermore, the exclusionary rule “‘forbids the use of direct and indirect
evidence acquired from governmental misconduct, such as evidence from an
illegal police search.’” The requirements of § 5 are ministerial in nature, and do
not in any way lead to the acquisition of evidence; rather, these requirements
come into play only after evidence has been seized pursuant to a valid search
warrant. Because the exclusionary rule pertains to evidence that has been illegally
seized, it would not be reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to
apply the rule to a violation of the postseizure, administrative requirements of § 5.
Just as there was no causal relationship between the violation of the “knock and
announce” statute and the seizing of the evidence in Stevens, there is in the instant
case no causal relationship between the officers’ failure to provide defendant with
a copy of the search warrant affidavit and the seizure of the firearms. [SobczakObetts, supra at 710, quoting in part, Stevens, supra at 636 and People v Locicero
(After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 508-509; 556 NW2d 498 (1996) (citations and
emphasis omitted.)]
The Court further indicated that even if the evidence had been seized pursuant to a state
search warrant, the exclusionary rule would not apply, see id. at 712, precisely the issue that is
before us now. Here, defendant challenged the seized evidence on the grounds that the police
officers failed to provide him with a copy of the affidavit, warrant, and return at the time of the
execution. However, as in Sobczak-Obetts, defendant has not alleged that his constitutional
rights were violated during the gathering of this evidence; instead, like the defendant in SobczakObetts, defendant maintains that exclusion is proper because of the statutory violation. Because
there is no claim that defendant’s constitutional rights were violated during the search, and since
the evidence seized from defendant’s residence was not seized illegally, we find that the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by ordering suppression of the evidence in
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this case. See id. at 711. Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for the statutory violation of MCL 780.655.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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