PEOPLE OF MI V DONALD C JAMES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 2, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 215407
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 97-009702
DONALD C. JAMES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession of 225 grams or more, but
less than 650 grams, of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(ii), delivery of less than fifty grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and possession of less than twenty-five grams of cocaine,
MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v).1 The trial court initially sentenced defendant to prison terms of twenty
to thirty years, one to twenty years, and one to four years for his convictions, respectively.
However, these sentences were immediately set aside and the trial court sentenced defendant as a
second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to a single term of twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it refused to sever count 1 from the
remaining two counts. Defendant argued below that severance was appropriate under either
MCR 6.120(B) or MCR 6.120(C). MCR 6.120(B) states that a trial court, upon request by a
defendant, must sever unrelated offenses for separate trials. MCR 6.120(B) further states that
offenses are “related if they are based on (1) the same conduct, or (2) a series of connected acts or
acts constituting part of a single scheme or plan.” In the instant matter, the record indicates that
all three counts involved defendant’s possession of cocaine on November 7, 1997, for purposes
other than his personal use. It may be fairly inferred from the facts that counts 2 and 3 arose
from defendant’s contemporaneous possession of the large amount of cocaine kept at his
accomplice’s house—the substance of count 1. At the very least, it was the arrest for counts 2
1
For ease of reference, the counts will be referred to herein as follows: MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(ii)
(“count 1”); MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv) (“count 2”); and MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v) (“count 3”).
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and 3 that led to the police investigation that led to the charges in count 1. Accordingly, we do
not believe that the trial court erred by finding that the offenses were related under the court rule.
Nevertheless, even related offenses may be severed where “appropriate to promote
fairness to the parties and a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each
offense.” The trial court rejected defendant’s contention that the multiple counts would lead to
juror confusion or prejudice to the defendant. A trial court’s refusal to sever charges under MCR
6.120(C) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Duranseau, 221 Mich App 204, 208;
561 NW2d 111 (1997). Because the subject matter of each count was so straightforward, we do
not believe that the multiple counts carried any potential for confusion among the jurors.
Moreover, refusing to sever the counts did not prejudice defendant because, even if the counts
had been severed, evidence of the facts behind the other counts would still have been admissible
at each of the trials. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying
defendant’s motions for severance.
Defendant next argues that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to
present a defense when it precluded certain testimony from a defense witness. The excluded
testimony was offered to show that a detective involved in this case had allegedly violated the
constitutional rights of the witness two years before the trial. Defendant suggested that the
evidence was relevant because it tended to show that the detective was “out to get” defendant.
The Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments of the US Constitution guarantee a defendant in a
criminal proceeding “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v
Kentucky, 476 US 683, 690; 106 S Ct 2142; 90 L Ed 2d 636, 645 (1986), quoting California v
Trombetta, 467 US 479, 485; 104 S Ct 2528; 81 L Ed 2d 413 (1984). However, as the Court
explained in Crane, supra at 689-690, an evidentiary ruling does not ordinarily rise to the level
of a constitutional violation:
We acknowledge also our traditional reluctance to impose constitutional
constraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state trial courts. In any given
criminal case the trial judge is called upon to make dozens, sometimes hundreds,
of decisions concerning the admissibility of evidence. As we reaffirmed earlier
this Term, the Constitution leaves to the judges who must make these decisions
“wide latitude” to exclude evidence that is “repetitive . . . , only marginally
relevant” or poses an undue risk of “harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the
issues.” Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679; 89 L Ed 2d 674; 106 S Ct
1431 (1986). Moreover, we have never questioned the power of States to exclude
evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the
interests of fairness and reliability--even if the defendant would prefer to see that
evidence admitted. Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302, 35 L Ed 2d 297,
93 S Ct 1038 (1973). Nonetheless, without “signal[ing] any diminution in the
respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and
implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures,” we have little
trouble concluding on the facts of this case that the blanket exclusion of the
proffered testimony about the circumstances of petitioner’s confession deprived
him of a fair trial. [Id., at 302-303, 35 L Ed 2d 297, 93 S Ct 1038.]
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We review evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488;
596 NW2d 607 (1999).
Here, the trial court excluded the witness’ testimony about the incident and resulting
lawsuit on the basis of relevancy. Only relevant evidence—evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence—is properly admissible. MRE
401, 402. The trial court concluded that the evidence was too remote in time to be relevant. We
agree. Moreover, as noted above, the incident involved a police officer and a third party, and did
not involve any conduct directed at defendant. Thus, we are not persuaded that the trial court
abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the alleged incident. Lukity, supra at 488. We
also reject defendant’s claim that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling deprived defendant of his
constitutional right to present a defense. The trial court’s ruling did not amount to a blanket
exclusion of all evidence questioning the detective’s credibility or suggesting that the detective
fabricated the charges against defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did not deprive defendant
of his constitutional right to present a defense.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it admitted a statement of
codefendant Derrick Glenn as a prior consistent statement under MRE 801(d)(1)(B). The
prosecution concedes, and we agree, that the statement was not admissible under that rule. See
People v Lewis, 160 Mich App 20, 29-30; 408 NW2d 94 (1987). On the other hand, the
prosecution argues that the statement was admissible under MRE 106 because defense counsel
referred to portions of Glenn’s statement during cross-examination. Under MRE 106, however,
an entire document is not admissible merely because the opposing party refers to portions of it.
Instead, the test is whether the remaining parts of the document “ought in fairness” to be
considered contemporaneously with the portions mentioned. People v Herndon, ___ Mich App
___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 216239, issued 6/15/2001), slip op at 21, n 85. We are not
persuaded that the prosecutor has sufficiently explained why “fairness” required that the entire
statement be admitted.
However, even if it was error to admit Glenn’s statement under MRE 801(d)(1)(B), and
the statement was not admissible under MRE 106, reversal is not required. Because Glenn
testified, the jury was able to evaluate his testimony, which did not vary from his statement in
any significant way. In other words, the statement did not reveal any critical facts that the jury
did not hear from Glenn himself. To the extent that Glenn’s statement tended to show that he
was credible and was not lying in order to obtain a deal with the prosecutor, this was cumulative
to the detective’s testimony that Glenn was cooperative and assisted in locating the cocaine in
Glenn’s home before any agreement was made. Thus, under these circumstances, any prejudice
caused by the admission of the statement was minimal and did not affect the outcome. People v
McCray, 245 Mich App 631, 642-643630 NW2d 633 (2001); People v Rodriguez, 216 Mich App
329, 332; 549 NW2d 359 (1996). Therefore, reversal is not warranted. Lukity, supra at 495-496.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by not suppressing evidence obtained
during a search of his apartment, after it had previously ordered suppression of evidence obtained
during a search of his parents’ home. We disagree.
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Probable cause to search defendant’s apartment was not dependent upon the information
obtained from the search of defendant’s parents’ home. According to the affidavit offered in
support of the search warrant for defendant’s apartment, the search warrant was based on Glenn’s
statements and the circumstances surrounding defendant’s arrest. The affidavit established that
Glenn had personal knowledge of the relevant facts, which is all that is required when the affiant
is a named informant. MCL 780.653; People v Powell, 201 Mich App 516, 522; 506 NW2d 894
(1993). The fact that Glenn was a suspect in this case was disclosed in the affidavit; however,
this does not preclude reliance on the information he provided. See MCL 780.653. Moreover,
after redacting any of the tainted information relating to the search of defendant’s parents’ home,
the affidavit still established probable cause to search defendant’s apartment. People v Griffin,
235 Mich App 27, 42-43; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). We note that defendant’s address was not
discovered because his apartment keys were found in his parents’ home. Rather, Glenn provided
the police with defendant’s address. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his apartment.
Alternatively, defendant argues that, even if the search of his apartment was
constitutional, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence obtained during
the search of the apartment. The evidence included a scale, marijuana, and other drug-related
paraphernalia. Defendant argues that the evidence should have been excluded because it was
only marginally relevant and unduly prejudicial.
Under MRE 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v Sabin (After Remand), 463
Mich 43, 57-58; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). Unfair prejudice does not mean any prejudice, but
“refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party’s position
by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, e.g., the jury’s bias, sympathy,
anger, or shock.” People v Goree, 132 Mich App 693, 702-703; 349 NW2d 220 (1984). See
also People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 501-502; 537 NW2d 168 (1995). The jury was instructed
that the evidence found in defendant’s apartment was associated only with the personal use of
drugs, and the prosecution did not improperly use the evidence. Defendant has not shown that
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to exclude the
evidence. Lukity, supra at 488.
Defendant also claims that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel based on several purported errors. There is a strong presumption that counsel was
effective. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 444; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). To
overcome this presumption, defendant must establish that “(1) the performance of his counsel
was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2)
a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different.” Id. The burden is on defendant to produce factual
support for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594
NW2d 57 (1999).
Defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to secure the
appearance of a witness, Gerald Gregory, at a suppression hearing. It is not apparent from the
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trial record what efforts, if any, defense counsel made to secure the witness’s presence at the
hearing. In the absence of a factual record regarding counsel’s efforts, or lack thereof, we do not
believe that defendant has met his burden of proof in regard to his contention that defense
counsel was ineffective for not producing this witness. Similarly, the record does not support
defendant’s claim that one of his attorneys was ineffective because he waited until the time of
trial to review the exhibits. Defendant was represented by two attorneys at trial and there was no
showing that defendant’s other attorney had not reviewed the exhibits before trial. Therefore,
defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by his second attorney’s failure to review the
exhibits ahead of time.
Defendant also argues that his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to call a
locksmith as a witness, thereby depriving him of a substantial defense. Where there is a claim
that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a defense, a defendant must show that he made a
good-faith effort to avail himself of the right to present a particular defense and that the defense
of which he was deprived was substantial. People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d
569 (1990). A substantial defense is one that might have made a difference in the trial’s
outcome. Id. We are reluctant to substitute our judgment for that of trial counsel in matters of
trial strategy, and ineffective assistance of counsel will not be found merely because a strategy
backfires. People v Duff, 165 Mich App 530, 545-546; 419 NW2d 600 (1987), quoting People v
Strong, 143 Mich App 442, 449; 372 NW2d 335 (1985). From the facts adduced at the
evidentiary hearing and the trial court record, it is apparent that defense counsel was aware of the
possibility that the key found in defendant’s apartment was generic and that many keys might
open the firebox. In fact, counsel made that argument at trial. However, this does not explain
the presence of the key in defendant’s apartment. In the absence of an “alibi” for the key, we are
not persuaded that the outcome would have changed based solely on the testimony of a locksmith
that multiple keys would open the firebox.
Defendant further claims that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to call Theresa
DeMarti as a witness. The decision regarding what witnesses to call is a matter of trial strategy.
People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 163; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). As noted above, we typically
refrain from substituting our judgment for that of trial counsel. Duff, supra at 545-546. The
testimony at the evidentiary hearing established that defense counsel made a strategic decision
not to call DeMarti as a witness, concluding that her testimony would not have substantially
benefited the defense and that her credibility was dubious. Thus, defendant has failed to
overcome the presumption that the decision not to call DeMarti as a witness was sound trial
strategy.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because of twenty-seven instances
of prosecutorial misconduct. The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266-267, ns 5-7; 531 NW2d
659 (1995). Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are decided case by case. People v McElhaney,
215 Mich App 269, 283; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). After reviewing each of the individual claims of
misconduct, we conclude that appellate relief is not warranted. Only a few of the alleged
instances of prosecutorial misconduct actually rose to that level. Of these, none were egregious
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enough for us to conclude that defendant was denied a fair trial—whether considered separately
or cumulatively.2
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of
multiple errors. Although a single error in a trial may not necessarily provide a basis for granting
a new trial, it is possible that the cumulative effect of multiple minor errors may add up to error
requiring reversal. People v Anderson, 166 Mich App 455, 472-473; 421 NW2d 200 (1988).
The test is whether the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the defendant of a fair and
impartial trial. People v Taylor, 185 Mich App 1, 10; 460 NW2d 582 (1990). Although there
were some errors in this case, we are satisfied that defendant received a fair trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
2
Defendant further argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the many
claimed instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Even assuming that counsel could have properly
objected to some of the unchallenged remarks, defendant has failed to show that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the result of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s
failure to object. People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996).
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