PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 28, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 230839
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 99-122537-FH
CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals by right from an order quashing a search warrant, suppressing
the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, and dismissing several charges against
defendant.1 We affirm.
In November 1999, Grand Rapids police searched a residence and found cocaine, three
guns, materials typically used in cocaine production, and mail and receipts listing defendant’s
name. The search occurred pursuant to a search warrant. A magistrate issued this search warrant
based on an affidavit in which the affiant, a police officer, recited incriminating information
given to him by one or two unnamed informants2 but did not make affirmative allegations
supporting the credibility of the informants or the reliability of the incriminating information.
In August 2000, defendant moved to quash the search warrant, suppress the discovered
evidence, and dismiss the case, relying primarily on MCL 780.653, which states:
The magistrate’s finding of reasonable or probable cause shall be based
upon all the facts related within the affidavit before him or her. The affidavit may
be based upon information supplied to the complainant by a named or unnamed
person if the affidavit contains 1 of the following:
1
Dismissal occurred because the disallowed evidence obtained under the search warrant
apparently comprised the only evidence incriminating defendant. Indeed, a discussion to this
effect took place at the suppression hearing, without objection by the prosecution.
2
The affidavit is not clear regarding whether one or two confidential informants provided
information to the affiant.
-1-
(a) If the person is named, affirmative allegations from which the
magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge
of the information.
(b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative allegations from which
the magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal
knowledge of the information and either that the unnamed person is
credible or that the information is reliable.
The trial court granted defendant’s motions, finding, inter alia, that the violation of MCL
780.653 invalidated the search warrant.
On appeal, the prosecution contends that the trial court’s order must be reversed because
a violation of MCL 790.653 does not warrant the suppression of the evidence. We disagree. We
review issues of statutory construction de novo. See Mager v Dep’t of State Police, 460 Mich
134, 143 n 14; 595 NW2d 142 (1999).
We find the case of People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 183-184; 538 NW2d 380 (1995),
dispositive. The Sloan Court ruled that mere conclusions by a police officer affiant, in the
absence of facts supporting the conclusions, could not support the issuance of a search warrant
under MCL 780.653. See Sloan, supra at 166-172. The Court then considered the appropriate
remedy for the violation of the statute that had occurred:
In [People v] Sherbine[, 421 Mich 502; 364 NW2d 658 (1984),
superceded on other grounds by statute as stated in People v Lucas, 188 Mich
App 554 (1991)], we held that evidence obtained specifically in violation of MCL
780.653 . . . must be excluded. The Legislature appears to have acquiesced in this
particular construction of MCL 780.653 . . . . While the Legislature subsequently
amended MCL 780.653 . . . because it disagreed with portions of our statutory
analysis provided in Sherbine, it is significant that the Legislature when instituting
such amendments did not alter our holding that evidence obtained in violation of
the statute must be excluded. To change the law in that regard would have been
an easy and convenient task for the Legislature. Neither the language in the
amendments, nor the legislative history pertinent to the amendments provide a
basis for concluding that a sanction other than exclusion is appropriate for the
violation of MCL 780.653 . . . . Clearly, the Legislature shares our view that no
remedy other than exclusion is as likely to assure the full enforcement of all the
requirements under MCL 780.653 . . . – a statute specifically designed by the
Legislature to implement the constitutional mandate for probable cause under
Const 1963, art 1, § 11.
Because the blood test result procured pursuant to the instant search
warrant constitutes evidence obtained in violation of MCL 780.653 . . . , we
conclude that it must be excluded. [Sloan, supra at 183-184 (footnotes omitted).]
-2-
Sloan, therefore, makes clear that evidence obtained under search warrants issued in violation of
MCL 780.653 must be suppressed. It is clear that the search warrant in the instant case was
indeed issued in violation of MCL 780.653.3 Indeed, the prosecution does not argue to the
contrary. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in quashing the search warrant, suppressing the
discovered evidence, and dismissing the charges against defendant.
We note that the prosecution spends a considerable portion of its brief discussing the socalled “good-faith exception” to the requirement of a valid search warrant and arguing that
suppression was not warranted in this case because in executing the warrant issued by the
magistrate here, the police acted in good faith. The prosecution points to the case of People v
Hill, 192 Mich App 54, 56; 480 NW2d 594 (1994), in which this Court declined the invitation to
“recognize and apply a good-faith exception to the search warrant requirement because the
police acted on a search warrant they believed was valid.” The prosecution contends that we
should either distinguish Hill or follow it reluctantly under MCR 7.215(I)(1) and call for a
conflict panel. We decline to take either of these actions. Indeed, as noted earlier, this case is
squarely governed by the Supreme Court construction of the applicable statute in Sloan, supra.
We are not at liberty to overrule or modify Supreme Court precedent, Boyd v W G Wade Shows,
443 Mich 515, 523; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), and the resolution of this case on statutory grounds
renders unnecessary a consideration of the prosecution’s constitution-based search and seizure
issues. See Sherbine, supra at 506.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
3
We acknowledge that the portion of MCL 780.653 violated in the instant case is not the same
portion of MCL 780.653 that was violated in Sloan. This fact, however, does not change the
applicability of Sloan to the instant case. Indeed, Sloan makes clear that “evidence obtained
specifically in violation of MCL 780.653 . . . must be excluded,” see Sloan, supra at 183, and
does not limit this principle to violations of only certain portions of MCL 780.653.
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.