PEOPLE OF MI V MATTHEW ALAN KURILIK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 28, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee
v
No. 219150
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-161152-FC
MATTHEW ALAN KURILIK
Defendant-Appellant
Before: Collins, P.J., and Murphy and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with several offenses arising from an automobile accident when
he struck another vehicle while intoxicated and driving at a high rate of speed. The driver of the
other vehicle subsequently died and the passenger received serious injuries. Defendant pleaded
guilty to four counts: (1) operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor
[OUIL] causing serious injury, MCL 257.625(5); (2) felon in possession of a firearm, MCL
750.224f; (3) driving with a suspended license, MCL 257.904(1); and (4) having open
intoxicants in a vehicle, MCL 257.624a. Immediately following his guilty plea, defendant was
tried and convicted by a jury of involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle, MCL 750.321,
and OUIL causing death, MCL 257.625(4). Defendant was sentenced as a third habitual
offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of fifteen to thirty years each for the
involuntary manslaughter and OUIL causing death convictions, five to ten years for the OUIL
causing serious injury conviction, two to ten years for the possession of a firearm by a felon
conviction, and ninety days each for the driving with a suspended license and open intoxicants
convictions. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
First, defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
statements that he made to a police detective in the hospital several hours after the accident. On
appeal, defendant does not contend that the statements were involuntary. Rather, he claims that,
due to his intoxication and hospitalization, he did not have the degree of understanding to make a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda1 rights. We conclude that the trial court did not
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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clearly err in ruling, following a Walker2 hearing, that defendant’s statements were made freely,
knowingly, and intelligently, with the understanding that they could be used against him. See
People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629-630; 614 NW2d 152 (2000).
Given defendant’s concession that his statements were voluntary, the critical inquiry is
whether defendant had the degree of understanding to provide a knowing and intelligent waiver
of his Miranda rights. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 28 (Boyle J.), 44 (Weaver, J.); 551
NW2d 355 (1996). “To establish a valid waiver, the state must present evidence sufficient to
demonstrate that the accused understood that he did not have to speak, that he had the right to the
presence of counsel, and that the state could use what he said in a later trial against him.” Id. at
29, citing Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 423; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986); accord
Daoud, supra at 637. A suspect need not understand the ramifications and consequences of
waiving his rights, and the test is not whether it was “wise or smart” to admit his culpability. Id.
at 636; Cheatham, supra at 28-29. The accused need only know of his available options and
make a rational decision, not necessarily the “best” one. Id. at 28.
Defendant was advised, and by all indications understood, that he did not have to speak to
the detective without an attorney being present. Moran, supra. As in Cheatham, it is undisputed
that the police officer who questioned defendant administered Miranda warnings,3 sought to
insure that defendant understood the warnings, and obtained an express written waiver before
questioning him. Cheatham, supra at 30. The written waiver is strong evidence that defendant’s
waiver of his rights was valid. Id. at 31. Defendant also provided appropriate answers to
questions that were intended to determine whether defendant was oriented to time and events.
By his question to the detective of what he was being charged with, defendant also exhibited
comprehension of what was occurring.
The record also indicates that defendant was advised of, and knew, that the police
intended to use his statements against him. Moreover, defendant had two prior felony
convictions. “A defendant’s previous experience with the police is ‘an important consideration
in determining whether an inculpatory statement was made voluntarily and understandingly.’”
Cheatham, supra at 35, quoting State v Fincher, 30 NC 1, 20; 305 SE2d 685 (1983). Further,
defendant was advised that other people were injured in the accident, that the detective was
investigating the accident and would turn his report over to the prosecutor’s office for review,
and that the prosecutor’s office would be seeking a warrant against defendant.
Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that defendant’s statements
to the detective were knowingly and intelligently made.
II
2
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
3
Miranda warnings were given to defendant despite the fact that the detective advised him that
he was no longer under arrest. Miranda warnings are not required unless the accused is subject
to a custodial interrogation. People v Hill, 429 Mich 382, 384; 415 NW2d 193 (1987).
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Second, defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by trial
counsel’s failure to seek suppression of defendant’s blood alcohol test results.
We note that defendant did not preserve this issue for our review by making a testimonial
record in the trial court in connection with a motion for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing.
People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). Therefore, our review is precluded unless
the details of the alleged deficiencies are apparent on the already-existing record. People v Sabin
(On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
Defendant presented no facts below, and presents none on appeal, to indicate that his
consent to have his blood withdrawn was invalid. Therefore, the blood alcohol level test results
were admissible into evidence against defendant. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278;
597 NW2d 1 (1999). Because the blood alcohol test results were admissible, defendant was not
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to move to suppress the
test results. Defendant, therefore, has failed to establish that there was a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s error, the result would have been different. Hoag, supra at 6-7.
Regarding defendant’s claim that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for
failing to raise the issues that defendant raises in his Standard 11 brief in this Court, this claim
must similarly fail because none of the issues raised by defendant have merit. Counsel is not
required to advocate a meritless position. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d
502 (2000).
III
Defendant next contends that he was denied a fair and impartial trial by the prosecutor’s
impeachment of him with a prior conviction of breaking and entering with intent to commit a
larceny. MRE 609.
Because defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s elicitation that he had a prior theft
conviction, we review the alleged error under the plain error rule, that is, whether a plain error
occurred that prejudicially affected defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Defendant has shown neither plain error in the admission of
the evidence regarding his prior conviction, nor prejudice to his substantial rights by the
admission of the evidence. See People v Bartlett, 197 Mich App 15, 19-20; 494 NW2d 776
(1992). See also People v Allen, 429 Mich 558, 611-612, 644; 420 NW2d 499 (1988); People v
Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 438-439; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). Defendant’s claim
accordingly fails.
IV
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor made several improper, prejudicial comments
during closing and rebuttal arguments, only one of which was preserved below with an
appropriate objection.
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we review the prosecutor’s comments
in context to determine whether they denied defendant a fair trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich
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261, 266-267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). However, as to those comments to which defendant failed
to object below, we limit our review to plain error. Carines, supra; People v Schutte, 240 Mich
App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
We find no error in the prosecutor’s remarks. Viewed in context, the remarks in closing
argument were proper commentary on the evidence and on defendant’s credibility. Bahoda,
supra at 282; People v Buckey, 424 Mich 1, 14-16; 378 NW2d 432 (1985). Each of the remarks
by the prosecutor in rebuttal of which defendant now complains were made in response to
arguments by defense counsel in his closing argument and, therefore, were not improper.
Schutte, supra at 721.
V
Lastly, defendant contends that his rights against double jeopardy were violated.
The prosecution was not precluded from prosecuting defendant at trial on two charges
after he pleaded guilty to four other charges arising from the criminal transaction at issue. With
regard to the four counts of which defendant pleaded guilty, jeopardy did not attach until the date
defendant was sentenced for those crimes, which was the same date defendant was sentenced for
the crimes for which the jury convicted him. People v Johnson, 396 Mich 424, 431, n 3; 240
NW2d 729 (1976). Thus, double jeopardy protections did not attach until that time and did not
preclude the jury trial on the remaining counts after defendant’s guilty plea. Moreover, because
defendant voluntary consented to the bifurcation of the adjudication of the two groups of
offenses, he cannot now claim that this was error. People v McCray, 210 Mich App 9, 14; 533
NW2d 359 (1995).
Further, defendant’s right against double jeopardy was not violated due to the fact that he
was convicted of both OUIL causing death and involuntary manslaughter. See People v Price,
214 Mich App 538, 546; 543 NW2d 49 (1995).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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