JUDY HOLLEY V CLARK SEED INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JUDY HOLLEY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross Appellee,
v
No. 223749
Midland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-009885-NO
CLARK SEED, INC.,
Defendant/Cross Appellant,
and
CAUDILL SEED COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Markey and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Caudill Seed Company, appeals by leave granted from an order denying its
motion for summary disposition brought jointly with defendant Clark Seed, Inc. Clark Seed has
filed a cross-appeal aligned with Caudill Seed’s position. We reverse. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff ate at a restaurant on May 27, 1995, and became ill on June 1, 1995. A June 10,
1995, culture revealed that she had contracted salmonella food poisoning. By June 14, 1995,
plaintiff learned that her food poisoning was the result of ingesting tainted alfalfa sprouts, and
those sprouts were then traced to the restaurant. Initially, investigating authorities believed the
contamination was caused by improper handling. Accordingly, plaintiff filed suit against the
restaurant on January 29, 1996. Later, the authorities believed that the contamination was the
result of improper packaging. Plaintiff therefore amended her complaint to add the distributor
and supplier of the sprouts. During a February 24, 1998, deposition of a health department
official, plaintiff learned that the authorities suspected that the seeds used by the alfalfa sprout
supplier were contaminated. Plaintiff claimed that she did not discover defendants’ identity as
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the seed suppliers until mid to late 1998.1
Plaintiff filed her action against defendants on March 29, 1999. Defendants moved for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that plaintiff’s action was barred by the
three-year limitation period. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that plaintiff’s claim
did not accrue until she “reasonably identified that these Defendants may have had some
responsibility for the injury.” On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in applying
the discovery rule because that rule applies to the discovery of a cause of action, not to the
discovery of the identity of tortfeasors. We agree.
The general accrual statute provides that a claim accrues “at the time the wrong upon
which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.” MCL 600.5827.
Our Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean that a claim does not accrue until all
the necessary elements of a cause of action have occurred and can be alleged in a proper
complaint. Connelly v Paul Ruddy’s Equipment Repair & Service Co, 388 Mich 146, 150; 200
NW2d 70 (1972). Where an element of a cause of action has occurred, but cannot be pleaded in
a proper complaint because it is not yet discoverable with reasonable diligence, courts have
applied the discovery rule. Travelers Ins Co v Guardian Alarm Co of Michigan, 231 Mich App
473, 479-480; 586 NW2d 760 (1998). Under the discovery rule, a claim accrues when, on the
basis of objective facts, the plaintiff should have known of a possible cause of action. Solowy v
Oakwood Hosp Corp, 454 Mich 214, 222; 561 NW2d 843 (1997); Moll v Abbott Laboratories,
444 Mich 1, 23-25; 506 NW2d 816 (1993). “Once a claimant is aware of an injury and its
possible cause, the plaintiff is aware of a possible cause of action.” Id. at 24. It is not necessary
that a plaintiff know the specifics of the evidence for a cause of action to accrue; it is enough that
she knows a cause of action exists in her favor. Id.
It is well settled that accrual of a cause of action is not delayed until the plaintiff
discovers the identity of the tortfeasor that might be ultimately liable for her injuries. In Brown v
Drake-Willock Int’l, Ltd, 209 Mich App 136, 142; 530 NW2d 510 (1995), this Court held that
the discovery rule pertains to discovering a specific injury, not to discovering the identities of all
potential parties. Similarly, in Poffenbarger v Kaplan, 224 Mich App 1, 12; 568 NW2d 131
(1997), this Court observed that “[t]he discovery period applies to discovery of a possible claim,
not the discovery of the defendant’s identity.” See, also, Thomas v Process Equipment Corp,
154 Mich App 78, 88; 397 NW2d 224 (1986); Reiterman v Westinghouse, Inc, 106 Mich App
698, 704; 308 NW2d 612 (1981); and Thomas v Ferndale Laboratories, Inc, 97 Mich App 718,
722; 296 NW2d 160 (1980).
In Lefever v American Red Cross, 108 Mich App 69; 310 NW2d 278 (1981), the plaintiff
received a blood platelet transfusion that was tainted with serum hepatitis and she was diagnosed
with the disease approximately five months later, on August 2, 1976. Id. at 71. She brought a
negligence claim against the defendant, the supplier of the tainted platelets, in October 1979. Id.
This Court concluded that her cause of action accrued no later than August 2, 1976, because once
1
Defendants dispute this claim and assert that materials plaintiff received in October 1996
pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request put her on notice of defendant Caudill’s status
as a seed supplier.
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she was diagnosed, all the elements of a cause of action had occurred and could have been
alleged in a proper complaint. Id. at 72-73. In concluding that the plaintiff’s claim was
untimely, this Court rejected the argument that her cause of action did not accrue until she
learned of the defendant’s connection to the case. Id. at 73.
The trial court in this case declined to follow these cases and applied the discovery rule
because of the complexity of evaluating which entity along the chain of production and
distribution of the alfalfa sprouts bore responsibility for the contamination that led to plaintiff’s
illness. That analysis, however, is simply a reformulation of the proposition that plaintiff was
entitled to rely on the discovery rule because she did not know the identity of the ultimate
tortfeasor. The case law makes it clear that a cause of action accrues regardless of the plaintiff’s
ability to identify a particular defendant or the precise mechanism that led to her injury. As in
Lefever, plaintiff knew she was injured on June 14, 1995, when she was informed that her food
poisoning was caused by tainted alfalfa sprouts. The fact that a complex investigation was
required to determine which entity along the distribution chain was ultimately responsible for the
contamination does not alter the fact that she could have pleaded a proper cause of action in
1995. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion for summary
disposition.
Reversed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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