SALLY A WILLIAMS V MASTER CRAFT CARPET SERV
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SALLY A. WILLIAMS and
EVAN HERBERT WILLIAMS,
UNPUBLISHED
September 14, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 220496
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-544018-NO
MASTER CRAFT CARPET SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Saad and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition, and we affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings
In September 1996, Botsford General Hospital of Farmington Hills hired Master Craft
Carpet Service, Inc. to install carpet in the hospital’s Unit Three North. Frederic Eberline, a
carpet layer and a former employee of Master Craft, supervised the installation at Botsford
through his company, E & E Flooring. Eberline, d/b/a E & E Flooring, had installed carpet at
Botsford on prior occasions and Master Craft’s president, Daniel Ulfig, testified that he and
Eberline negotiated payment after the completion of each job, based on the per-yard cost of
carpet installation.
On September 18, 1996, the second night of installation, Eberline and the other installers
used duct tape to mark off their work area in Unit Three North and verbally cautioned passersby
and personnel at the nearby nurse’s station about the potential hazards near the work area.
Plaintiff, on duty that night as an oncology nurse, learned about the carpet installation prior to
her shift and, that night, she saw a carpet installer in the hallway, loosening old carpet for
removal. Throughout the evening, plaintiff used different hallways to avoid the work areas while
attending to her patients and checking in at the nurse’s station. However, on one occasion and,
plaintiff asserts, at the encouragement of one of the installers, plaintiff walked under the tape
blocking a work area in the hallway and took long steps over some glue and onto a nearby
carpet. Twenty to thirty minutes later, plaintiff again stepped on the floor in that part of the
hallway, but slipped and fell on fresh glue recently applied to the floor.
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Plaintiff filed her complaint on January 23, 1997, and alleged that Master Craft breached
a duty to maintain a safe work area at the hospital. In its answer and affirmative defenses,
Master Craft admitted that it installed carpet at the hospital on the day in question. Master Craft
also raised the affirmative defense that any injuries suffered by plaintiff were the result of her
own failure to exercise reasonable care and that “[a]ny and all injuries or damages claimed are
solely due to the actions or inactions of others over whom Defendant had neither responsibility
nor control, and such actions or inactions constitute intervening, superseding cause not
foreseeable to Defendant.”
Following the depositions of Eberline and Ulfig, plaintiff filed a complaint against
Eberline, d/b/a E & E Flooring, raising the same claims it raised against Master Craft.
Thereafter, Master Craft filed a motion for summary disposition and contended that it owed no
duty to plaintiff to maintain the safety of the work site because Eberline is an independent
contractor, not an employee of Master Craft. In response, plaintiff argued that Master Craft’s
answer to the complaint and answers to interrogatories indicated that an employee of Master
Craft performed the work on the night plaintiff sustained her injuries and that Master Craft was
estopped from asserting the affirmative defense that an independent contractor performed the
work.
The trial court granted Master Craft’s motion and ruled that (1) Eberline acted as an
independent contractor on September 18, 1996, (2) Master Craft did not maintain control of the
work site, and (3) the installation did not constitute an ultrahazardous activity.1
II. Master Craft is Not Precluded from Presenting Facts Regarding E & E
Flooring’s Status as an Independent Contractor
Plaintiff contends that Master Craft was bound by its admissions that a Master Craft
employee performed the carpet installation on the night of the incident. We disagree.
Pursuant to plaintiff’s discovery request, Master Craft submitted answers to
interrogatories, drafted by Daniel Ulfig. Plaintiff asked Master Craft to identify “each and every
employee, agent or servant of the Defendant, who was in any way involved with the Plaintiff’s
employer, at the time of the above described accident.” In response, Ulfig stated that “the
defendants workers on the scene were Fred Everline [sic].” To a request to identify “each and
every one of Defendant’s agent,[sic] servants or employees who were responsible for safety,”
Ulfig stated, “No one was specifically assigned to safety. All employees are aware of the
accepted standards for installing carpeting.” When asked to name “the Defendant’s employee(s)
who was in charge of the carpentry [sic] project at the hospital,” Master Craft named “Dan Ulfig,
president of Master Craft.” Further, when asked which of “the Defendant, its agents or
employees, or some other person, firm or corporation in the Defendant’s behalf,” was working at
the time of the incident, Ulfig named Master Craft Carpet Service, Inc.
“The interpretation and application of court rules and statutes presents a question of law”
which we review de novo. Grzesick v Cepela, 237 Mich App 554, 559; 603 NW2d 809 (1999).
1
The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claim against Eberline, d/b/a E & E Flooring on the same
day.
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MCR 2.111(C) provides: “As to each allegation on which the adverse party relies, a responsive
pleading must (1) state an explicit admission or denial; (2) plead no contest; or (3) state that the
pleader lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an allegation,
which has the effect of a denial.”
While parties are bound by factual statements made in pleadings and interrogatories,
MCR 2.111(C) does not apply to statements by parties regarding questions of law. Atkinson v
City of Detroit, 222 Mich App 7, 11-12; 564 NW2d 473 (1997). The terms “employee” and
“independent contractor” are legal terms. Candelaria v BC General Contractors, Inc, 236 Mich
App 67, 72-73; 600 NW2d 348 (1999). Master Craft’s president, Daniel Ulfig, who answered
the interrogatories on Master Craft’s behalf, is a layman who cannot be presumed to be qualified
to properly apply legal terms to the facts surrounding Eberline’s employment status. Wright v
Wright, 134 Mich App 800, 804-805; 351 NW2d 868 (1984). Furthermore, the questions, and
therefore the answers, were broad in their construction and are subject to multiple interpretations.
Therefore, Master Craft was not barred from presenting evidence that Eberline was an
independent contractor. Id. Moreover, and more importantly, both Eberline and Ulfig testified
unequivocally under oath and under cross-examination that Eberline is an independent contractor
and their sworn testimony remains unrebutted.
Plaintiff also argues that Master Craft was barred from asserting the affirmative defense
that an independent contractor performed the carpet installation. Again, we disagree. Master
Craft raised this affirmative defense in its responsive pleadings by stating that any injuries or
damages were “due to the actions or inactions of others over whom Defendant had neither
responsibility nor control.” Moreover, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in using
the aforementioned affirmative defense, along with the unrebutted testimony of Eberline and
Ulfig to rule that Master Craft preserved the defense that E & E Flooring is an independent
contractor.
III. Master Craft is Not Liable for E & E Flooring’s Alleged Negligence
A. Sufficient Evidence Showed that E & E Flooring is an Independent Contractor
Next, plaintiff argues that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether
Master Craft owed a duty of care to plaintiff. We disagree.2
2
We review an order granting or denying a motion for summary disposition de novo. Walters v
Bloomfield Hills Furniture, 228 Mich App 160, 162; 577 NW2d 206 (1998). “When reviewing a
motion for summary disposition granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the
affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Solomon v Royal Maccabees Life Ins Co, 243 Mich App
375, 379; 622 NW2d 101 (2000). A trial court properly grants a motion under this rule if no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id. Moreover, to establish a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant breached
that duty; (3) that the defendant’s breach of duty was a proximate cause of the
(continued…)
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First, ample evidence established that Eberline d/b/a E & E Flooring is an independent
contractor. “An independent contractor is defined as ‘one who, carrying on an independent
business, contracts to do work without being subject to the right of control by the employer as to
the method of work but only as to the result to be accomplished.’” Candelaria, supra, at 73,
quoting Kamalnath v Mercy Memorial Hosp Corp, 194 Mich App 543, 553; 487 NW2d 499
(1992). To determine the liability of a general contractor for an independent contractor’s
negligence, “an employer’s retained control is relevant to the issue whether there was in fact a
contractee-contractor relationship.” Id. “If the employer of a person or business ostensibly
labeled an ‘independent contractor’ retains control over the method of the work, there is in fact
no contractee-contractor relationship, and the employer may be vicariously liable under the
principles of master and servant.” Id.
Here, when cross-examined by plaintiff’s counsel during his deposition, Master Craft
president, Daniel Ulfig testified unequivocally and repeatedly that Eberline, d/b/a E & E
Flooring is an independent contractor, not an employee and that he was paid by the job, not by
the hour as were employee installers of Master Craft.3 Ulfig also testified that Eberline has his
own company, E & E Flooring, and that E & E Flooring was given the contract to do the
Botsford job. Ulfig testified that, long ago, Eberline was an employee of Master Craft but, for
some time, has worked as an independent contractor for many different people. Further, Master
Craft contracted with E & E Flooring to do the Botsford job without any specific direction how
to do the job. Moreover, Eberline of E & E Flooring was the only supervisor on the job; Master
Craft neither directed nor supervised the job and had no one on the job site. E & E Flooring had
installed carpet at Botsford Hospital three or four times previously as an independent contractor.
Further, documentation presented to the trial court is fully consistent with the unrebutted
testimony of Ulfig and Eberline that E & E Flooring acted as an independent contractor.
Specifically, E & E Flooring’s records reveal that it invoiced Master Craft for the Botsford
Hospital job and Master Craft’s tax records show that it paid E & E Flooring as an independent
contractor and issued the company an IRS Form 1099.
Eberline provided the only supervision on the job site and plaintiff presented no evidence
that Master Craft supervised any of the Botsford work. That Master Craft contracted with
Botsford for the carpet and supplied some of the materials has no bearing on the legal question
whether E & E Flooring functioned as an independent contractor or employee. Clearly, the trial
court had overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence that compelled the conclusion
that Eberline, d/b/a E & E Flooring is an independent contractor, not an employee. Moreover, as
stated above, there is no testimonial or documentary evidence to the contrary.
B. Master Craft is Not Responsible for the Negligence of an Independent Contractor
(…continued)
plaintiff’s damages; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered damages. [Jenks v Brown,
219 Mich App 415, 417; 557 NW2d 114 (1996).]
3
Master Craft had approximately twenty employees, all of whom were paid by the hour.
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Generally, “when an owner or general contractor hires an independent contractor to
perform a job, the owner or general contractor may not be held liable in negligence to third
parties or employees of the independent contractor.” Candelaria, supra, at 72. There are two
exceptions to this rule, neither of which applies here.
The doctrine of “retained control” applies not only to the determination of an employer’s
vicarious liability, it also may impose direct liability on a landowner or general contractor under
certain circumstances. Candelaria, supra, at 73. Under this theory, “the owner or general
contractor’s retention of supervisory control provides the basis for the imposition of an
independent duty on the part of the owner or general contractor to exercise its retained control
with reasonable care.” Id. However, the doctrine applies only in those situations involving
‘common work areas.’ Id. at 74. A common work area is a work site at which multiple
subcontractors work or will eventually work under the supervision of the general contractor. Id.
at 75. In a common work area, therefore, a general contractor may be “‘held responsible for its
own negligence in failing to implement reasonable safety precautions,’ where its ‘retained and
exercised’ control over a project was sufficient to create a corresponding duty to implement such
precautions.” Id. at 74, quoting Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91, 108; 220 NW2d 641
(1974), overruled in part on another grounds Hardy v Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc, 414
Mich 29; 323 NW2d 270 (1982). As our Supreme Court observed in Funk:
Placing ultimate responsibility on the general contractor for job safety in
common work areas will, from a practical, economic standpoint, render it more
likely that the various subcontractors being supervised by the general contractor
will implement or that the general contractor will himself implement the
necessary precautions and provide the necessary safety equipment in those areas.
[Funk, supra, at 104.]
Here, however, plaintiff presented no evidence that multiple subcontractors worked or
were expected to work at the installation site at Botsford’s Unit Three North. Accordingly,
Master Craft had no duty to implement safety standards and precautions in the work area to
protect multiple subcontractors and Master Craft cannot be held directly liable for plaintiff’s
injuries under the doctrine of retained control.
Similarly, the other exception, the inherently dangerous activity doctrine, does not apply
here. Under this theory, “an employer is liable for harm resulting from work ‘necessarily
involving danger to others, unless great care is used’ to prevent injury, or where the work
involves a ‘peculiar risk’ or ‘special danger’ which calls for ‘special’ or ‘reasonable’ precautions.
Butler v Ramco-Gershenson, Inc, 214 Mich App 521, 525; 542 NW2d 912 (1995), quoting
Bosak v Hutchinson, 422 Mich 712, 724; 375 NW2d 333 (1985) (citations omitted). Under such
circumstances, a general contractor owes a continuing duty to third parties only if the “special
risk of danger” is “recognizable in advance ….” Phillips v Mazda Motor Mfg Corp, 204 Mich
App 401, 406; 516 NW2d 502 (1994). Moreover:
[L]iability should not be imposed where the activity involved was not
unusual, the risk was not unique, ‘reasonable safeguards against injury could
readily have been provided by well-recognized safety measures,’ and the
employer selected a responsible, experienced contractor. Rasmussen v Louisville
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Ladder Co, Inc, 211 Mich App 541, 549; 536 NW2d 221 (1995), quoting Funk,
supra, at 110.
Obviously, carpet installation does not constitute an inherently dangerous activity. While
the installation process may involve a slight risk that someone might trip on tools, carpet rolls,
carpet cuttings or adhesive, the process, by its nature, does not involve danger to others as long
as the installers exercise ordinary care. Moreover, the activity does not involve a peculiar risk of
physical harm or a special danger requiring a high degree of care; the installation of carpet is a
routine task which carries only a minimal, ordinary risk even when the activity occurs in a
hospital.
In sum, neither the “retained control” exception nor the “inherently dangerous activity”
exception applies and, therefore, Master Craft may not be held directly or vicariously liable to
plaintiff for the alleged negligence of an independent contractor, Eberline d/b/a E & E Flooring.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted Master Craft’s motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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