PEOPLE OF MI V STANLEY D KELLOGG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 11, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 229695
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 98-011628-FH
STANLEY D. KELLOGG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Collins, P.J., and Hoekstra and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer, MCL
257.602a(3), and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second
offense, MCL 257.625 (OUIL-2nd). Defendant was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of 2½
to 5 years’ and six months’ imprisonment on the respective convictions. This Court denied
defendant’s application for delayed leave to appeal; however, our Supreme Court, in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to us for consideration as on leave granted.1 We
affirm.
Defendant’s claim on appeal is based on statements that the trial court made at the plea
hearing. At that time, the prosecution indicated that it had made a plea agreement with
defendant. The agreement was that in exchange for his plea of guilty and sentencing to the
charges of fleeing and eluding and OUIL-2nd, reduced from OUIL-3rd, and defendant’s truthful
testimony at a trial in an unrelated case, a charge of driving with a suspended license and a
supplemental information charging defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender would be
dismissed. In addition, the prosecutor made a sentence recommendation that defendant receive
no more than one year in jail. Defendant acknowledged that to be the full and complete
agreement in the case. The trial court then proceeded to complete the guilty plea. At the
conclusion of the plea hearing, the trial court made the following statement:
Mr. Kellogg, I want you to know that I haven’t made any agreements or
deals with anyone about a plea or sentence. I will go along with the
1
People v Kellogg, 463 Mich 865 (2000).
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recommendation about [the] sentence in this case, provided you keep your end of
the bargain, which is providing truthful testimony next week, or whenever that
case goes to trial. But, beyond that, I haven’t made any agreements or deals.
Subsequent to the plea, defendant testified in the unrelated trial as the plea agreement
required,2 and then appeared before the trial court for sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the
trial court indicated that it could not “accept” the prosecutor’s sentence recommendation and
offered defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty. Defendant’s counsel argued
that the trial court should abide by the recommendation because the prosecution had already
received the benefit of defendant’s testimony and because the trial court had promised to go
along with the recommendation if defendant “keeps his end of the bargain.” The trial court
responded that it was in full compliance with the law and required that defendant choose between
going forward with sentencing or withdrawing his guilty plea. Defendant opted to proceed with
sentencing and this appeal ensued.
On appeal, defendant argues that he is entitled to specific performance of the sentence
recommendation that the prosecutor made. Defendant maintains that the trial court’s
representation that if he complied with the term of the plea agreement to provide truthful
testimony, then the trial court would go along with the prosecutor’s recommendation, induced
him into compliance and now requires this Court to order the trial court to sentence defendant in
conformity with the prosecutor’s recommendation.
Although we are troubled by the apparent promise that the trial court made that was not
honored at sentencing, we reject defendant’s claim for specific performance because the record
does not support a finding that the promise was part of the plea bargain in the case. The plea
bargain as stated on the record was negotiated between the prosecutor and defendant. Nothing
about the bargain suggests that the trial court participated in or affirmed the agreement prior to
the moment that the trial court made its promise at the conclusion of the case. To the contrary,
the trial court stated that it had not made any “agreements or deals.” As such, the promise of the
trial court was gratuitous, not bargained for and not part of the consideration that induced
defendant to make his plea. Consequently, defendant cannot credibly argue that the trial court’s
promise induced his guilty plea or his subsequent performance of a term of the plea agreement
that required him to offer truthful testimony in an unrelated case. Further, as the trial court
noted, defendant received considerable benefits from the plea bargain, including a reduced
charge on the OUIL count and dismissal of a charge of driving with a suspended license and of a
supplemental information charging defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender.
With regard to the prosecution of the case, the record demonstrates that defendant
received that for which he bargained. The prosecutor made the sentence recommendation to the
trial court and never wavered from it. Just because the trial court determined not to follow the
recommendation does not entitle defendant to specific performance. The only specific
performance to which defendant was entitled was from the prosecutor for a recommendation of a
2
That testimony is not part of the record, but the prosecution does not challenge that
representation, nor was that fact disputed at the sentencing hearing.
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one-year jail sentence. People v Siebert, 450 Mich 500, 516-518; 537 NW2d 891 (1995). That
promise was honored. When the trial court decided not to follow the recommendation,
defendant’s options were to proceed with sentencing or withdraw his plea. People v Killebrew,
416 Mich 189, 209-210; 330 NW2d 834 (1982).3 Defendant was afforded the opportunity to
make that choice. Having opted to go forward with the sentencing, he is entitled to no further
relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
3
Modification recognized by People v Williams, 464 Mich 174; 626 NW2d 899 (2001).
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