PEOPLE OF MI V FRANKIE L MILLER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 4, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 218922
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 98-001560
FRANKIE L. MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Sawyer and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, MCL
750.157(a). He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to mandatory life
imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conspiracy
conviction. We disagree. In determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to
sustain a conviction, we are required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287,
296; 519 NW2d 108 (1994).
A conspiracy is a mutual agreement between two or more individuals to commit a
criminal act or to accomplish a legal act through criminal means. People v Buck, 197 Mich App
404, 412; 496 NW2d 321 (1992). The essence of the conspiracy is the agreement itself, and it is
sufficient if the acts of the parties establish the agreement. Id. The crime is complete when the
agreement is made, whether or not some overt act is taken in order to further the conspiracy. Id.
To prove conspiracy to commit murder, it must be demonstrated that each conspirator had the
requisite intent to commit the murder. Id. The prosecution must demonstrate that the
conspirators deliberated and planned the crime with the intent to kill the victim. Id.
Additionally, direct proof of the conspiracy is not essential; instead, proof may be derived from
the circumstances, acts and conduct of the parties. People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich
334, 347; 562 NW2d 652 (1997).
In this case, Ronald Mullins indicated that there was a plan for defendant to “do hits” or
“kill people” for Edward Sims. Mullins recounted an incident where defendant and the other
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alleged co-conspirators looked for the victim at a motorcycle club. Mullins testified that he and
Sims later bonded defendant out of jail. The next day, he and defendant convened in the
bathroom at Club Rose, the nightclub at which the shooting took place. At that time, defendant
pulled out a gun, which Sims later said was his, and stated that he intended to kill the victim.
Edward Griffin then joined them in the bathroom. Defendant did not know the victim, so he told
Griffin to dance by the victim so defendant would know who he was. Griffin did so and
defendant subsequently shot the victim, killing him. Viewed most favorably to the prosecution,
the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
was involved in a conspiracy to kill the victim.
In the context of deciding the sufficiency issue, we reject defendant’s claim that he was
deprived of a fair trial because of the improper admission of hearsay testimony. Because
defendant failed to object to the challenged testimony at trial, appellate relief with respect to this
issue is foreclosed absent a showing of plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Pesquera, 244 Mich App
305, 316; 625 NW2d 370 (2001).
Defendant’s statement to Mullins directing him to dance beside the victim was not
hearsay because it was a party admission. MRE 801(d)(2)(A). Also, the challenged testimony by
Mullins and Griffin regarding Sims’ statements was admissible under MRE 801(d)(2)(E), as
statements by coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. Therefore, plain error has not been
shown.
Defendant also complains that the prosecutor failed to present evidence that was
mentioned in her opening statement. This issue is also unpreserved because it was not raised at
trial. In light of Griffin’s testimony at trial admitting that he told the police that he saw Sims
give money to defendant after the shooting, we find no plain error with respect to the challenged
statement by the prosecutor. Thus, this unpreserved issue does not warrant appellate relief.
Carines, supra; People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
Next, defendant argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because Griffin testified that he
pleaded guilty of conspiracy to murder and the court failed to give a limiting instruction with
respect to this testimony. Because defendant did not object to this testimony at trial, the issue is
not preserved, thus foreclosing appellate relief absent plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. Pesquera, supra at 316; People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 375; 624 NW2d 227
(2001). Here, there was no plain error because Griffin was a witness at trial, was subject to
cross-examination, and the circumstances involving the guilty plea in exchange for the dismissal
of greater charges was relevant to Griffin’s credibility. Disclosure of the guilty plea to blunt the
impact of attacks on the witness’ credibility served a legitimate purpose and was permissible.
United States v Veltre, 591 F2d 347, 349 (CA 5, 1979); see also United States v Carr, 647 F2d
867, 869 (CA 8, 1981); State v Borden 605 SW2d 88, 90 (MO, 1980). Moreover, defendant’s
substantial rights were not affected by the failure to give a limiting instruction, because there was
no attempt to use the fact of Griffin’s guilty plea as substantive evidence of defendant’s guilt, and
the court provided a cautionary instruction an accomplice testimony. United States v King, 505
F2d 602, 607 (CA 5, 1974); State v Just, 441 A2d 98, 104-105 (Conn, 1981); People v Coles, 79
Mich App 255, 265-269; 261 NW2d 280 (1977), affirmed 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983).
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Next, defendant argues that the court’s conspiracy instructions were deficient. Once
again, because defendant failed to object to the court’s instructions at trial, we review this under
the plain error standard. Knapp, supra at 375. We are satisfied that, viewed in their entirety, the
court’s instructions fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected defendant’s
rights. People v Caulley, 197 Mich App 177, 184; 494 NW2d 853 (1992). Thus, plain error has
not been shown.
Defendant argues that the trial court also erred in admitting Mullins’ testimony
concerning what Sims told him. Defendant maintains that the testimony was inadmissible
hearsay. We disagree. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony
because it was admissible as the statement of a coconspirator under MRE 801(d)(2)(E). People v
Taylor, 195 Mich App 57, 60; 489 NW2d 99 (1992).
Defendant also argues that the court erred in instructing the jury in accordance with CJI2d
5.5 (Witness a Disputed Accomplice) with respect to Mullins’ testimony. Because defendant did
not preserve this issue with an appropriate objection at trial, he must show plain error affecting
his substantial rights. Knapp, supra at 375. Because Mullins did not explicitly admit to
participating in the crime, the court’s decision to give CJI2d 5.5 is not plainly erroneous.
Moreover, we conclude that the doctrine of judicial estoppel has no applicability here.
Next, defendant’s failure to object to the court’s decision to allow the jury to rehear
Griffin’s testimony pursuant to its request precludes appellate relief absent plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. See People v Nash, 244 Mich App 93, 96-97; 625 NW2d 87
(2000). It was within the trial court’s discretion to allow the jury to rehear the testimony. MCR
6.414(H). Defendant has not shown that the request was unreasonable or that unfairness resulted.
Plain error has not been shown.
Finally, we reject defendant’s claim that reversal is required because he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel. Because defendant did not raise this issue in an appropriate
motion in the trial court, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v
Hurst, 205 Mich App 634, 641; 517 NW2d 858 (1994). A defendant’s claim that counsel’s
assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction has two components. First, the
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires a showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 5-6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). In
attempting to persuade a reviewing court that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must also
overcome the presumption that the challenged action was trial strategy, and must establish “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been
different. Id. at 6.
Most of defendant’s claims pertain to matters previously addressed in this opinion, which
we have concluded are without merit. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make meritless
objections. People v Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App 411, 425; 564 NW2d 149 (1997).
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Furthermore, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to more vigorously argue the
directed verdict motion because it is apparent from the record that the trial court was aware of the
facts and the applicable standard, and properly concluded that a directed verdict was not
warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry William Saad
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