PEOPLE OF MI V MARTIN COURTNEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 28, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 222010
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98-015889-FH
MARTIN COURTNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K.F. Kelly, P.J., and White and Talbot
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct (“CSC III”), MCL 750.520d(1)(a). Defendant was sentenced as a fourth habitual
offender, MCL 769.12. The trial court enhanced defendant’s sentence to a term of life
imprisonment for each of the two convictions. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts
Defendant stopped to assist the complainant and his family in a Saginaw parking lot after
their car had broken down. Defendant thereafter befriended the family and invited them to stay
at his home until their car was fixed. The complainant and his family were staying at defendant’s
home for approximately one week when defendant sexually assaulted the complainant on two
separate occasions. The victim was a thirteen-year-old adolescent who attended special
education classes and despite his chronological age, functioned at a third grade level. A jury
convicted defendant of two counts of CSC III. The court sentenced defendant as a fourth
habitual offender to two life sentences.
II. Defendant’s Prior Convictions
First, defendant contends that the trial court relied on two constitutionally infirm
convictions when it enhanced his sentence. We disagree. Defendant did not raise this objection
at sentencing but instead raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Nevertheless, this Court
may consider unpreserved constitutional challenges where the alleged error may have affected
the defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
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Defendant claims that two of his prior felony convictions used to enhance his sentence
were obtained without the benefit of counsel. In support, defendant references the presentence
investigation report (“PSIR”), which indicates that for two separate convictions, defendant’s
attorney was “unknown.” Defendant argues further that this notation on the PSIR constitutes
prima facie evidence that those two convictions were obtained in violation of defendant’s right to
counsel. We do not agree.
It is axiomatic that a trial court cannot consider prior convictions obtained in derogation
of the right to counsel for purposes of meting out punishment for another offense. People v Zinn,
217 Mich App 340, 342; 551 NW2d 704 (1996). Initially, the defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the prior conviction was obtained without the benefit of counsel. Id. at 343. To
satisfy this burden, defendant must present:
(1) prima facie proof that a previous conviction was violative of Gideon1, such as
a docket entry showing the absence of counsel or a transcript evidencing the same,
or (2) evidence that the defendant requested such records from the sentencing
court and that the court either (a) failed to reply to the request, or (b) refused to
furnish copies of the records, within a reasonable time. Id. (Citation omitted.)
A review of the record in the instant matter establishes that defendant did not meet his
initial burden. The PSIR indicates that for two of defendant’s prior convictions, counsel was
“unknown.” This is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case that these convictions were
indeed procured without the assistance of counsel. See Zinn, supra at 3442. Accordingly, we do
not find that the trial court’s consideration of the disputed prior convictions to enhance
defendant’s sentence constituted plain error requiring reversal.
III. Challenges to the PSIR
Next, defendant asserts that a 1974 conviction was improperly included in his PSIR and
improperly considered by the trial court at sentencing. Inaccurate information considered by the
sentencing court may implicate defendant’s right to due process. People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App
531, 533; 462 NW2d 793 (1990).
A defendant has a right to the use of accurate information at his sentencing, and if
information in his PSIR is challenged, the court must respond to and make findings on those
challenges. People v McAllister, 241 Mich App 466, 473; 616 NW2d 203 (2000). See also
People v Brooks, 169 Mich App 360, 365; 425 NW2d 555 (1988); People v Pierce, 158 Mich
App 113, 116; 404 NW2d 230 (1987). A sentencing court’s failure to respond to alleged
inaccuracies in the PSIR may constitute error requiring resentencing. To adequately address the
alleged inaccuracies, the sentencing court may:
1
Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 Sct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963).
2
The Zinn court indicated that “mere silence regarding counsel” does not equate to that type of
prima facie evidence required to establish that the defendant was convicted without the benefit of
counsel.
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[H]old an evidentiary hearing to determine the report’s accuracy; (2) accept the
defendant’s unsworn statement; (3) ignore the alleged misinformation while
sentencing. MCR 6.425(D)(3); People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App 531, 535; 462
NW2d 793 (1990); Brooks, supra at 365.
In the case sub judice, defendant claims that a prior felony conviction was improperly
listed on his PSIR. As regards that particular “conviction,” defendant contends that prosecution
on the 1974 charge was deferred in exchange for his guilty plea and he had successfully
completed the required period of probation. At sentencing, defense counsel objected to the
inclusion of this conviction on defendant’s PSIR. The court overruled the objection based on the
prosecution’s statement that the conviction remained on the LEIN as a “conviction with
probation” and that documents filed with the court by the PSIR’s author indicated that the charge
stood as a “conviction.”
A review of the record in the case at bar indicates that defendant offered only an
unsubstantiated assertion that his 1974 conviction should not be included on the PSIR.
Defendant did not otherwise ask for an evidentiary hearing at which he could have provided the
court with proof of his assertion. People v Lawrence, 206 Mich App 378, 380; 522 NW2d 654
(1994). Defendant had the opportunity to refute the alleged inaccuracy contained in his PSIR and
failed to do so. The trial court heard defendant’s challenges and the prosecution’s response to
those challenges and found that the listed conviction was valid and one on which it could rely
when enhancing defendant’s sentence. MCR 6.425(D)(3). We therefore do not find error in this
regard.
IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant next asserts that the prosecution, in its rebuttal argument, improperly vouched
for the complainant’s credibility and purposefully used derogatory verbiage to describe defendant
to inflame and impassion the jury. Defense counsel failed to object to these comments at trial.
This Court reviews defendant’s unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct for plain
error. People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). Issues pertaining to
prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed case by case and the remarks to which defendant assigns
as misconduct cannot be viewed in isolation. Id. at 721. Indeed, the scope of review must
include the context in which the remarks were uttered. Id.
Although the prosecution may not vouch for a witness’ credibility, Schutte, supra at 722,
it is entirely proper for a prosecutor to respond to defense counsel’s suggestions that a
prosecution witness is fabricating testimony. People v Sharbnow, 174 Mich App 94, 101; 435
NW2d 772 (1989). The remarks as to which defendant asserts misconduct cannot be viewed in
isolation. In this case, the remarks made by the prosecution were in response to defense
counsel’s closing argument implying that the complainant and other prosecution witnesses
conspired and concocted the charges against defendant. Prosecutors are not prohibited from
reminding the jury of evidence and arguing that the evidence presented at trial supports a
witness’ credibility. Schutte, supra at 722; People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551
NW2d 460 (1996). Here, the prosecution’s remarks did not imply superior knowledge of the
witness’ truthfulness or overall credibility. Schutte, supra at 722.
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Defendant also contends that he was denied a fair trial as a result of the prosecution’s use
of negative descriptors with regard to his person and the charged conduct. The prosecution’s
closing argument was peppered with words such as “sicko” and “sleazy” in direct reference to
defendant and his alleged conduct. Additionally, the prosecutor used the word “disgusting”
several times to describe not only defendant’s conduct, but also the complainant’s hesitancy to
report the assault, the tenant’s delay in calling the police, and defense counsel’s theory of
conspiracy. Defendant argues that the prosecution’s use of these derogatory terms inflamed the
jury and unfairly prejudiced him.
Prosecutors may, however, use “hard language” and are not required to couch their
arguments in “soft” words calculated to avoid arousing emotion. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App
669, 678; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). Indeed, a prosecutor “need not state her argument in the
blandest possible terms.” Schutte, supra at 722. Our review of the trial transcript in its entirety
reveals that these comments by the prosecution were primarily limited to its rebuttal argument.
A vigorously argued and otherwise sound trial will not be reversed on the basis of isolated
remarks that could have been immediately cured by the trial court with a cautionary instruction
had defense counsel timely objected. Ullah, supra at 679. Although the prosecution may have
imprudently used certain adjectives when referencing defendant, those remarks, if timely
objected to at trial, could have been addressed by the trial court immediately thus eliminating any
possible prejudice to defendant. Accordingly, we do not find error requiring reversal.
V. Proportionality of Sentence
Finally, defendant argues that his sentence was disproportionate. This Court reviews
issues pertaining to sentence proportionality for an abuse of discretion. People v Alexander, 234
Mich App 665, 679; 599 NW2d 749 (1999); People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d
1 (1990).
Our Supreme Court in Milbourn, supra, held that an abuse of discretion occurs when a
defendant’s sentence violates the principle of proportionality. A sentence satisfies this principle
when it is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the history of the offender. Id. at
636, 650.
In this case, the trial court based its sentence on a thorough examination of the instant
offenses and defendant’s background. As the trial judge noted, defendant’s four prior felony
convictions involved similar criminal sexual conduct against young males. Additionally, the
instant convictions came to pass from assaults committed by defendant only ten months after his
release from a thirteen-year sentence for the exact same offense. The Milbourn court instructs
appellate courts to consider whether the circumstances surrounding a defendant’s conviction
place that defendant in the least or most threatening class with respect to the particular crime.
Milbourn, supra at 654. Given defendant’s consistent criminal behavior and prior convictions
for identical crimes, we are convinced that defendant’s sentence is “entirely proportionate to the
seriousness of the offense and the circumstances of this offender.” People v Chandler, 211 Mich
App 604, 161; 536 NW2d 799 (1995). The sentencing court’s imposition of the maximum
sentence for both offenses did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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