PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL F JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 28, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 218919
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-005381
MICHAEL F. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b,
for shooting his former girlfriend. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment
without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the
felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that insufficient evidence identified him as the shooter or proved
his premeditation and deliberation. When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this
Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if a rational
jury could have found that the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). With respect to identity, the
victim’s mother specifically identified defendant as the man fleeing her home immediately after
the shooting occurred. Furthermore, testimony by the victim’s son and sister and evidence of a
January 1997 personal protection order that the victim obtained against defendant showed that
defendant repeatedly had threatened to kill or hurt the victim. We conclude that this evidence
and the reasonable inferences arising from it supported the jury’s finding beyond any reasonable
doubt that defendant shot the victim. To the extent that defendant challenges the believability of
the victim’s mother’s identification, we note that issues of witness credibility and the weight of
evidence belong to the jury, and we will not second guess the jury’s determinations. People v
Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505-506; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
Regarding premeditation and deliberation, these elements may be established by evidence
of the prior relationship of the parties, the defendant’s actions before the killing, the
circumstances surrounding the killing itself, and the defendant’s conduct after the murder.
Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom may suffice to establish
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a defendant’s premeditation and deliberation. People v Abraham, 234 Mich App 640, 656; 599
NW2d 736 (1999). In this case, defendant and the victim had engaged in a romantic relationship
that ended acrimoniously shortly before the victim’s murder. During the months preceding the
murder defendant threatened to kill the victim. The victim’s death, which occurred during the
early hours of the morning, resulted from several close range gunshots to her face and head.
People v Berry (On Remand), 198 Mich App 123, 128; 497 NW2d 202 (1993). Within twelve
hours of the murder, defendant’s sister observed a gun in defendant’s waistband. The shooter
gained entry to the victim’s home through locked doors without damaging them. Furthermore,
on learning that the police were looking for him, defendant left his sister’s home for a friend’s
residence, where shortly thereafter police apprehended him. We conclude that this evidence
amply supported the jury’s determination beyond any reasonable doubt that defendant
premeditated and deliberated the victim’s murder.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his past bad acts
contained within the personal protection order and the victim’s sister’s testimony. We review the
trial court’s admission of evidence for a clear abuse of discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490,
494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
Evidence of past acts is admissible if relevant to any fact at issue outside of the
defendant’s criminal propensity, as long as the risk of unfair prejudice does not substantially
outweigh its probative value. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55, 64; 508 NW2d 114
(1993), modified 445 Mich 1205; 520 NW2d 338 (1994). The prosecutor offered the other acts
evidence to prove defendant’s intent and motive to kill the victim. The evidence of defendant’s
prior threats to the victim, contained in both the personal protection order and the victim’s
sister’s testimony, plainly tended to establish defendant’s motive for killing the victim and prove
his intent to kill the victim, both proper purposes. People v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 452-453; 537
NW2d 577 (1995) (noting that evidence of discord within a romantic relationship is relevant to
motive and premeditation); People v Teague, 411 Mich 562, 565; 309 NW2d 530 (1981)
(observing that recent past threats are relevant to prove the defendant’s motive and intent).
Furthermore, in light of the significant probative value of this evidence shedding light on
defendant’s relationship with the victim, any risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially
outweigh the evidence’s probative value. MRE 403. Accordingly, the evidence was admissible.
Defendant further suggests that the protection order was inadmissible in light of the
prosecutor’s failure to timely notify defendant of his intent to introduce the order, and that the
trial court erred in refusing defendant’s request for a limiting instruction regarding the other acts
evidence. While defendant correctly observes that a prosecutor intending to introduce evidence
of past acts must provide the defendant reasonable notice, MRE 404(b)(2), and that the court
must read a requested limiting instruction that delineates the jury’s proper consideration of prior
acts, Starr, supra at 498, we find that neither the prosecutor’s failure to properly notify defendant
nor the trial court’s refusal to read defendant’s requested limiting instruction affected the
outcome of defendant’s trial. Given the facts that (1) defendant knew almost two years before
his trial that the prosecutor introduced the protection order during defendant’s preliminary
examination, (2) the other acts evidence was admissible, and (3) the transcripts reflect that
defendant had several opportunities at trial to challenge the admissibility of the evidence, we
cannot conclude more probably than not that the asserted lack of notice resulted in a miscarriage
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of justice. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999); People v Hawkins,
245 Mich App 439, 453-456; 628 NW2d 105 (2001). Furthermore, in light of the substantial
evidence of defendant’s guilt and the cumulative nature of the evidence of threats contained in
the protection order and the victim’s sister’s testimony, we likewise are not convinced that the
instructional error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Lukity, supra.
Defendant also asserts that the reading into evidence of defendant’s sister’s and nephew’s
February 11, 1997 written statements to the police constituted the impermissible admission of
hearsay evidence. The statements were hearsay because they were not made at the trial and were
offered into evidence “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” i.e., as substantive evidence.1
MRE 801(c), People v Harris, 201 Mich App 147, 150-151; 505 NW2d 889 (1993). A court
may not admit hearsay evidence unless an exception applies. MRE 802. Therefore, the
prosecutor could introduce the statements as substantive evidence only after he laid the proper
foundation for their admission as past recollections recorded, MRE 803(5), a hearsay exception.
People v Jenkins, 450 Mich 249, 256; 537 NW2d 828 (1995).
The following elements must be met to establish a past recollection recorded: (1) the
witness once had knowledge of the matter, (2) the witness now has an insufficient recollection of
the matter to permit him to testify fully and accurately, and (3) the document either was written
by the witness, or was examined by the witness and accurately reflects the witness’ knowledge
when the matter remained fresh in the witness’ memory. People v Hoffman, 205 Mich App 1,
16; 518 NW2d 817 (1994); People v Missias, 106 Mich App 549, 554; 308 NW2d 278 (1981).
Defendant’s sister testified repeatedly that she could not remember various events
involving defendant that occurred the day before the victim’s death. Furthermore, she agreed
that when she signed her statement to the police on the day after the victim’s murder the events
remained fresher in her mind. Because the sister’s testimony established the necessary
foundational elements for the admission of her earlier statement as a past recollection recorded,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the prosecutor to
request that the sister read excerpts of her statement into the record. MRE 803(5); Starr, supra at
494.
The prosecutor failed to establish, however, that defendant’s nephew’s previous statement
to the police qualified as a past recollection recorded. The prosecutor showed neither that the
nephew lacked sufficient recollection of the matter to permit his full and accurate testimony nor
that the nephew’s statement accurately reflected his knowledge when the events were fresh in his
mind. The nephew specifically rejected that the statement accurately reflected his knowledge of
events occurring the day before the victim’s murder. The nephew explained that although he had
signed the statement, he never reviewed it. Notwithstanding the nephew’s attempts to respond
from memory to the prosecutor’s questions and his denial of the statement’s accuracy, the
prosecutor requested and the trial court ordered, both improperly, that the nephew simply read his
1
The sister’s and nephew’s statements did not qualify as nonhearsay under MRE 801(d)(1)(A)
because neither the sister nor nephew made the prior statements under oath.
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prior statements into the record. The trial court clearly abused its discretion when it sanctioned
this tactic.2 MRE 803(5); Starr, supra.
The prosecutor’s and the trial court’s mishandling of the nephew’s prior statements led to
the introduction of several statements prejudicial to defendant, including that (1) on the day
before the murder defendant asked his nephew to drive him to the victim’s house; (2) when the
nephew declined to provide defendant transportation defendant drew his gun and threatened to
shoot his nephew; (3) defendant stated to his nephew that “he was tired of that girlfriend playing
with him;” and (4) “[a]fter [defendant] killed [the victim], he came back to the [nephew’s] house
to find out if the police is [sic] looking for him.” As indicated above, however, MCL 769.26
“places the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that ‘after an examination of the entire cause,
it shall affirmatively appear that the error asserted has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”
Lukity, supra at 495. After carefully scrutinizing the effect of the instant error in the context of
the untainted evidence presented at trial, including the properly admitted evidence of (a) the
victim’s and defendant’s failed romantic relationship; (b) defendant’s repeated threats during the
weeks and months before the murder to kill the victim, and the protection order obtained by the
victim; (c) the victim’s mother’s identification of defendant running away from her home
immediately following the shooting; (d) defendant’s sister’s sighting of a gun in defendant’s
waistband on the day before the murder; (e) defendant’s apparent flight from his sister’s home on
notification that the police were searching for him; (f) the facts that defendant had visited the
home where the shooting occurred many times before the murder, and that the crime scene did
not reflect a break in; and (g) the facts that the victim’s mother testified that the man fleeing the
scene of the shooting wore “light” clothes, and that a police officer testified that he discovered
defendant in his boxer shorts next to a pile of clothes that included a pair of tan pants, we are not
convinced that “it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without
the error.” Lukity, supra.
Defendant further claims that the circuit court’s method of selecting jurors violated MCR
2.511(F), which requires that each dismissed potential juror be replaced before a party is required
to exercise peremptory challenges, and denied him due process. Defendant failed to preserve this
issue for review because his counsel exercised just one peremptory challenge, failed to object to
the jury selection method, and expressly indicated his satisfaction with the jury. People v
Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich 495, 514-515, n 19; 566 NW2d 530 (1997).3
2
While the prosecutor might properly have inquired of the nephew regarding his prior
inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes, the prosecutor plainly violated the rules of
evidence by demanding that the nephew read his prior statements into the record. We further
note the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that they could consider evidence of the nephew’s
prior statements for impeachment purposes only. Jenkins, supra at 260-264.
3
We note that People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459; 552 NW2d 493 (1996), on
which defendant relies, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Hubbard, this Court
concluded that the defendant’s failure to exercise all his peremptory challenges did not forfeit his
fair cross section challenge to the jury venire because the “[d]efendant could not have cured any
defect in the juror allocation process through the use of additional peremptory challenges.” Id. at
468. In this case, the trial court only once failed to seat a new juror immediately before
(continued…)
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Defendant lastly contends that his life sentence without parole qualifies as a determinate
sentence violative of Const 1963, art 4, § 45, and that the sentence constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment. Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Both arguments entirely lack merit. The Legislature has
the authority to establish determinate sentences, including life sentences without parole. People
v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 426-428; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). Furthermore, in light of the
gravity of the offense, a sentence of life with no possibility of parole for a first-degree murder
conviction does not constitute a cruel or unusual punishment. People v Launsburry, 217 Mich
App 358, 363-364; 551 NW2d 460 (1996).
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
(…continued)
requesting that defendant exercise peremptory challenges. Defendant, who utilized only one
peremptory challenge, could have cured this procedural defect by exercising further peremptory
challenges.
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