PEOPLE OF MI V DANIEL BARTON HARRIS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 21, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224552
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 98-003025-FC
DANIEL BARTON HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Wilder and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted his sentences imposed on his plea-based
convictions of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2). Defendant was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to
consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for the murder conviction and 20 to 30 years’
imprisonment for the home invasion conviction. We vacate defendant’s sentences and remand
for resentencing.
I. Facts and Proceedings
On January 12, 1999, defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and first-degree
home invasion in return for the dismissal of other charges pending against him. In establishing a
factual basis for the plea, defendant stated that he entered the home of his mother’s neighbor to
steal money to purchase drugs. Defendant further stated that he had used drugs on the day of the
incident, and that he did not clearly recall the events. He also acknowledged that he struggled
with the victim, and stated that he believed the victim was stabbed during the struggle. In
addition, defense counsel indicated that he intended to have defendant examined by a
neuropsychologist before sentencing, but that he had not yet been able to schedule the
examination. The court agreed to finance the examination, and scheduled sentencing for
February 9, 1999. In this regard, because family members of the victim were coming from out of
state in order to be present at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stressed the importance of
knowing whether that was a firm date.
On January 29, 1999 defense counsel filed a motion requesting an adjournment of
sentencing. The motion stated that the psychologist would be able to examine defendant between
the dates of February 16 and 28, 1999. The motion also indicated that defendant had not given
-1-
an accurate history of his mental health background to the Forensic Center, that little information
was known about his psychological status, and that it was possible defendant suffered from
physical and psychological abnormalities that influenced his behavior.
The trial court scheduled a hearing on defense counsel’s motion for February 8, 1999.
However, defense counsel, who was retained, did not appear to argue it that day; instead, on
February 4, 1999, he informed the prosecutor, but not the court, that he would rely on his written
motion. He also informed the prosecutor that if his motion was denied, he would ask a different
attorney to stand in for him at sentencing. According to the prosecutor, defense counsel
informed her that he would not be present for either hearing because he had received an
unexpected deal on a trip to Jamaica and was leaving on February 6, 1999. Following the
hearing, the court denied the motion and refused to adjourn sentencing, scheduled to proceed the
next day.1
At sentencing, held on February 10, 1999,2 defense counsel was not present. The court
therefore informed the parties that it had reappointed defendant’s former counsel, who was
appointed counsel for defendant at his preliminary examination, to represent defendant during his
sentencing hearing. The court noted that he had specifically reappointed defendant’s former
counsel to represent him at sentencing, because, having represented him at the preliminary
examination, she was familiar with both defendant and the necessary particulars of the case.
Nonetheless, defendant objected to being represented by appointed counsel, stating that she was
not his lawyer and that that he had previously fired her because he believed her to be “no good.”
In denying defendant’s request to adjourn the hearing, the trial court stated:
What prompts me to go forward here today is the fact that I did not have
any advance notice, and more importantly, the victim’s family did not have any
advance notice, and under the circumstances, balancing all the interests and
considering the fact that [appointed counsel] had [sic] represented [defendant] in
the past, I concluded that this sentencing should go forward.
The court then recessed in order to allow appointed counsel the opportunity to review the
presentence investigation report with defendant.
After recess, the court allowed family members of the victim and a police officer
involved in the case to comment. The court then allowed appointed counsel to comment on
behalf of defendant, at which time she stated that given defendant’s history of head injuries and
institutionalized mental heath treatment, a neuropsychological examination would have provided
the court with a more complete and accurate understanding of defendant’s mental status. The
court then sentenced defendant as a second habitual offender to consecutive terms of life and 20
to 30 years’ imprisonment. In sentencing defendant, the court commented on defendant’s lack of
1
Defendant has not provided us with a transcript of the motion hearing; therefore, we are unable
to recite the reasons given for the denial.
2
The record is not clear as to why the sentencing hearing was rescheduled from February 9, 1999
to February 10, 1999.
-2-
remorse and found that the crime was cold, calculating, insensitive and callous and that he agreed
with the presentence investigation report that defendant’s actions were reprehensible and selfindulgent.
II. Analysis
Defendant first argues that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court
failed to adjourn the sentencing hearing so that he could be represented by retained counsel. We
agree.
A trial court’s decision whether to grant an adjournment is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App 356, 368; 592 NW2d 737; People v Peña,
224 Mich App 650, 660; 569 NW2d 871 (1997), mod on other grounds 457 Mich 885; 586
NW2d 925 (1998); see also People v Sinistaj, 184 Mich App 191, 201; 457 NW2d 36 (1990).
An abuse of discretion occurs when the result was so violative of fact and logic that it evidences
a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or an exercise of passion or bias. Echavarria, supra;
People v Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App 411, 415; 564 NW2d 149 (1997). In making a
determination as to whether a trial court abused its discretion with regard to a motion to adjourn,
we consider whether the defendant (1) is asserting a constitutional right, (2) has a legitimate
reason for asserting the right, such as a bona fide dispute with his attorney (3) was negligent in
asserting his right, (4) is merely attempting to delay the proceedings, and (5) has demonstrated
prejudice resulting from the trial court’s decision. Echavarria, supra at 369; Peña, supra at 661;
see also Sinistaj, supra.
Defendant unequivocally stated that he had hired his own counsel and that he did not
want to be represented by an attorney he had previously fired. A defendant who can afford
retained counsel has a constitutional right to defend an action through the attorney of his choice.
People v Portillo, 241 Mich App 540, 542, 543; 616 NW2d 707 (2000). See also Echavarria,
supra, and People v Arquette, 202 Mich App 227, 231; 507 NW2d 824 (1993), citing Const
1963, art 1, § 13 and MCL 600.1430. Thus, defendant has met the burdens of factors one and
two. Defendant has also shown that he was not negligent in making his request for an
adjournment. In addition, because defendant’s counsel ignored at least an implied court directive
to appear for sentencing, and since defendant had not sought prior adjournments, it does not
appear as if defendant was merely attempting to delay the proceedings. See id. Finally, since
defendant’s claim “relates to an arbitrary and improper infringement of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel . . . . a showing of prejudice is not required.” People v Durfee, 215 Mich App
677, 682-683; 547 NW2d 344 (1996); People v Johnson, 215 Mich App 658, 667-668; 547
NW2d 65 (1996).
Whether appointed counsel adequately represented defendant at the sentencing hearing is
irrelevant. As stated in Durfee, supra at 682-683:
[A] trial court’s arbitrary removal of a defendant’s . . . trial counsel during
a critical stage in the proceedings,[3] over the objection of defendant, violates the
3
Our Supreme Court has previously held that sentencing is a critical stage in the proceedings, at
(continued…)
-3-
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under such circumstances, a
harmless-error analysis does not apply. . .
Finally, as we noted in Johnson, [supra at 669-670,] the fact that substitute
counsel may have performed adequately at sentencing is of no consequence. The
trial court improperly removed . . . counsel over the objection of . . . defendant
before sentencing. . . . Thus, reversal is required where the trial court improperly
interfered with defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel (Internal citations
omitted).
III. Conclusion
In summary, based on Echavarria, Durfee, and Johnson, and the cases cited therein, we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it chose to proceed with sentencing
without providing defendant a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel of his own choosing. Cf.
People v Williams, 386 Mich 565, 573-574; 194 NW2d 337 (1972). Accordingly, we reverse
defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing.4
Reversed and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
(…continued)
which the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel. See People v
Miles, 454 Mich 90, 98; 559 NW2d 299 (1997), citing People v Pubrat, 451 Mich 589, 594; 548
NW2d 595 (1996).
4
Because we conclude that remand is necessary based on the trial court’s decision to go forward
with the sentencing in the absence of defendant’s retained counsel, we need not determine
whether the trial court also abused its discretion when it failed to adjourn the sentencing hearing
in order to allow defendant to obtain a neuropsychological examination; nonetheless, since we
are remanding this case for resentencing, we presume that defendant’s counsel will be able to
schedule such an examination prior to sentencing.
In addition, because defendant’s retained counsel apparently left for vacation without the
permission of the trial court (even though there was at least two pending matters before the court)
and without ensuring that his client was adequately represented by counsel agreed upon by the
client, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.2, and 3.5 of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct may be
implicated. We note that, on remand, any attorney having knowledge of the facts who believes
that defendant’s former retained counsel significantly violated the MRPC, has the responsibility
to report such conduct to the Attorney Grievance Commission, MRPC 8.3, assuming such report
has not already occurred.
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
