FRANK VETTESE V JACOBSON STORES INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FRANK VETTESE and CHARMAINE
VETTESE,
UNPUBLISHED
August 21, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 222508
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-009943-CZ
JACOBSON STORES, INC. and DAVID
LINCOLN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Frank Vettese1 appeals as of right from the trial court’s order dismissing his age
discrimination and retaliation claims under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his age discrimination claim
under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We review de novo a trial court’s summary disposition ruling. A
(C)(10) motion tests the factual support of a claim. The court reviewing a (C)(10) motion
considers in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party the pleadings, affidavits and other
relevant evidence filed in the action to determine whether the documentary evidence shows a
genuine issue of any material fact to warrant trial, or whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28
(1999).
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an
adverse employment action, including demotion, (3) he was qualified for the position, and (4) he
was demoted under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Lytle
v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 172-173, 177; 579 NW2d 906 (1998); Town v
Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 695; 568 NW2d 64 (1997).
1
Plaintiff's wife, Charmaine Vettese, has filed a derivative claim for loss of consortium. As used
in this opinion, the term “plaintiff” refers solely to Frank Vettese.
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Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination
arises and the burden shifts to the defendant to dispel this presumption by articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s adverse employment action. Lytle, supra
at 173. When the defendant produces such evidence, the burden of proof returns to the plaintiff
who must show “that there was a triable issue that the employer’s proffered reasons were not true
reasons, but were a mere pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 174. “[I]n the context of summary
disposition, a plaintiff must prove discrimination with admissible evidence, either direct or
circumstantial, sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a
motivating factor for the adverse action taken by the employer toward the plaintiff.” Id. at 176.
We conclude that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. In
particular, plaintiff failed to prove that he was qualified for the assistant store manager position.
“An employee is qualified if he was performing his job at a level that met the employer’s
legitimate expectations.” Town, supra at 699. Even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, we find that plaintiff did not establish the existence of a material factual
dispute regarding his qualification for the position from which defendants demoted him.
Plaintiff undisputedly had problems getting along with another assistant store manager
(ASM). Several meetings occurred attempting to resolve the conflict. The store’s general
manager testified that plaintiff’s and the other ASM’s failures to work together harmoniously and
plaintiff’s otherwise uneven behavior created concern among management and associate level
employees. Defendants also submitted evidence that two sales associates had complained of
plaintiff’s abrasive management style, which reflected plaintiff’s difficulty establishing
professional relationships. These episodes necessitated intervention and counseling by the
store’s human resources director. Defendants further submitted evidence that plaintiff lacked
suitable communication skills for the ASM position.
To demonstrate his qualification, plaintiff relies on his receipt of an April 1998 positive
performance appraisal and $3,000 pay increase. As the trial court noted, however, the evaluation
is a one-page self appraisal. Even the self appraisal lists plaintiff’s weaknesses, including an
inability to communicate effectively with senior executives and a need to foster better coworker
relationships. Furthermore, the April 1998 appraisal predated plaintiff’s May and June 1998
conflicts with his coworkers. Beyond the April 1998 self appraisal and the accompanying pay
increase, no other relevant evidence supports plaintiff’s claim of a good performance evaluation
or tends to establish that he performed his job well enough to rule out the possibility that
defendants demoted him because of his inadequate job performance. Id.
Plaintiff also failed to present sufficient evidence that defendants demoted him under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Contrary to plaintiff’s
suggestion, the mere fact that defendants replaced him with a younger person is insufficient to
establish a prima facie case. See Eliel v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 150 Mich App 137, 141; 387
NW2d 842 (1985). Moreover, we note that at the time of plaintiff’s demotion defendant also
discharged three other employees younger than plaintiff. Consequently, we conclude that
plaintiff has failed to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Even if we assumed that plaintiff established a prima facie case, we would find that
defendants articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for demoting him. As indicated
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above, plaintiff undisputedly had a dysfunctional relationship with another management team
member, who was discharged, and problems with two sales associates. Other evidence indicated
that plaintiff lacked the ASM position’s requisite communication skills. Defendants also
submitted evidence that the Birmingham store had financial troubles that spurred management to
take steps, including revamping the management team, to improve the store’s financial future.
Plaintiff has proffered no evidence tending to suggest that defendants’ legitimate reasons
were merely pretexts for discrimination. While plaintiff relies on the affidavits of two of his
former coworkers, who essentially indicate that plaintiff was a good employee and that
defendants’ reasons for demoting him were suspect, this evidence raises no triable issue that
plaintiff’s age constituted a motivating factor underlying defendants’ decision to demote him.
Lytle, supra at 174, 176. Simply casting suspicion on defendants’ proffered legitimate reasons
does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that age was a motivating factor underlying the
decision to demote plaintiff, Irvin v Airco Carbide, 837 F2d 724, 726 (CA 6, 1987), nor do the
beliefs of one or two employees that plaintiff was a good worker raise a triable issue of age
discrimination. Grano v Dep’t of Development of City of Columbus, 699 F2d 836, 837 (CA 6,
1983) (“The ultimate issue . . . is whether the [employer’s] subjective criteria were used to
disguise discriminatory action”). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted
defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s age discrimination claim.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants summary disposition
of his retaliation claim. The Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL
418.301(11) provides in relevant part as follows:
A person shall not discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate
against an employee because the employee filed a complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted a proceeding under this act or because of the exercise by
the employee on behalf of himself or herself or others of a right afforded by this
act. [Emphasis added.]
To establish a retaliatory discharge claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he was engaged in a
protected activity, (2) the defendant knew of the protected activity, (3) the defendant acted
adversely to plaintiff, and (4) the protected activity caused the adverse employment activity.
DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997). The plaintiff
must prove that he was demoted because he exercised his rights under the WDCA and that this
activity was a significant factor in his employer’s adverse employment decision. Taylor v
General Motors Corp, 826 F2d 452, 456 (CA 6, 1987); Polk v Yellow Freight System, Inc, 801
F2d 190, 198 (CA 6, 1986).
Plaintiff suffered a back injury while working in June 1998. Defendants demoted
plaintiff in August 1998, but plaintiff did not file a worker’s compensation claim until October
29, 1998. Because plaintiff did not file a worker’s compensation claim before his demotion, he
cannot establish a claim for retaliatory discharge. Contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, the
Employer’s Basic Report of Injury (a Form 100 accident report) filed by his employer is not
equivalent to a claim for benefits. Moreover, a retaliatory discharge claim premised on an
employer’s anticipation of a future claim does not state a cause of action. Griffey v Prestige
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Stamping, Inc, 189 Mich App 665, 668; 473 NW2d 790 (1991). We therefore conclude that the
trial court correctly granted defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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