PEOPLE OF MI V KENNETH EDWARD QUINTON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 7, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 230630
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-007321-AR
KENNETH EDWARD QUINTON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Murphy and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). At defendant’s preliminary examination, the district court
dismissed the charge. The prosecution appealed the district court’s ruling to the circuit court,
which affirmed the dismissal of the charge. This Court denied the prosecution’s application for
leave to appeal the circuit court’s order. People v Quinton, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered August 1, 2000 (Docket No. 228194). The prosecution then filed an application
for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which, in lieu of granting leave to appeal,
remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. People v Quinton, 463
Mich 899; 618 NW2d 913 (2000). We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the charge
against defendant.
At defendant’s preliminary examination, Michigan State Police Detective Thomas
Cremonte testified to the following. On November 2, 1997, a woman identified as Cavill called
the Michigan State Police from her cell phone while driving south on M-23 near I-96. She
informed the police that she was defendant’s live-in girlfriend, and that she and defendant had a
domestic dispute earlier that day. Defendant had threatened Cavill. At the time of the call,
Cavill was afraid. She informed the police that defendant was following her in a green, 1983
Ford pickup truck. Cavill also told the police that she had observed defendant place several
packets of cocaine inside a green folder, which he was carrying with him inside his truck.
Detective Cremonte was directed to attempt to locate defendant’s vehicle. Cremonte
traveled to the general area from which Cavill was calling. He spotted a vehicle matching the
description given by Cavill. The green, 1983 Ford pickup truck that Cremonte observed was
traveling behind a car driven by a woman. Cremonte stopped the truck. Cavill was directed to
continue driving to the police station and to make a written statement. The driver of the truck
-1-
identified himself as defendant, and Cremonte ordered him to exit the truck and stand at the rear
of the vehicle.
At that point in the testimony, the district court refused to allow the prosecutor to
question Detective Cremonte regarding the search of defendant or his truck. The court
determined that Cavill’s reliability was not established by her phone call or an independent
investigation by the police and, therefore, evidence found in defendant’s possession was
excluded. Defendant moved for dismissal of the charge, which the district court granted. The
circuit court affirmed the district court’s ruling.
On this appeal, the prosecution argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the charge
against defendant because the stop of defendant’s vehicle did not violate defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for an
abuse of discretion. People v Adams, 232 Mich App 128, 132; 591 NW2d 44 (1999).
The prosecution claims that the stop of defendant was justified because there was
reasonable cause to suggest that defendant had violated the domestic violence statute. We
agree.1 At the time of defendant’s arrest, MCL 764.15a provided:
A peace officer may arrest an individual for violating section 81 or 81a of the
Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.81 and 750.81a, or a local
ordinance substantially corresponding to section 81 of that act regardless of
whether the peace officer has a warrant or whether the violation was committed in
his or her presence if the peace officer has or receives positive information that
another peace officer has reasonable cause to believe both of the following:
(a) The violation occurred or is occurring.
(b) The individual has had a child in common with the victim, resides or
has resided in the same household as the victim, or is a spouse or former spouse of
the victim.
MCL 750.81a provided:
(1) A person who assaults an individual without a weapon and inflicts serious or
aggravated injury upon that individual without intending to commit murder or to
inflict great bodily harm less than murder is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable
1
The circuit court refused to consider the prosecution’s argument regarding defendant’s violation
of the domestic violence statute as justification for the stop, ruling that argument was not
preserved because it was not raised before the district court. We consider the argument regarding
the domestic violence statute that the prosecution addresses on appeal because the issue is
necessary to a proper determination of this case and involves a question of law concerning which
the necessary facts have been presented. See People v Lumsden, 168 Mich App 286, 292-293;
423 NW2d 645 (1988) and Providence Hospital v National Labor Union Health & Welfare
Fund, 162 Mich App 191, 194-195; 412 NW2d 690 (1987).
-2-
by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or
both.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), an individual who assaults his or her
spouse or former spouse, an individual with whom he or she has had a child in
common, or a resident or former resident of his or her household, without a
weapon and inflicts serious or aggravated injury upon that individual without
intending to commit murder or to inflict great bodily harm less than murder is
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or
fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both.
(3) An individual who assaults his or her spouse or former spouse, an individual
with whom he or she has had a child in common, or a resident or former resident
of his or her household, in violation of subsection (2), and who has 1 or more
previous convictions for assaulting or assaulting and battering his or her spouse or
former spouse, an individual with whom he or she has had a child in common, or
a resident or former resident of his or her household, in violation of this section or
section 81, 82, 83, 84, or 86 or a local ordinance substantially corresponding to
section 81, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2
years or a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or both.
Here, Cavill informed the police that she was defendant’s live-in girlfriend. She further stated
that she and defendant had been involved in a domestic dispute earlier in the day. Defendant had
threatened Cavill. Cavill told the police that she was afraid of defendant. Under these
circumstances, the police had reasonable cause that a violation of MCL 750.81a had occurred and
that Cavill and defendant resided in the same household. Thus, Detective Cremonte was justified
in stopping and arresting defendant. MCL 764.15a.
It is well settled that a police officer’s search of a defendant incident to an arrest requires
no additional justification. People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115; 549 NW2d 849 (1996), citing
United States v Robinson, 414 US 218; 94 S Ct 467; 38 L Ed 2d 427 (1973) and People v
Chapman, 425 Mich 245; 387 NW2d 835 (1986). In addition, when the arrest is of a person in a
vehicle, the police may search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle as well as any
closed containers found in the search of that area. People v Catanzarite, 211 Mich App 573,
581; 536 NW2d 570 (1995), citing New York v Belton, 453 US 454, 458-460; 101 S Ct 2860; 69
L Ed 2d 768 (1981). Therefore, Detective Cremonte’s search of defendant or defendant’s vehicle
incident to his arrest did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11.
The fact that Detective Cremonte specified that he stopped and searched defendant
because the police had information that he possessed drugs does not change our conclusion. As
stated by our Supreme Court in People v Oliver, __ Mich __; __ NW2d __ (Docket Nos. 112341;
115064, issued 6/12/01):
"[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated
by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
-3-
justify that action." [Id. at slip op p 18, quoting People v Arterberry, 431 Mich
381, 384; 429 NW2d 574 (1988), quoting Scott v United States, 436 US 128, 138,
98 S Ct 1717, 1723, 56 L Ed 2d 168 (1978).]
Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence found incident to
the search of defendant or his vehicle and in dismissing the charge against defendant.
Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the charge against defendant. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
