JOANN ELIZABETH WALSH V MICHAEL JOHN WALSH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOANN ELIZABETH WALSH,
UNPUBLISHED
July 31, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 222434
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-000905
MICHAEL JOHN WALSH,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Murphy and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s opinion and order denying her
post-divorce judgment request for: (1) declaratory relief with regard to the constitutionality of a
portion of the Eligible Domestic Relations Order Act (the EDRO Act), MCL 38.1701 et seq.; and
(2) injunctive relief with regard to the refusal of the Macomb County Employees’ Retirement
System (MCERS) to treat the domestic relations order (DRO), entered in conjunction with her
divorce judgment, as an eligible domestic relations order (EDRO) under the EDRO Act. We
hold that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the challenged portion of the EDRO Act is
unconstitutional, and we affirm the opinion and order of the trial court.
Plaintiff and defendant had been married for almost forty-four years when they were
divorced, pursuant to a consent judgment, in 1998. At that time, their eight children were no
longer minors and the only marital asset was a vested pension from which defendant had been
receiving monthly payments since he retired at the end of 1992. In conjunction with the consent
judgment of divorce, plaintiff and defendant agreed to the entry of a DRO purporting to assign to
plaintiff the right to receive, directly from the MCERS, one half of defendant’s $573.37 monthly
retirement benefit, along with another $200 from defendant’s remaining share as alimony. When
the MCERS received a copy of the DRO, it made the determination, as required by MCL
38.1710, that the DRO did not qualify as an EDRO, and notified plaintiff, as the named alternate
payee, of its conclusion. Subsequently, plaintiff sought to have both defendant and the MCERS
held in contempt of court, and moved the trial court to, among other things, declare a portion of
the EDRO Act unconstitutional, as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan
Constitution. Const 1963, art 1, § 2. Specifically, plaintiff asked the court to strike down
§ 2(e)(viii) of the EDRO Act, which limits the definition of an EDRO to DROs that are “filed
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before the participant’s retirement allowance effective date.” MCL 38.1702(e)(viii). Plaintiff
argued that: (1) the EDRO Act unconstitutionally discriminated between those ex-spouses of
plan participants who retired before divorce, and those ex-spouses of plan participants who
retired after divorce; and (2) § 2(e)(viii) had the net effect of unconstitutionally discriminating
between ex-spouses of county employees who divorced after retirement, and ex-spouses of
participants in other public retirement systems created or authorized by state law who divorced
after retirement. The Macomb County Retirement Commission (MCRC), as administrator of the
MCERS, appeared to oppose plaintiff’s requests. The Office of the Attorney General was
notified, pursuant to MCR 2.209(D), that the constitutionality of a statute was being challenged
in a case to which the state was not a party. However, the Attorney General apparently declined
to intervene.
The MCRC argued to the trial court, among other things, that an EDRO was less
necessary when a divorce post-dates the commencement of benefit payments because all
elections by the plan participant have been made, and a current flow of payments was more
analogous to income than to property. The trial court determined that, in response to an equal
protection challenge, the classifications identified by plaintiff were subject to a rational-basis
review. Thereafter, the court reasoned that the limitation at issue evinced a desire by the
Legislature “not to complicate matters or drive up costs by having to recalculate as participants’
lives change.” Consequently, the court concluded that plaintiff had failed to carry her heavy
burden of establishing that there was no rational basis for § 2(e)(viii) of the EDRO Act.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it applied a rational-basis
review, rather than the “means scrutiny test”; (2) application of the proper test, i.e., the means
scrutiny test, requires a determination that § 2(e)(viii) of the EDRO Act violates the equal
protection guaranty of the Michigan Constitution; and (3) even if a rational-basis review were
applicable, the trial court nonetheless erred when it found a rational basis for § 2(e)(viii). We
review constitutional issues de novo. McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 24; 597 NW2d 148
(1999).
“The Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Michigan
Constitution provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law. US Const,
Am XIV; Const 1963 art 1, § 2. . . . Michigan’s equal protection provision [is] coextensive with
the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution.” Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 258;
615 NW2d 218 (2000). Despite the well-accepted proposition that the Michigan Constitution
offers no broader remedy than its federal counterpart when it comes to equal protection analysis,
see also Doe v Dep’t of Social Services, 439 Mich 650, 670-671; 487 NW2d 166 (1992), plaintiff
brings her equal protection challenge under only the Michigan Constitution in order to avail
herself of language from Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 668-671; 232
NW2d 636 (1975), articulating the means scrutiny test and describing the circumstances when it
might be applicable. Nonetheless, the current rule in Michigan is that, “[w]hen a party raises a
viable equal protection challenge, the court is required to apply one of three traditional levels of
review, depending on the nature of the alleged classification.” Crego, supra at 259. The highest
level of review, known as “strict scrutiny,” is applied to inherently suspect classes such as race or
national origin. “Absent the implication of one of these highly suspect categories, an equal
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protection challenge requires either rational-basis review or an intermediate, ‘heightened
scrutiny’ review.” Id.
“Means scrutiny” (a/k/a the “fair-and-substantial-relation-to-the-object-of-the-legislation
test”) is simply a label that was given by one legal commentator to what, at the time, was the
emerging concept that later developed into what became known as intermediate scrutiny or
heightened scrutiny (a/k/a the “substantial relation test”). See Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226
Mich App 701, 718; 575 NW2d 68 (1997). See also, Manistee Bank & Trust Co, supra at 668669. “The fair-and-substantial-relation-to-the-object-of-the-legislation test” refers to the review
utilized by the United States Supreme Court in 1971 when it examined an Idaho statute
mandating a preference for men over women in the selection of an administrator for an intestate
estate. The Court said that, “[a] classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’” Reed v Reed, 404
US 71, 76; 92 S Ct 251; 30 L Ed 2d 225 (1971), quoting Royster Guano Co v Virginia, 253 US
412, 415; 40 S Ct 560; 64 L Ed 2d 989 (1920). After the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in
Manistee Bank & Trust Co, the United States Supreme Court decided Craig v Boren, 429 US
190; 97 S Ct 451; 50 L Ed 2d 397 (1976), wherein it held that the lesson from Reed and its
progeny was that, “[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.” Id. at 197. This, of course, is the formulation for intermediate scrutiny that is
applied today under both the federal and Michigan Equal Protection Clauses, and is typically
applicable to sex-based classifications and classifications based on illegitimacy. See Clark v
Jeter, 486 US 456, 461; 108 S Ct 1910; 100 L Ed 2d 465 (1988); Crego, supra at 260-261.
Plaintiff would have this Court apply intermediate scrutiny to the classifications created
by § 2(e)(viii) of the EDRO Act on the theory that it fits within the rule from Manistee Bank &
Trust Co that, “where the challenged statute carves out a discrete exception to a general rule and
the statutory exception is no longer experimental, the substantial-relation-to-the-object test
should be applied.” Id. at 671. However, despite the fact that this statement has never been
expressly overruled, since the Michigan Supreme Court determined that Michigan’s Equal
Protection Clause offers no more protection than its federal counterpart, the Court has
consistently held that, “[u]nless the discrimination impinges on the exercise of a fundamental
right or involves a suspect class, the inquiry . . . is whether the classification is rationally related
to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Frame v Nehls, 452 Mich 171, 183; 550 NW2d 739
(1996). See also, e.g., Yaldo v North Pointe Ins Co, 457 Mich 341, 349; 578 NW2d 274 (1998)
(“Defendant is not a member of a protected class, nor are fundamental rights involved. Therefore,
defendant’s equal protection claim is reviewed using a rational basis test.”); Vargo v Sauer, 457
Mich 49, 60; 576 NW2d 656 (1998) (“Because there is no fundamental right or suspect
classification involved, the rational-basis standard of review governs in the present case”).
More recently, in Crego, supra, the Court considered a statute that clearly carved out a
discrete exception to a general rule. Specifically, it was a statute that, for over forty years,
permitted illegitimate children whose paternity had not been legally ascertained to be treated
differently from all legitimate children as well as from those illegitimate children whose paternity
had been determined. The Court held that intermediate scrutiny would apply if the classification
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was considered to be based on illegitimacy (which the Court viewed as a reasonable
characterization) but that a rational-basis review would apply if the classification was considered
to be one that distinguished between children whose paternity had not been ascertained and
children whose paternity had been ascertained (which the Court also viewed as a reasonable
characterization). Crego, supra at 262-264. Importantly, the Court expressly rejected the notion
that a classification based on whether paternity had been established was entitled to more than a
rational-basis review, noting that such a classification “neither implicates a fundamental right or
an inherently suspect class, nor has it been recognized by this Court or the United States Supreme
Court as deserving of any heightened standard of review.” Id. at 265 n 7.
More recent Michigan Supreme Court cases take precedence over prior Michigan
Supreme Court cases, and it is the current principles of law that this Court is obligated to follow.
See Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 309, n 3; 614 NW2d 910 (2000). Consequently,
this Court is not permitted to disregard more recent binding Michigan Supreme Court precedent
in order to reach back to a rule from an older Michigan Supreme Court case and employ
something more than rational-basis review to a classification that does not impinge on a
fundamental right or involve either an inherently suspect class or a class that has been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court or the Michigan Supreme Court as deserving of intermediate
scrutiny. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by employing rational-basis review.
Having determined that rational-basis review is the proper level of scrutiny to employ, we
now turn to the substance of plaintiff’s equal protection challenge.
Under rational-basis review, courts will uphold legislation as long as that
legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Dandridge v
Williams, 397 US 471, 485; 90 S Ct 1153; 25 L Ed 2d 491 (1970). To prevail
under this highly deferential standard of review, a challenger must show that the
legislation is “arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of
the statute.” Smith v Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231, 271; 301 NW2d
285 (1981). A classification reviewed on this basis passes constitutional muster if
the legislative judgment is supported by any set of facts, either known or which
could reasonably be assumed, even if such facts may be debatable. Shavers v
Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 613-614; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). Rational-basis
review does not test the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation, or
whether the classification is made with “mathematical nicety,” or even whether it
results in some inequity when put into practice. O’Donnell v State Farm Mut
Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 542; 273 NW2d 829 (1979). Rather, the
statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging it bears a heavy
burden of rebutting that presumption. Shavers, supra. [Crego, supra at 259-260.]
Importantly, when the Legislature chooses to address a problem, it is permitted, in cases subject
to a rational-basis review, to do so one step at a time. O’Brien v Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich 1,
18-19; 299 NW2d 336 (1980), citing Williamson v Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc, 348 US 483;
75 S Ct 461; 99 L Ed 563 (1955).
Because a rational-basis review encompasses the consideration of any set of facts that
could reasonably be presumed, plaintiff has the enormous task of proving the lack of any possible
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or presumable rational justifications. In this case, two potential justifications have been posited:
(1) the MCRC argued that EDROs are not as necessary after all pension elections have been
finalized and the benefits have taken the form of a current stream of payments; and (2) the trial
court deduced that the Legislature was concerned with the burden on county pension systems of
recalculating benefits, and that this burden would not be as keenly felt by larger retirement
systems. These proposed justifications each appear to primarily address one of the two allegedly
unfair classifications identified by plaintiff.
Initially, plaintiff complains that there is no rational reason for the EDRO Act to treat her
differently than it would if the DRO had issued before defendant retired and began drawing
benefits. Although we do not adopt the MCRC’s distinction between property and income, we
can readily accept the argument that permitting the assignment of pension benefits is more
necessary when divorce occurs before retirement than when it occurs afterward. For instance, a
pre-retirement EDRO keeps the participant from being able to make elections that might
otherwise adversely affect the non-participant spouse’s interest. In addition, it serves to
compartmentalize those retirement benefits that have already accrued and are subject to
distribution from those yet to be accrued and which are not a marital asset. However, these
considerations do not come into play when the divorce post-dates the commencement of
payments. While there may remain reasons why an ex-spouse in a post-retirement divorce may
also desire to receive an assignment of an otherwise unassignable benefit (such as in the instant
case, i.e., assurance of payment1), the Legislature is permitted to address the problems presented
by nonassigability of public pension benefits one step at a time.
However, plaintiff points out a second, and potentially more problematic, set of
classifications. Plaintiff notes that a wide variety of legislation governing other public retirement
systems in Michigan permits pension benefits to be alienated pursuant either to an EDRO or to
certain judgments of the court. Typical of these statutes is a provision of the State Employees’
Retirement Act that declares pension benefits accrued under that retirement system to be subject
to: (1) any order pursuant to MCL 552.18; (2) “any other order of a court pertaining to alimony
or child support”; or (3) an eligible domestic relations order under the EDRO Act. MCL
38.40(2). By comparison, the statutory provision governing county retirement plans simply
provides that payment of retirement benefits from such a system are subject to EDROs under the
EDRO Act. MCL 46.12a(31).
Assuming for present purposes that the challenged classifications flow from the EDRO
Act, rather than from the statutes that govern the various public retirement systems, the trial
1
Plaintiff argued to the trial court, as she does on appeal, that her interest in the pension benefits
is rendered worthless by her inability to get paid directly from the MCERS. There are several
flaws in her reasoning, however. First, she is not without recourse directly against defendant. It
is not as if defendant can disappear with the money, since the MCRS will have to know where he
is in order to forward the payments. Plaintiff can invoke the court’s powers of contempt and can
attach the pension benefits once they are in defendant’s possession. Second, and more
importantly, the mere fact that plaintiff can envision a statutory scheme that would make her
ability to get what is coming to her easier does not, by itself, provide a basis for this Court to
declare a statute, or any part of a statute, unconstitutional.
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court’s reasoning regarding the perceived burden of cost recalculations on county retirement
systems provides a rational basis for the differing treatment. Although plaintiff argues that she
presented evidence that the increased cost of administration would be negligible, she misses the
point of a rational-basis review. It is worth repeating that a “[r]ational-basis review does not test
the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation, or whether the classification is made with
“mathematical nicety,” or even whether it results in some inequity when put into practice.
Crego, supra, 463 Mich 260 (citation omitted). Hence, the challenged statutory scheme passes a
rational-basis review.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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